

Conference Proceedings of the 3rd Tanzanian Association of Sociologists National Conference

*Sociology of Development: Development Challenges
& Prospects for Africa in the 21st Century*



**Saint Augustine University
Lovoie Conference Centre
23rd -24th November, 2017**



*The 3rd Tanzanian Association of Sociologists National Conference Proceedings-
December, 2017*

Sociology of Development: Development Challenges & Prospects for Africa in the 21st Century

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of Sociologists National Conference**

Full Papers and Abstracts

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Preface

Taasisi ya Sayansi Jamii (TASAJA)/Tanzanian Association of Sociologists organized the Third Tanzanian National Sociological Conference which was given a theme of **Sociology of Development: Development Challenges and Prospects for Africa in the 21st Century**. The theme aimed to underscore how sociology was vital in understanding the challenges the continent was grappling with on the one hand and the expected prospects on the other in the 21st century. The focus, however, was accorded to “Sociology of Development” being one of the branches of sociology because of the ability it offers in; Explaining the linkages between the social, cultural, political, legal, and institutional aspects of development and the manner in which such attributes are facilitative on the one hand and inhibitive on the other; Addressing social transformation processes from sociological and anthropological perspectives, paying special attention to differential responses to change and the shifting dynamics of power relations at different socio-spatial levels; Focusing on the life worlds, ideologies and organizational strategies of a variety of social actors; and in exploring social unrest, the way people cope with conflicts and disasters, migration, refugees, poverty, food security and access to social and natural resources which are crucial to rural and urban livelihoods. It is therefore imperative that the time has come for the government not to insulate and downplay the role and participation of sociologists in the developmental discourses but the opposite.

On another account, the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the independence of many African countries availed an opportunity for African researchers to review the continent's performance in 50 years of independence. Many gains in terms of social, economic, political development have been registered. Enormous progress has been noted in education, health, infrastructure, and governance systems. The fall of authoritarian regimes, the end of apartheid, the change of ruling parties, and the recent profound changes in the Maghreb countries and elsewhere in North Africa amongst many have made the promise of democratisation and development of Africa much more real. Yet still, even with the recent socioeconomic and political transformations, Africa is still beset by rapid urbanisation, gender inequality, food insecurity, violence, conflict, political fragmentation, governance issues, and most importantly, poverty, which has led to the exclusion and marginalization of the larger segment of African societies.

The implications of such vices have raised the awareness on the need for Africans to theoretically and pragmatically tackle the issue of Africa's future in the new century. This apprehension underscores the importance and significance of this conference. Fundamentally, the conference focused on understanding why and how Africa is still at this developmental quagmire after 50 years of independence, and what opportunities are there for the continent to reposition itself in the world, and reshape the world with regard to its own objectives.

Discussions on the African challenges and prospects are much more important today than they were 30 to 40 years ago because of the magnitude of the pain they inflict on countries

on the one hand and the potential for change they present in the era of science and technology. In the event, therefore, pertinent questions were asked and responded to, these include; How is Africa affected? Why does it get affected? How prepared is the continent to face these challenges as well as those that will arise in the future? Will this be Africa's century, as it is sometimes claimed? How can Africa take charge of its future and make this century the one of its renaissance? How could the sociologists take part in addressing the challenges and what types of improvements are required in order for them to better prepare Africa to face the challenges of the coming decades of this century? Below is a list of sub-themes around which the discussions were anchored:

- Managing Africa's Natural Resources in the Era of Globalization;
- Sociologists' Participation in Effecting Positive Change for Development
- The Contribution of Social Institutions in Shaping African Development
- Gains and Losses of Africa in the Liberalized World
- Thinking the Future, Reinventing our Future;
- Renegotiating Africa's Place in the World;
- Strengthening African Higher Education and Research Systems;
- Making Governance Work for all Africans;
- Transforming African Agriculture;
- Industrial Development in the era of Neoliberal Globalization;
- Transforming Gender Relations in Society for Development; and
- Moral, Ethics and Society;



.....
Bituro P. Kazeri
TASAJA Information Officer

Editorial - Paper Submission, Acceptance Criteria, and Selection Process

- a) Technical Pre-Screening was carried out by the conference selected committee to check that the manuscript was complete (i.e. title, affiliations, keywords, main text, and a reference list), English is sufficient for peer review process, figures are complete and clear enough to read and manuscript complies with instructions provided in the Guide for Authors. Submitted papers which did not meet the prescribed requirements were not selected for presentation in the conference.
- b) Two senior researchers received the selected paper from the selected committee and further pre-screened the submissions to check that they complied with the conference scope, matched with the article classifications, were of potential interest to readers, and had high relevance. The submissions were returned to the Author for revision if it needed to be shortened to match with the length expectations for the paper classification type. These two researchers further submitted the paper to the Editor in Chief.
- c) The appointed Editor in Chief checked the papers in greater detail and initiated the review process by selecting highly qualified reviewers who evaluated the manuscripts. These reviewers landed the initial final verdict on whether the paper was relevant and at least ready to be presented at the conference. Those which did not qualify were returned to Authors with the recommendation for more improvements.
- d) During the conference, participants received further comments, critics, and commendations from which the presenter was, thereafter, required to respond clarify. Conceded points comments which needed further review were further recorded by the secretariat to be served to presenters for action. It was after the Authors had addressed such comments the paper was accepted to be published the online Conference Proceedings. Authors were availed a maximum of 7 days to incorporate the comments.

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PART I

Abstracts

Reflections on Macro-factors Associated with the Description of Poverty in the Society: A Macro-analysis of the African Context

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Abstract

This study examined the empirical determinants of poverty in the context of Africa using macro-factors based on the data collected from 31 African countries. It tested the hypothesis; H_1 . The study findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between determinants of poverty and macro-structures of a society. The documentary review method was used to solicit data from relevant sources. The model applied is Poverty $(\phi, H, Z) = f(\alpha, \beta, \chi, A, \mu, \nu, \kappa, \psi, \omega)$, poverty measured in human poverty index (ϕ), Poverty Headcount Rate (H), and poverty Gap Index (Z), and inequality measured in GINI coefficient (θ), Female participation Rate (ρ), and gender Inequality Index (η), Political stability index (α), Government effectiveness Index (β), Regulatory Quality Index (χ), Rule of Laws Index (A), Ease to Start Business Index (μ), Ease to Pay Taxes Index (ν), FDI Net Flows (κ), Domestic Credit to Private (ψ), and the Ease to Get Credit index (ω). The multiple regression models were used to analyse the data from 31 African countries. The study found that the key determinants of poverty are GNI per capita, government effectiveness, ICT use, gender inequalities, FDI net flows, political stability, ease to pay taxes and get credit in a country. However, dilemma associated with conception of the poverty phenomenon still continues both at micro and macro-levels. Dilemma and mismatch symbolise weakness when it comes to issues of policies, decision making and their implementation in a society. The study finding indicated that political stability in a country has a negative influence on poverty. The political stability is negatively related to poverty. This implies that a country with stable political stability is more likely to have low level of poverty. The study also confirms that ICT use and gender inequality have negative influence on conception of poverty. This means that the use of ICT and effective implementation of MDGs/SDGs will reduce misunderstanding of the poverty phenomenon at the level of a country. It is recommended that African countries should define the poverty phenomenon in three levels namely individual, societal, regional or country level.

Key words: Poverty, Determinants of poverty, Macro-analysis, Poverty-index

**The Utilization and Preference of Health Care Services in the Pastoral Communities: A Case
of the Maasai in Monduli District, Tanzania**

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Abstract

This paper examines the health seeking behavior of the Maasai community in Monduli District in the midst of the widely promoted and dominating Modern Health Care System (MHCS). The findings presented in this paper were drawn from the study which was conducted in October, 2015 in Monduli District. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used although the former largely dominated given the nature of the subject in question. The study findings revealed that contrary to the anticipation of the modernists and government who support the modern health care system (biomedicine), community members prefer traditional health care services over the services provided under the Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities. Their choice and preference of treatment were guided by the long and deeply seated knowledge of their traditional health care system, its efficiency, and their perceived quality health care services. The paper concludes that, while the introduction of primary health care is vital and necessary in ensuring that people get proper and quality health care services, particularly in this era where there is an increase and emergence of unprecedented diseases, it appears, however, not to marry with the locals' way of life and conception of health care. Unless this contradiction is sorted out, particularly during the planning stages, PHC services as the new intervention are unlikely to be acceptable, effective or sustainable in the traditionalistic communities like the Maasai. It is recommended that full community engagement in initiation stage of such programs needs to be embraced for such programs to make sense first before implementing them.

Key Words: Primary Health Care, Primary Health Care Services, Traditional treatment, Biomedical treatment

**Globalized Nile Perch Fishery and Management Challenges: Markets, Governance and
Livelihood dynamics in Lake Victoria, Tanzania**

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Lake Victoria is home to one of Africa's largest inland fishery with Nile Perch as its most valuable export product. Its international trade has prompted increased investment in efficient fishing techniques and technologies, most of which are detrimental to the integrity of the lake's ecosystem. The export community has gained increased control of production and marketing functions, secured strong domination of the industry as well as marginalized the fishing communities. We draw on field work carried out from 2009-2010 aimed at establishing the organization of fishing in Lake Victoria Fisheries, Tanzania. We here examine how local fish markets and market partners, governance processes and local livelihood systems influence and shape the organization of fisheries in Lake Victoria. We stress that the fishing community is characterized by complex fishing organizations, with commercialized and close inter-personal ties, multiple social and economic networks and vulnerability. They use a range of strategies to become involved in capitalized operations and ensure their livelihood goals are met. These livelihood systems are based on a variety of options within the limits of available resources to minimize livelihood and vulnerability. However, these options are a serious long term threat to the sustainability of the resources and the lives of the people in Lake Victoria.

Key words: Lake Victoria, Markets, Governance and Livelihood systems

Our Way, Our Demise: An Overview of Key Selected Self-inflicted Socio-economic, Political and Intellectual Issues Confronting Africa in the 21st Century

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Abstract

The African continent is endowed with enormous human and natural resources, with the latter estimated to be greater than that of almost any other continent in the world, yet she is the least developed region in the world. Although the phenomenon has been the subject of numerous interventions and innumerable studies each purporting to prescribe a solution by discerning the way forward for the continent, the situation continues to persist and exacerbate reducing Africa into a beggarly region. But in specific terms, what is it that keeps dragging African progress back? While many issues have been pinpointed, this analytical paper that benefited from a systematic review of literature attempts to identify and limit itself to a few apparently dire aspects of development the continent is seriously facing in the 21st century. These include poverty, governance, politics, corruption, state capture, and African-mannerism. It is in the opinion of this piece that addressing such issues is key to resolving African underdevelopment quagmire.

Key words: Africa, Corruption, Governance, Politics, State capture, African-mannerism

The Paradox of Development in Africa in the 21st Century

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Abstract

The purpose of this analytical paper is an attempt to understand the challenges of development in the 21st century. Relying on literature and content review, the paper argues that multiple definitions of development, the shifting of the focus of development, multiple paths to development, to be told what to do, and attitude are the major challenges facing development in the 21st century. The paper concludes that each society should be allowed to define and develop organismically in response to its social institutions and structures.

Key words: Development, Organismic, Social institution, Social structures

Measurement of Social Inequalities in Developing Countries: Lessons from Africa

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Abstract

The study examined ways of measuring social inequalities in Africa where 31 countries were sampled from Africa. The data were obtained using documentary review method. Multiple regression models were used to analyse the data based on the macro-factors with which inequality as social phenomenon is expressed. The study found that the key determinants of poverty and inequalities in Africa are GNI per capita, government effectiveness, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) use, gender inequalities, FDI Net flows, political stability, ease to pay taxes and easiness to get credit in a country. The study recommends that the reduction of poverty should be determined by the increase in the use of ICT, effectiveness of implementation of MDG3, and restructuring of the micro-credit policy and outreaching the services to the rural and poor people, and effectiveness of the government.

Key words: Social inequality, Determinants of social inequality, Inequality-index,

African Social Institutions Meltdown in the Era of Cultural-Globalisation: Family and Marriage Institutions Diagnosed

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Abstract

It is almost axiomatic to state that marriage and family are two most fundamental institutions in Africa as it is in any other social organisation given the vital roles they play. While the family is considered as the sociocultural manufacturing industry, training ground, foundation, cradle and basic unit of any social being, marriage is generally considered as a defining marker in the transition from childhood to adulthood and the dais for profound human fulfillment, procreation and societal stability and continuity. However, a plethora of literature, generally, suggests that their eminence has progressively been weakening and their functions melted down as a result of cultural globalisation. This analytical paper that capitalises on secondary data is set to clearly show the specific areas and manner in which the phenomenon has come about. Evidence from several parts of Africa indicates that, various social, cultural, and economic practices and values of the two institutions that were considered noble, grandiose and functional have progressively been eroded and in some way compromised by the dominant western cultural contents. The former in many ways surpasses the latter in terms of the context and contents within which African marriages and families are positioned, and therefore, should not be left to wither. The paper, therefore, calls for the African people not to stockpile and embrace every sociocultural element prescribed by the western creed but selectively aligning with what contextually works for the betterment of the African societies.

Key words: Cultural globalisation, family, marriage, African culture, Western culture

PART II

Full Papers

Reflections on Macro-factors Associated with the Description of Poverty in the Society: A Macro-analysis of the African Context

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Abstract

This study examined the empirical determinants of poverty in the context of Africa using macro-factors based on the data collected from 31 African countries. It tested the hypothesis; H_1 . The study findings indicate that there is no significant relationship between determinants of poverty and macro-structures of a society. The documentary review method was used to solicit data from relevant sources. The model applied is Poverty $(\phi, H, Z) = f(\alpha, \beta, \chi, A, \mu, \nu, \kappa, \psi, \omega)$, poverty measured in human poverty index (ϕ), Poverty Headcount Rate (H), and poverty Gap Index (Z), and inequality measured in GINI coefficient (θ), Female participation Rate (ρ), and gender Inequality Index (η), Political stability index (α), Government effectiveness Index (β), Regulatory Quality Index (χ), Rule of Laws Index (A), Ease to Start Business Index (μ), Ease to Pay Taxes Index (ν), FDI Net Flows (κ), Domestic Credit to Private (ψ), and the Ease to Get Credit index (ω). The multiple regression models were used to analyse the data from 31 African countries. The study found that the key determinants of poverty are GNI per capita, government effectiveness, ICT use, gender inequalities, FDI net flows, political stability, ease to pay taxes and get credit in a country. However, dilemma associated with conception of the poverty phenomenon still continues both at micro and macro-levels. Dilemma and mismatch symbolise weakness when it comes to issues of policies, decision making and their implementation in a society. The study finding indicated that political stability in a country has a negative influence on poverty. The political stability is negatively related to poverty. This implies that a country with stable political stability is more likely to have low level of poverty. The study also confirms that ICT use and gender inequality have negative influence on conception of poverty. This means that the use of ICT and effective implementation of MDGs/SDGs will reduce misunderstanding of the poverty phenomenon at the level of a country. It is recommended that African countries should define the poverty phenomenon in three levels namely individual, societal, regional or country level.

Key words: Poverty, determinants of poverty, macro-analysis, poverty-index

1.0 Introduction

One of the challenges facing African countries is how to conceptualize the poverty phenomenon and its eradication as was set by Millennium Development Goals (MDGs for 2000 – 2015), replaced by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs for 2015 - 2030). There is an evidence of poor monitoring of MDGs/SDGs in most of the developing countries (MDGR,

2015). The prevalence of *dynamic and situation* definition of the concept of poverty is another active challenge. The proper definition of African poverty should be extracted from its empirical determinants of the African context. The understanding of the key measuring determinants and features of poverty is a substantial step forward to have a proper African definition of poverty and the middle way to overcome the problems. Knowing the key determinants and features of poverty is an advanced stage of getting the right definition of the poverty phenomenon and a right way of escaping such phenomenon in Africa. Central to the question why we need African definition of poverty is relatively subjected to culture and environment (Lewis, 1961).

The decision and policy makers face difficulties on how to set agendas, policies and strategies of poverty eradication at a national and across the African Continent. The MDGs report (2015) evidences that there is a persistence of the gender inequity in developing countries and the wide gaps exist between the poorest and the richest households, and between rural and urban areas. Millions of poor people still live in poverty and hunger, without access to basic services. The conflict remains the biggest threats to human development and the climate change and environmental degradation undermine the progress achieved, and poor people suffer the most. The report evidences that there is a larger disparity which remains in primary school enrolment and the poorest and most disadvantaged children bear the heaviest burden. The policy and decision makers lack the *appropriate and effective monitoring strategies* of the MDGs/SDGs. They lack the empirical determinants and features and proper definition of African poverty that will be a guideline or paving and directing tool to achievement of MDGs/SDGs. This paper seeks to establish the empirical macro-features related to poverty using the context of Africa.

The examination of the determinants and features of poverty in African is necessary in order to eradicate the dilemmas held by different nations across the globe. Most of the decision and policy makers in Africa are brainstormed on how to eradicate the poverty and inequality in Africa. Most researchers such as (Kerr and Teal, 2014; Marrero and Rodriguez, 2012 and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010) confirmed the existence of the chronic poverty in Africa. Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem (2009) examined the determinants of poverty in Africa using the set of 48 countries. Using the multiple regression model, they found that population rate, inflation and external serving, low economic activities and gender discrimination are the key determinants of poverty in Africa. Anyanwu (2013) examined the causes and effects of poverty and economic growth in Africa and his study findings conform to the findings by Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem (2009).

The trade openness, higher real capital, GDP, income inequalities and low education expenditure are found to be the determinants of poverty in Africa (Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem, 2009). Sekhampu (2013), Anyanwu (2005) and Aker and Mbiti (2010) evidenced that the key determinants of poverty in Africa are the households head education, households size, employment age and low education. Apata, Apata, Igbalajobi and Awoniyi (2010) investigating the determinants of poverty in Nigeria confirm that limited access to micro-credit, education and gender discrimination cause the poverty in Africa. Their study was supported by Bogale, Hagedorn and Korf (2005), Iradian (2005), Geda, de Jong, Kimenyi

and Mwabu (2005), Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), and Woolard and Klasen (2004) who found that the poverty was determined by household size, credit market imperfection, low level of education and increase of income and social inequalities.

Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007) examining the determinants of poverty in Sub-Sahara Africa found that unfavourable investment/risks and FDI flows are causes of poverty in Africa. The unfavourable investment contributes to lack of sustainable productivity and profitable investment and low FDI net flows among African countries. This causes unemployment and lack of management competence skills and technology that is created or accelerated by more FDI and investments. The political stability and good governance will be likely to overcome the poverty in Africa (Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou, 2007). Lopez and Perry (2013) examining the determinants of inequality in Latin America revealed that the higher inequality constitutes a barrier to poverty reduction. Furthermore, they found that inequality is a major determinant of crime and violence in Latin America. The same finding was confirmed by Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), and Ncube, Brixiova and Bicaba (2014).

Geda (2006) examining the poverty in Africa found that the transparency and openness of the government and the use of ICT are the determinants of poverty in Africa. The ICT use increases likelihood of the innovation and creativity so as to increase the productivity and entrepreneurial skills. Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits (2008) examining poverty in South Africa found that the population growth, gender, house household structure and age of the household are the determinants of poverty in Africa. The World Bank Group (2013) examining poverty in Tanzania confirmed that poverty is negatively correlated with higher education of the household head whereas internal migration is related to the level of economic growth.

The better access to the rural credit and capacity building of the community based organisation will reduce poverty in rural areas in Africa (Binam et al. (2011). The access to the micro credit in African societies particularly in the rural areas will reduce poverty. It is claimed that poverty in rural areas is more acute than in urban areas. The cultural and gender inequalities, large household size, low education and political instability are found to be the causes of poverty (Abebe and Quaicoe, 2014; Ikejiaku, 2009; Philip and rayhan, 2004; Andersoon, Engvall and Kokko, 2006; Edoumiekumo, Karimo and Tombofa, 2013; Khalid, Shahnaz and Bibi, 2005; Oluoko-Odingo, 2009).

The technological and policy dependency are suggested to cause poverty in Africa. As it evidences the slow use of ICT in Africa, the innovation and creativity are noticed to be low, and create high dependency on the technologies and policies from the United States of American (USA) and European countries. Andriopoutou and Tskloglou (2011) and Albert and Collado (2004) suggested that the high political and technological dependency of the African countries are some of the causes of poverty. They lack innovation and creativity and they are forced to use the hired technology and they have the opportunities for developing the technology they acquired. The growth of GDP was also found to have the positive impact on reducing poverty. The decrease in the GDP is likely to cause poverty (Vijayakumar and Olga, 2012; Edoumiekumo, Karimo and Tombofa, 2013). Malik (1996) examining the determinants of rural poverty in Pakistan found that participation rate, education

attainment and female-male ratio and market and capital access are the determinants of poverty in Pakistan. These findings are supported by Herrera, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006) in Madagascar and Peru, and Ennin et al. (2011) in Ghana, Bahta and Haile (2014) in Eritrea.

The studies done by Asongwa, Okwocha and Umeh (2012) in Nigeria, Bahta and Haile (2014) in Eritrea, Runsinarith (2011) in Cambodia and Ataguba, Fonta, and Ichoku (2013) in Nigeria on the investigation of the determinants of poverty among rural farmers confirm that the less expenditure on education (primary and secondary education) and limited or less access to the micro-credit accelerate the increase of poverty in Eritrea, Cambodia and Nigeria. Yahie (2000) examining poverty reduction strategy in African countries found that there is a positive role of the private sector in fostering the development in Africa. The private sector has a positive role in the contribution to reduce poverty by providing employment and reducing the gaps of the income inequalities. Addae-Koronkye (2014) found that the poor land ownership and other capital resources of the households, poor governance and conflicts –political stability hinder poverty reduction in Africa. Kennedy (2012) and Mwabu, Kimenyi, Kimalu and Nafula (2002) evidenced that the poverty root in Africa is due to colonial legacy and corruptions.

In general, the literature explains more on micro-factors (individual level) of the country than the household level. The macro-factors such as economic growth, social, political and economic inequalities have been left behind by many researchers particularly those in Africa. This paper attempts to address the determinants and features of poverty by examining the empirical social, economic and political experiences in 31 African countries.

2.0 Material and Methods

2.1 Site Description and Sample Analysis

The study is based on the African continent where 31 countries which are predominantly developing countries namely Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The countries were sampled based on western region, southern region, northern region, eastern region, horn of Africa and central region.

2.2 Data Collection and Data Analysis Methods

The study used the descriptive research design and quantitative approach in order to extract the facts from the practical reality in 31 African countries. The data was extracted from the OECD Fact book, the World Bank and other national specific documents. The stepwise multivariate regression model was used to analyse the data.

2.3 Procedure

The process of selecting the documents to be reviewed for this study involved accessing the soft and or hard copies available in the field, checking their authenticity, credibility and evaluating them carefully. Indeed, documentary review deemed useful to this study due to its advantages of providing vast information, cost-effective and provision of permanently

available data. However, the use of this method for this study was challenging as there are many policy documents related to empirical determinants of poverty in the context of Africa with reference to macro-factors across each country.

3.0 Operationalization of Variables

The model which guided the study was Poverty $(\phi, H, Z) = f(\alpha, \beta, \chi, A, \mu, \nu, \kappa, \psi, \omega)$, poverty measured in human poverty index (ϕ), Poverty Headcount Rate (H), and poverty Gap Index (Z), and inequality measured in GINI coefficient (θ), Female participation Rate (ρ), and gender Inequality Index (η), Political stability index (α), Government effectiveness Index (β), Regulatory Quality Index (χ), Rule of Laws Index (A), Ease to Start Business Index (μ), Ease to Pay Taxes Index (ν), FDI Net Flows (κ), Domestic Credit to Private (ψ), and the Ease to Get Credit index (ω)

3.1 Dependent Variables (DVs)

3.1.1 Poverty Dependent Variables

3.1.1.1 Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI): is an international measure of acute poverty covering over 100 developing countries. It complements the traditional income-based poverty measured by capturing the severe deprivations that each person faces at the same time with respect to education, health and living standards (UNDP, 2010).

3.1.1.2 Poverty Headcounts Rate (PHR): Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) is the population below \$1.25 a day which is the percentage of the population living on less than \$1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. As a result of the revisions in PPP exchange rates, the poverty rates for individual countries cannot be compared with poverty rates reported in earlier editions (World Bank, 2010).

3.1.1.3 Poverty Gap Index (PGI): Poverty gap at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) is the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall) expressed as the percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence (World Bank, 2010).

3.2 Independent Variables (IVs)

3.2.1 Political Stability Index (PSI): It captures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010 and World Bank, 2010).

3.2.2 Government Effectiveness Index (GEI): It captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010 and World Bank, 2010).

3.2.3 Regulatory Quality Index (RQI): Is the scaled ration on capturing the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations

that permit and promote private sector development (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010; World Bank, 2010).

3.2.4 Rule of Laws Index (RLI): Is the ratio that captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010 and World Bank, 2010).

3.2.5 Ease to Start Business Index (ESI): World Bank's Ease of Doing Business (Index) measures the business regulations of countries, worldwide, and examines the key factors that directly affect each country's businesses, for example; business formation, operation, laws, challenges (World Bank, 2010).

3.2.6 Ease to Pay Taxes Index (EPTI): The ranking of economies on the ease of paying taxes is determined by sorting their distance to frontier scores for paying taxes. These scores are the simple average of the distance to frontier scores for each of the component indicators, with a threshold and non-linear transformation applied to one of the component indicators, the total tax rate. The threshold is set as the frontier for the total tax rate indicator. It is defined as the total tax rate at the 15th percentile of the overall distribution of total tax rate indicator for all years included in the analysis (Djankov et al., 2010).

3.2.7 FDI Net Flows: The World Bank defines foreign direct investment as the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors. The data are in current U.S. dollars.

3.2.8 Domestic Credit to Private Sectors: According to World Bank, domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries, these claims include credit to public enterprises. The financial corporations include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where the data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies.

3.2.9 Ease to Get Credit Index: The ranking of economies on the ease of getting credit is determined by sorting their distance to frontier scores for getting credit. These scores are the distances to frontier score for the sum of the strength of legal rights index and the depth of credit information index.

3.2.10 GNI per Capita: GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the mid-year population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI which is calculated in national currency is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions.

3.2.11 ICT Use Index: The ICT Use Index (IUI) is an index published by the United Nations International Telecommunication Union based on internationally agreed information and communication technologies (ICT) indicators. This makes it a valuable tool for benchmarking the most important indicators for measuring the information society. The IUI is a standard tool that governments, operators, development agencies, researchers and others can use to measure the digital divide and compare ICT performance within and across countries. The ICT Use Index is based on 11 ICT indicators, grouped in three clusters namely access, use and skills.

4.0 Results and Discussion

To test the hypotheses H_1 , there is no significant relationship between poverty and macro-structures of a society. The study examined the determinants and macro-features of poverty in Africa using the data obtained from 31 African countries that were collected using the documentary review method and analysed using the multivariate regression model with the aid of the Minitab 17 software. The data were analysed using the descriptive statistics and the general profile of the macro-characteristics of the sampled African countries as the determinants of poverty in Africa (Table 4.1).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Country Specific Characteristics

Variable	Total					
	Count	N*	Mean	SE Mean	StDev	CoefVar
Political Stability Index	31	0	-0.420	0.154	0.855	-203.48
Government Effectiveness	31	0	-0.5735	0.0892	0.4964	-86.55
Regulatory Quality Index	31	0	-0.4955	0.0939	0.5227	-105.49
Rule of Law Index	31	0	-0.5455	0.0929	0.5175	-94.87
Ease to Start Business Index	30	0	0.3930	0.0417	0.2285	58.15
Ease to Pay Taxes	31	0	0.4190	0.0525	0.2922	69.74
FDI Net Flows	31	0	0.0310	0.00660	0.03675	118.77
Domestic Credit to Private	31	0	0.2647	0.0456	0.2537	95.85
Ease to Get Credit Index	31	0	0.4519	0.0517	0.2877	63.66
ICT Use Index	31	1	0.4320	0.0696	0.3812	88.24
Multidimensional Poverty Index	31	4	0.2895	0.0307	0.1597	55.18
Gender Inequality Index	31	2	0.5473	0.0168	0.0903	16.51
Female Participation Rate	31	0	60.71	3.74	20.84	34.33
Poverty Headcount Rate	31	2	39.40	4.10	22.09	56.06
GINI Coefficient	31	1	44.54	1.69	9.28	20.83
Poverty Gap Index	31	2	14.66	2.07	11.13	75.92

Source: Field Data (2015)

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the country's macro-characteristics of 31 African countries sampled. The table profile that averages the mean of poverty in Africa is 39.40 percentage of the population living on less than \$1.25 a day at 2005 international prices. Multidimensional Poverty Index is averaged at 0.2895 and Poverty Gap Index is averaged at 14.66 for African countries. The poverty gap index gives the ratio of the cost of eliminating poverty using perfectly targeted transfers compared with using completely untargeted transfers. Thus, the smaller the poverty gap index, the greater the potential economies for poverty alleviation budget from identifying the characteristics of the poor so as to target benefits and programmes.

4.1 Determinants and Feature of Poverty in Africa

The poverty was measured using multidimensional poverty index, poverty headcount and poverty gap index as the function of the macro-country factors. Poverty was measured using GINI Coefficient, Gender Inequality index and Female Participation ratio as the function of the macro factors or country specific factors sampled from 31 African countries.

4.1.1 Multidimensional Poverty Index Measure: Determinants and Features

The poverty in Africa has been measured using multidimensional poverty index to reflect the percentage of the population that is multi-dimensionally poor and adjusted by the intensity of the deprivations. The multidimensional poverty index was regressed to the macro-factors of the specific 31 African countries to determine the determinants of poverty in Africa. The stepwise regression model was run (Table 2). The regression model was run at 0.05 or 5 per

cent of level of statistical significance and found that the GNI per capita, gender inequality, domestic credit to private sectors, ease to get credit and ICT Use in the country are the main determinants of the acute poverty in African countries. These macro-factors have negative influences on poverty. That is, the higher ICT Use in a country and higher GNI per capita reduced the acute poverty in Africa.

The key feature of acute poverty in a country is having less use of technology (ICT use), domestic credit to private sector, ease to get credit and having GNI per capita, and having high inequality in a country (Table 2).

Table 2: Stepwise Regression model on poverty and its determinants in Africa

Alpha-to-Enter: 0.05, Alpha-to-Remove: 0.05		
Response is Multidimensional Poverty Index on 13 predictors, with N = 25		
N (cases with missing observations) = 6 N (all cases) = 31		
The regression equation is		
$\phi = 0.605 - 0.0950\alpha - 0.015\beta + 0.086\chi + 0.093A + 0.140\mu - 0.159\nu + 0.379\kappa + 0.111\psi - 0.077\omega - 0.298\pi - 0.166\eta + 0.00038\rho - 0.000019 \text{ GNI} \dots\dots\dots(i)$		
Step	1	2
Constant	0.4059	0.4324
GNI Per Capita	-0.00003	-0.00002
T-Value	-5.54	-3.74
P-Value	0.000	0.001
ICT Use Index	-0.143	
T-Value	-2.32	
P-Value	0.030	
S	0.109	0.0998
R-Sq	57.20	65.60
R-Sq (adj)	55.34	62.47
Mallows Cp	10.1	6.0
PRESS	0.335484	0.256277
R-Sq (pred)	47.36	59.78

Source: Field data (2015)

Table 2 shows the stepwise regression model of the macro-factors in 31 African countries. The regression was run at 0.05 levels of significance. The model was determined at the $R^2 = 57.20$

4.1.2 Poverty Gap Index Measure of poverty: Determinants and features

The examination on poverty gap index was done by regressing the index with the macro factors of the 31 African countries and found that the determinants of poverty gap is GNI per capita and political stability in a country. The key feature of the poverty measures is the high political stability in a country which accelerates the increase in poverty gap and the less GNI per capita increases the poverty gap in a country (Table 3).

Table 3: The regression model of poverty gap and macro factors in African countries

The regression equation is

$$Z = -8.6 + 9.02 \alpha - 4.65 \beta - 10.9 \chi - 1.17 A + 3.24 \mu + 13.9 v - 20.2 \kappa - 5.88 \psi + 10.2 \omega + 4.48 \pi + 26.4 \eta - 0.023 \rho - 0.00132 \text{ GNI} \dots\dots\dots(ii)$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	-8.57	23.50	-0.36	0.722
Political Stability Index	9.018	2.681	3.36	0.006
Government Effectiveness Index	-4.648	8.244	-0.56	0.583
Regulatory Quality Index	-10.94	10.24	-1.07	0.307
Rule of Law Index	-1.172	9.612	-0.12	0.905
Ease to Start Business Index	3.243	7.639	0.42	0.679
Ease to Pay Taxes	13.889	9.976	1.39	0.189
FDI Net Flows	-20.16	49.13	-0.41	0.689
Domestic Credit to Private	-5.879	7.737	-0.76	0.462
Ease to Get Credit	10.209	8.677	1.18	0.262
ICT Use Index	4.482	8.494	0.53	0.607
Gender Inequality Index	26.38	28.54	0.92	0.373
Female Participation Rate	-0.0232	0.1147	-0.20	0.843
GNI Per Capita	-0.0013170	0.0004388	-3.00	0.011

S = 6.32906 R-Sq = 83.8% R-Sq (adj) = 66.2%

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	13	2480.74	190.83	4.76	0.005
Residual Error	12	480.68	40.06		
Total	25	2961.42			

Source: Field data (2015)

Table 3 shows the regression model of the poverty gap index and macro-factors in 31 African countries. The model is determined at 83.8 per cent, and accepted at 99 per cent of level of confidence. The p-value is 0.005 less than 0.01 significant levels. The model determines the factors of poverty gap and its features.

4.1.3 Poverty Headcount Rate Measure of Poverty: Determinants and Features

The poverty was examined in terms of the poverty headcount rate. The poverty headcount rates were regressed with macro factors of 31 African countries, and found that poverty determinants are political stability and GNI per capita. The poverty feature is less than GNI per capita and an increase of political stability increases the poverty (Table 4).

Table 4: Regression model of the poverty and macro factors of African countries

The regression equation is

$$H = 27.5 + 11.9 \alpha - 4.2 \beta - 11.6 \chi - 0.5 A + 0.5 + 14.5 v - 58.3 \kappa - 6.8 \psi + 20.6 \omega - 6.9 \pi + 30.9 \pi - 0.080 \rho - 0.00312 \text{ GNI} \dots\dots\dots (iii)$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	27.55	37.77	0.73	0.480
Political Stability Index	11.939	4.308	2.77	0.017
Government Effectiveness Index	-4.25	13.25	-0.32	0.754
Regulatory Quality Index	-11.60	16.46	-0.70	0.495
Rule of Law Index	-0.51	15.45	-0.03	0.974
Ease to Start Business Index	0.54	12.28	0.04	0.966
Ease to Pay Taxes	14.52	16.03	0.91	0.383
FDI Net Flows	-58.33	78.97	-0.74	0.474
Domestic Credit to Private	-6.80	12.44	-0.55	0.594
Ease to Get Credit	20.59	13.95	1.48	0.166
ICT Use Index	-6.93	13.65	-0.51	0.621
Gender Inequality Index	30.85	45.87	0.67	0.514
Female Participation Rate	-0.0802	0.1844	-0.43	0.671
GNI Per Capita	-0.0031206	0.0007052	-4.42	0.001

S = 10.1723 R-Sq = 88.9% R-Sq (adj) = 76.9%

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	13	9957.3	765.9	7.40	0.001
Residual Error	12	1241.7	103.5		
Total	25	11199.0			

Source: Field data (2015)

Table 4 shows the regression model of the poverty headcount rate and macro factors sampled from 31 African countries. The regression model was run at 0.05 levels of significance and it is determined at 88.9 per cent at p-value of 0.001 which is less than 0.01.

The government effectiveness index has a negative coefficient value of -0.13865, *t-value* of -2.27, and *p-value* of 0.038 in the inequality regression model, which was found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is less than 0.05 or 5 per cent. This implies that there is a strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the second pair of hypotheses. That is, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at 95 per cent level of confidence. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between inequality and government effectiveness in Africa. The *p-value* of poverty is out greater than 0.05 levels of significance. Therefore, there is no strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis in poverty relations. That is, there is no relationship between poverty and government effectiveness in Africa.

The regulatory quality index in the poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.11152, *t-value* 1.56, and *p-value* of 0.38 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. This implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the third pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and regulatory quality index.

The regulatory quality index in the inequality model has a negative coefficient value -10.94, *t-value* of -1.07 and *p-value* of 0.307 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 0.10 since the *p-value* is greater than 0.10. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the third part of the hypotheses pair is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between inequality and regulatory quality in a country.

The rule of law index in poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.093, *t-value* of 1.02, and *p-value* of 0.320 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. Therefore, there is no strong evidence to reject the null hypotheses of the fourth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is no significant relationship between the rule of law and poverty in Africa.

The rule of law index in inequality regression model has a negative coefficient value of -5.161, *t-value* of -0.55 and *p-value* of 0.590 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent of the level of significance. It was found that there was no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypotheses in the fourth pair of hypothesis. Therefore, null hypothesis is accepted. That is, there are no significant relationships between inequality and rule of law in Africa.

The ease of starting business index in the inequality regression model has a negative coefficient value of -5.942, *t-value* of -0.79, and *p-value* of 0.442 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 0.1 or 10 per cent. This implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the second pair of hypotheses. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the fifth set of hypotheses is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between the easiness of starting business in a country and inequality in Africa.

The easiness of starting business index in poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.140, *t-value* of -1.19, and *p-value* 0.245 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level of significance, since *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. This evidences that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the fifth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is no significant relationship between poverty and easiness of starting business in African countries.

The ease to pay tax index in the poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 13.889, *t-value* 1.39, and *p-value* of 0.189 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. This implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the sixth pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and easiness of paying taxes in a country.

The ease of paying taxes in the inequality model has a negative coefficient value – of 0.05904, *t-value* of -0.71 and *p-value* of 0.485 which was found to be statistical insignificant at 0.10 since the *p-value* is greater than 0.10. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the sixth part of the hypotheses pair is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between inequality and easiness of paying taxes in a country.

The FDI Net flows in the poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.379, *t-value* of 0.96, and *p-value* of 0.347 which was found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. This implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the third pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and FDI Net Flows in African countries.

The FDI Net Flows in the inequality model has a negative coefficient value of -248.03, *t-value* of -2.54 and *p-value* of 0.020 which was found to be statistically significant at 0.05 since the *p-value* is less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the sixth pair of the hypotheses is accepted. That is, there is a significant relationship between inequality and FDI Net flows in Africa.

The domestic credit to private sectors index in the poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.111, *t-value* of -2.72, and *p-value* of 0.010 which was found to be statistically significant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is equal to 10 per cent. This implies that there is a strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the seventh pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and domestic credit to private sectors in Africa.

The ease to get credit index in poverty regression model has a negative coefficient value of -0.077, *t-value* of -2.57 and *p-value* of 0.017 which was found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is less than 5 per cent. Therefore, there is a strong evidence to reject the null hypotheses of the eighth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is a significant relationship between easiness of getting credit and poverty in Africa.

The government effectiveness has a negative influence on poverty but insignificantly related to poverty. Poverty will be reduced by improving or increasing the government effectiveness in a country. The government effectiveness indicates the operational and administrative policies in a country. The study findings conform to the study findings by Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem (2009), Anyannwu (2013), Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007), Geda (2006), Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013), Vijayakumar and Olga(2012), and Addae-Koronkye (2014) who found that the good governance practices and administration are negatively related to poverty.

Regulatory quality, rule of law and ease to start business are positively related to poverty and are found to be statistically insignificant. The increase of these factors causes poverty. Therefore, poverty eradication will not be accelerated by high quality of regulatory quality. On the other side, the high regulatory quality, rule of law and ease to start business will reduce the social and political inequalities. The literature does not explain this factor.

Easiness of paying taxes is insignificantly related to poverty and inequality indicates that poverty and inequality are accelerated by low easiness of paying taxes. The countries that are likely to pay more taxes are less poor.

The easiness to get credit in a country is negatively related to poverty but insignificantly related to inequality. That is, the country that has good legal and environmental opportunities to offer more and easier credit (micro-credits) to her citizens is more likely to reduce poverty and inequalities. The provision and establishment of the micro-credit financing in the rural and urban areas are an appropriate strategy that reduces poverty and inequality. This finding conforms to the study findings by Apata, Apata, Igbalajobi and Awoniyi (2010), Iradian (2005), Binam *et al.* (2011), Bahta and Haile (2014), Asogwa, Okwocha, and Umeh (2012), and Runsinarith (2011) who found that favourable and conducive environment for accessing the micro-credit sometimes foster poverty reduction in the country. The micro-credit financing will be improved and regulated to allow people to accumulate the seed capital and start the business or investments in education or other long term investments that will increase the household assets in a country. Such micro-credit financing will reduce the income inequalities.

The use of technology (ICT Use) was found to have negative influence on poverty, since the higher use of ICT in a country accelerated less poverty and inequality. This finding indicates that the application of ICT in a country reduces poverty and inequality. This is true in that the innovation and creativity in a country foster the development and reduce poverty and inequality. The application of ICT in a country is geared at reducing the workforce and costs of production and increases the comparative advantage. This study finding is supported by Geda (2006) who confirms that the application of the ICT will reduce poverty and inequality in Africa.

The GNI per capita is negatively related to poverty that is, the higher GNI per capita reduces the poverty. The increase of the GNI per capita will increase the income of the individuals and saving and investment for short and long term projects/investments. The income inequalities will be reduced by increasing of the GNI per capita in a country. This finding

conforms to the findings by Anyanwu (2013), Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007), World Bank Group (2013), Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013), Albert and Collado (2004), and Edoumiekumo, Karimo and Tombofa (2013), Vijayakumar and Olga (2012) who found that there is indeed a negative effect of the GNI per capita and poverty.

The gender inequality is found to be positively related to poverty and social economic inequality. The higher gender inequality increases poverty and inequality in the country. The Millennium Development Goal 3 aims to promote gender equity and women empowerment is an appropriate goal to eradicate poverty and inequality in Africa. The promotion of gender equity and women empowerment will increase the women participation in the economy and reduce gender inequality. This study finding conforms to the findings by Adeyemi, Ijaiya, and Raheem (2009), Apata, Apata, Igbalajobi and Awoniyi (2010), Naschold (2002), Armstrong, Lekezwa, and Siebrits (2008), Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), Abebe and Quaicoe (2014), Malik (1996), Oluoko-Odingo (2009), Marrero and Rodriguez (2012) who found that the gender discrimination decelerated the poverty reduction in African countries.

5. o Conclusion and Recommendations

This study investigated the determinants of poverty in the context of Africa. The results reveal that the GNI per capita influences the conception of poverty in negative ways. That is, the growth of the economy in a country accelerates the reduction of poverty in the country. The political stability contributes to eradication of poverty in Africa. The country with stable political stability has more opportunities to eradicate poverty. The study also indicates that the ICT use and gender inequality have negative influence on poverty. This means that the use of ICT and effective implementation of the MDGs will reduce the misunderstanding of the poverty phenomenon at the level of a country. The study also confirms that the easiness of getting the credit in a country and government effectiveness reduce poverty.

It is recommended that African countries should define the poverty phenomenon at three levels namely individual, society and regional or country level. At individual level, the study indicated that lack of primary and secondary education, primary health care, and big size of the households is due to poverty or is the poverty. At this level, poverty can be defined as inability of individuals or households to access or generate financial assets in long term of period and causes the individuals or households to miss their basic or necessary needs such as health, education, food (nutrition) and shelter. This definition reflects the characteristics and features of the African societies as evidenced by this study and other studies.

It is also recommended that macro-determinants are not strong enough to direct proper understanding of the poverty phenomenon as inability of the individual or households to access or generate financial assets that can be caused by either micro- or macro-level factors. The micro-level factors include the education of the family member(s) or heads of households, age of the head of the households, heritage status, cultural practices and safe water and sanitation, and limited land ownership both in rural and urban areas. The macro-level factors include micro-credit policy, population, gender disparity, employment status, real per capita GDP, inflation, investment policy, technology, government effectiveness, market and capital access, political stability, fiscal policy, and others. The restructuring of the

micro-credit policy allows more rural people to have access to micro-loans. The national policy which is aligned to the MDGs/SDGs increases the GNI per capital, maintains the political stability, improves the taxations structure and administration, increases the easiness of paying taxes and reduces tax evasion and avoidance. Effective monitoring of the implementation of the MDG 3 promotes gender equity and women empowerment in order to achieve the MDGs/SDGs. The effective monitoring of the MDGs/SDGs will foster poverty eradication in Africa and other developing countries. The African countries should invest more in ICT use and application and reduce the technological dependency and increase the creativity and innovation. The female participation in some African countries is low and this should be recovered by increasing the female participation rate in political, social and economic issues.

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Endnote

1. Poverty is a 'relative' term that can be termed into two main concepts namely absolute and relative poverty. *Absolute poverty* involves people and their children having extreme difficulty in merely surviving (Haughton and Khandker, 2009). But in richer societies where the poor are a minority, their *relative poverty* generally involves inability to obtain social necessities available to the majority - and is often intensified by social exclusion (Lewis, 1961, and Haughton and Khandker, 2009).
2. Lewis (1961) developed the *theory of the culture of poverty* in which he posits that being in poverty tends to create a way of living that becomes a culture of its own. Lewis believes that culture is learned, shared, and socially transmitted as behaviour of a social group. The people living in culture as a separate part of society that is, the poor segregate themselves from mainstream society (Lewis, 1961). From this theory, Lewis means that when poverty is established, the culture of poverty tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because of its effects on children. A *cycle of poverty* is produced from each generation and finds it difficult to escape. Besides the learned cultural norms, what are other barriers that are there to prevent poor children from improving their future lifestyle? What are the *escaping strategies* from the cycle of poverty? They are the key questions in addressing the poverty and inequality in Africa.
3. It should be noted that poverty is narrower than social exclusion and it is not exactly the same, but they are associated. The *social exclusion theory* is a broader concept than poverty. It refers to being "shut out" or excluded from mainstream society. Like Oscar Lewis' theory of social segregation, social exclusion describes the divisions in the society. Unlike Lewis, this theory claims that social exclusion prevents people from participating in the society.
4. *The theory of Situational Constraints* states that the poor are trapped into poverty because of their situation (environments and policies not cultures). It rejects the fact that it is the culture of poverty that constrains them. Once poverty is removed then the poor will have no difficulty in seizing opportunities in the society. It further states that the poor share the values of the society as a whole and they do not have separate cultural values that are at odds with the society.
5. The poverty can be viewed as the welfare dependency (Murray, 1938). According to Murray (1938), the undeserving poor remain in poverty because the welfare state encourages them to depend on state provision. This is done mostly in developing countries like Tanzania, and others. According to Murray (1938), the state provision is too generous and creates "welfare dependency". This in turn does not provide any incentive for the "feckless poor" to provide for themselves.
6. In a broad view, *unemployment* can be seen as a central issue in understanding the causes of poverty. An *economic recession* means a decrease in employment rates and an increase in poverty. Unemployment is imposed upon people rather than being a lifestyle choice and the benefits can be seen as too low. By increasing the benefits, poverty may be reduced. According to Nurkse (1953), the concept of *vicious circle of poverty* implies a circular constellation of forces tending to act and react in such a way as to keep a country in the state

of poverty. In such state of affairs, the process of capital formation remains obstructed and restricted. We start with low real income which results in a meagre savings which will in turn check the investment. Low level of investment would create deficiency of capital which leads to low productivity in second round. This again results in low income. Here, the circle perpetuates the low level of development (Nurkse, 1953). From the supply side, there is low income, low savings, low investment, capital deficiency and low productivity. On the demand side, there is low income, low demand for goods, limited home market and low investment (Nurkse, 1953). This situation concludes the generalized concept that you are poor because you are poor.

The Utilization and Preference of Health Care Services in the Pastoral Communities: A Case of the Maasai in Monduli District, Tanzania

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Abstract

This paper examines the health seeking behavior of the Maasai community in Monduli District in the midst of the widely promoted and dominating Modern Health Care System (MHCS). The findings presented in this paper were drawn from the study which was conducted in October, 2015 in Monduli District. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used although the former largely dominated given the nature of the subject in question. The study findings revealed that contrary to the anticipation of the modernists and government who support the modern health care system (biomedicine), community members prefer traditional health care services over the services provided under the Primary Health Care (PHC) facilities. Their choice and preference of treatment were guided by the long and deeply seated knowledge of their traditional health care system, its efficiency, and their perceived quality health care services. The paper concludes that, while the introduction of primary health care is vital and necessary in ensuring that people get proper and quality health care services, particularly in this era where there is an increase and emergence of unprecedented diseases, it appears, however, not to marry with the locals' way of life and conception of health care. Unless this contradiction is sorted out, particularly during the planning stages, PHC services as the new intervention are unlikely to be acceptable, effective or sustainable in the traditionalistic communities like the Maasai. It is recommended that full community engagement in initiation stage of such programs needs to be embraced for such programs to make sense first before implementing them.

Key Words: Primary Health Care, Primary Health Care Services, traditional treatment, biomedical treatment

1.0 Introduction

Over the last four decades, one of the major concerns and commitment of global community has been attainment of the health for all. It has been recorded that Alma-Ata International Conference of 1978 on the field of public health remains of huge symbolic importance for Primary Health Care (PHC) world-wide (WHO, 1978a). Today, medical scientists require more information from both modern and tradition medical fields. The Alma-Ata declares that "Primary health care is essential health care based on practical, scientifically sound and socially acceptable methods and technology made universally accessible to individuals and families in the community through their full participation and at a cost that the community and country can afford to maintain at every stage of their development in the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination. It forms an integral part both of the country's health system, of which it is the central function and main focus, and of the overall social and economic development of the community. It is the first level of contact of individuals, the family and community with the national health system bringing

health care as close as possible to where people live and work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing health care process” (WHO, 1978b).

In Africa and Tanzania in particular, the government policy documents and national development plans are oriented towards the adoption of PHC strategy in delivering equitable and people-centred health care services. The Tanzania National Health Policy and other subsequent health strategies echo the same (National Health Policy, 2007). The government in its efforts has initiated comprehensive programme of PHC services to cover all people including the poor with an emphasis on equity and access at affordable cost. As recent as 2016, PHC services status indicates that there is established variation of health facilities including 4679 dispensaries though they are for both public and private and 481 health centres (Kafanabo, 2016).

Despite the efforts waged by the URT of providing its citizens with health care services, still there are cases where these health care services are bypassed and not-used even if the services are available at PHC facilities. Instead, the service users go for services at higher levels like the district or use the alternative treatment especially traditional medicines. The base-line report conducted in rural western Tanzania shows that 44% of women seeking delivery in the health institutions bypass the nearest health facility (Kahabuka, Moland, Kvale, & Hinderaker, 2012). For Bowen (2010), the community’s treatment seeking behaviour in Migombani Village in Monduli District shows that 75% of households get treatment from higher level hospitals rather than established primary health facility.

The study by World Bank (2001) shows that increase in availability, accessibility, affordability and quality improvement of service does not always translate to increased access to healthcare until client satisfaction is met. In the same vein, the World Health Report (2008) “Primary Health Care now more than ever” points out the importance of organizing health services around people’s needs and expectations as one of four main issues of Primary Health Care reforms. This is to say, the client’s preferences and choices need to be met if at all to ensure effective use of primary health care facilities and this in return is possible when the client’s preferences and choices and reasons for preferences are established from their own viewpoint and thereafter used to guide health care promotion.

The bypass and non-use of the facilities established to the people's vicinity raise complex questions that cannot be answered without the consideration of the community’s preferences and reasons behind which in turn help to fill the lacuna that exists in primary health facility. This paper for that reason attempts an understanding of the community use of the primary health care services, community treatment preferences and factors that shape their preferences and as a result it affects their use of the primary health facilities.

2.0 Material and Methods

The cross-sectional design was employed in this study. This design was selected amongst other designs because it was relevant to the population with stable characteristics and related cultural background in which Maasai community dominates the area of the study and therefore, the design was suitable for the study. This design was also appropriate when defining a set of attitudes, opinions, or behaviours that were observed in the field. This

design was similarly relevant to this study because it helped in describing the situations as explained in the field.

The qualitative approach was used to get an in-depth understanding of the community's preferences and unearth the hidden reasons leading to varying attitudes towards the community use (or not) of services provided in primary health care facilities, community health treatment options and forces that determine their preferences. The study therefore was descriptive and explanatory in nature.

The study was conducted in selected wards in Monduli District in northern Tanzania. Monduli District lies between latitudes: 3° 19'60" South and longitude: 36° 15' 0" East. It borders Kajiado District of Kenya to the North, Hai District to the North East, Ngorongoro, Karatu and Mbulu to the West, Babati and Simanjiro to the South and Arumeru to the East. It is the largest District in Arusha with a surface area of 16,061 km square occupying 18% of the region (URT, 2005). According to the 2012 Tanzania National Census of habitats and people, Monduli District Council had a total population of 158,929, male being 75,615 and female population was 83,314.

Monduli was purposively selected because it is one of the remote districts in Arusha Region in North Eastern Tanzania, with the local population composed of predominantly pastoralists who strongly reserve their culture. Being bound to cultural setting therefore, would lead to a bias or preferences to traditional treatment. Further, the studies and researches conducted in the district signal the potential challenge of community use of PHC services.

The study used both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. The area of the study was selected purposively and cluster sampling design was used for the purpose of extending it further to the wards level. Monduli District was purposively selected by a researcher to represent other rural or remote districts and through cluster sampling, Makuyuni Division was chosen and further, two wards of Esilalei and Mswakini were purposively focused to narrow down the study for detailed analysis. This was however not enough as the researcher selected two proximal villages from each of the two wards that ensured proximity to the researcher since they were geographically easily accessible. In narrowing the geographical area and sampling the divisions to villages, the time and money were saved on visiting the selected areas. The study involved married people with families (particularly, in community interviews) because they possessed decision to other family members and for this reason their preference, use or non-use of available health treatment options was equals to the other community members.

Probability sampling was used to select the sample. The list of *bomas* was prepared in each village from which systematic sampling was used by calculating the skip interval in every village and then the sampled 15 *bomas* from each village were selected of which again implied 15 households and from each selected *boma*, one household was involved in the study. In the household, the two couples were interviewed that is, the father and his older wife or the young one in the absence of the old one although only in polygamy families.

The key informants who are not necessarily couples and workers in the primary health centres were involved through purposive sampling. Purposely, only 8 key informants that is, 2 from each village were interviewed 1 being a male and the other being a female. This reasonably ensured gender balance and capturing of women's views that seem to be less important in the Maasai community who dominated the selected wards. Likewise, 1 PHC worker from each of the four health centres was included in the study basing on the criteria that he or she was either the centre in charge or one in charge at the moment in the absence of the head. Purposive sampling was also used to select participants for the FGD (12 people) in each village that meant 6 for women group and 6 for men group.

The study therefore employed the sample size of 180 people which means 90 people from each ward that comprised of 60 household members, 4 key informants, 2 health centres officers and 48 FGD members. Semi-structured interview was used to 120 community members, 8 key informants and 4 health care providers. The method suited exploration of the perceptions and opinions of participants regarding the complex and sensitive issues of PHC and enabled probing for more information and clarification of answers. The parents were interviewed separately (male Vs Female head) and the interview setting was their homes. The interviews were audio-recorded and during the interview, the researcher took further notes as well. The interview also captured things that were not captured by FGDs.

The focus groups were useful in this study as the researcher explored ideas and obtained in-depth information about the people's treatment preferences and reasons behind. The FGDs were conducted in the 4 villages from which 2 FGDs for each village were held. Each FGD consisted of 6 people and was formed and held basing on sex. The total number of 48 people participated in FGDs meaning that 12 people from each village (6 for male group and 6 for female group). The FGDs assisted in detailed information on issues pertinent to use, preferences and factors that shaped their preferences.

Before the data were analyzed, the researcher transcribed all interviews because the transcription helped the researcher to become acquainted with the data. The quantitative data from the field were subjected to descriptive statistics where the measures were presented in frequencies, percentages and tables. The study used Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 16 to analyze and quantify the data. The qualitative data were analyzed and presented based on the pre-determined themes and categories after transcription.

3.0 Results and Discussion

3.1 Use of Services Provided in Primary Health Care Facilities

This part aimed to determine if the community members in Monduli Rural District use services provided in primary health care facilities, what health care cases were taken (or not taken) to primary health centre and where community members were alternatively taken for treatment. The participants were asked a closed ended question on whether there was a usual use of a primary health care facility available in the community when any of them felt sick or any family member became sick. Their responses were summarized in Table 3.1. Sixty (60) participants reported to use the services in primary health care whereas one hundred

and sixteen (116) were not using it. This indicated that the majority were not using the services available and provided in primary health care facilities and instead sought the treatment from other sources especially through home remedy, traditional healers, bone setters, spiritual healers, private clinics, pharmacies and drug shops. The majority however reported to go for traditional treatment as compared to using modern medicines. This finding conflicts with a study finding in India whereby the difference between the use of primary health care services and quacks mode of treatment were very minimal. For instance, only just over half (54.9%) had ever utilized the services in primary health care centres (Chandwani et al., 2008).

On the other hand, there was a significant difference in using and/or not using the services basing on gender. Women mostly used the services as compared to men. A separate question asked to participants aimed at examining how often they used the primary health care services. It was noted that the majority of those who reported to use primary health care services rarely used the services. Further probing had shown that only women and children used the services relatively often and this was contingent especially to women becoming pregnant and as a result they seek maternity and child care before and after delivery. Men rarely use health services from primary health centres and most of them reported their preference for traditional medicines means of treatment. This is a verbatim quote during interview session where a middle-aged man in Oltukai village pointed out;

...I never went to this health facility for treatment and I don't even remember the last time I went to any hospital. I go to the bush-camp (a temporarily made camp in the forest where men stay and slaughter livestock in a number of days) every year with my fellows (young and elder men) where we stay for one month. Apart from slaughtering cows and goats, we drink every plant roots soup and rid out all kinds of diseases and other health related problems. Even when I get injured, I just go to treat myself in the bush-camp.

The discussions from different categories of men focus groups indicated the tendency of men to be the major source of treatment. When a man attended to the bush-camp, it was rare to be attacked by what was reported to be “minor diseases” which in the participants’ perspective included Malaria, diarrhea, typhoid, gonorrhea, syphilis and other sexually transmitted diseases.

In addition, a female participant in Mswakini Village was quoted saying;

...I and my family do not seek treatment from the primary health centre. Whenever one of us feels sick or ill, we go and find some special roots or barks of a healing tree species in the forest and make natural medicine and give it to the sick one. The examples of these healing trees include Ormukutan, Oremit, Alaisai, Osokonoi, Endundulu, Enjani engabura, Enjani emburkel and many others. When the sick doesn't recover, we take him to a traditional specialist who knows more about how to identify the illness and a specific natural medicine to treat it. Other diseases do not get out until reported to a local spiritual healer...

In sum, the responses show that there were multiple and different sources of treatment in the community. These include home remedy, traditional healers, bone setters, spiritual leaders, private clinics, pharmacies and drug shops. It was found however that the majority were using traditional medicines.

However, a few people reported to use health services available in primary health care services and their use denoted that the community in Monduli Rural District was linked to primary health care facilities. The participants who reported to use health services provided in primary health care centers mentioned specifically that the reporting of the cases such as headache and typhoid while attending clinic for children is a must because it is a prerequisite for further free of charge treatment at the centres when the child falls sick. During the interview, one of the participants in Esilalei village pointed out;

... Only some of the diseases especially headache and stomachache or typhoid can be treated in our health center. But other diseases cannot be detected quickly and treated and instead it is better to use the traditional medicines in order to get better earlier...

In this study, it was observed that the community locally categorized most of the diseases that can better be attended under traditional health care system and only those diseases that can easily be understood and prescribed with medicines and sometimes without even medical examination. Those diseases which do not even require medical examination are reported at the primary health care centres. The study findings oppose those in Uganda whereby health cases like vomiting among children, convulsion, pressure (hypertension), ulcers (chronic epigastric pain), dental problems, cough and chest pain, epilepsy, diabetes, malaria, and measles' needed conventional care (Bakeera et al., 2009).

Table 3.1: Frequencies by sex for use and non-use of Primary Health Care Services (PHCS)

	Use PHCS		Not Use PHCS		Total
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	
Sex					
Male	10	6	81	46	91
Female	50	28	35	20	85
Total	60	34	116	66	176

Source: Field Data (2015)

3.2 Community's Treatment Preference and Reason Behind

3.2.1 Community's Sources of Treatment and Treatment Preference in Health Seeking

The next two questions asked to participants were about their available sources of treatment and every participant was required to locate his or her most preferred treatment type. The responses on the available treatment options for the community revealed multiple sources of treatment including home remedy, traditional healer, bone setters, primary health care facilities, private clinics, pharmacies and drug shops and spiritual sources including what participant referred to as 'witchdoctors'. The most popular sources to majority were home remedy, traditional healer, bone setters and primary health care

facilities. The popularity of these options was attributed to their closeness to the community as compared to other sources. Having been asked to locate treatment source preferences, the participants varied in their responses. With regard to Table 3.2., most participants prefer home remedy treatment to other forms of treatment. This was 100 participants out of 176 equals to 56.8 per cent. This was followed by traditional healers (41 participants) equals to 23.3 per cent. The least preferred options were private clinics, pharmacy and drug shops as well as others. When asked to specify what it was meant by 'others', the participants referred to both spiritual treatment and seeking treatment at higher levels such as at district hospitals, regional and referral hospitals.

Table 3.2: Participants' treatment sources preference

Sources of Treatment	Frequency	Percent
Home remedy	100	56.8
traditional healer	41	23.3
Bone setters	13	7.4
PHCS	12	6.9
Private clinics, pharmacy and drug shops	5	2.8
Others	5	2.8
Total	176	100.0

Source: Field Data (2015)

These response patterns show that the majority sought treatment from unconventional sources as compared to conventional or modern treatment sources and particularly primary health care centres available in the community. This is contrary to the findings of the study done in India in which more than two-thirds (70.5%) of the respondents in the community survey listed primary health centre as their preferred choice of health care facility followed by the services provided by quacks (12.9%) in case of illness (Chandwani *et al.*, 2008).

3.2.2 Preference on Home Remedy

Many participants indicated to have favoured home remedy as their first choice of treatment when one falls sick. Regardless of the favourable and enabling characteristics that according Andersen (1968) lead to the use of biomedical health services, for example, availability of services, financial services to purchase services, health insurance, severity of illness and perception of need for health services amongst others, participants explained that it is normative in the Maasai community for anyone to use available traditional medicines like roots, barks and leaves of plants in striving to become better before thinking about attending to the hospital or health centre. This contradicts with the study by Wenzel (2011) on western and traditional medicine use practices in Shirati, Tanzania which found that community members first go to hospital before traditional medicine and back to traditional medicine only when the treatment at the hospital did not heal them.

The focus group discussions highlighted various traditional medicines such as Ormukutan, Oremi, Enjani engabura, Alaisai (all these are for vomiting and diarrhoea to remove any dirt in the stomach and treat diseases like malaria, typhoid, headache signs and stomach-ache)

Endundulu, Alamuriaki, Osokonoi, Enjani emburkel, Elwaay and several others to treat diseases ranging from sexually transmitted, injuries and other causes of diseases. Such medicines are taken at home remedy before attending to the primary health care centres. However, these medicines were taken to solve ailments in general. Furthermore, the participants did not differentiate between self-use of traditional medicine treatment at home and attending to the herbalist for treatment. Yet, all participants appreciated the use of herbs, minerals and animal extracts in the healing process during treatment and no one reported non-use of this alternative means of treatment. They also appreciated the effectiveness and good treatment outcomes. It was observed that most health cases had specified traditional medicines to treat and so many options were available before deciding to seek treatment in conventional health systems.

3.2.3 Preference on Traditional Healer

Nearly all participants in this study pointed out the use of health services offered by a traditional healer to persist in the studied community. Several treatments accessed at the traditional healer included ailments for both children and adults, traditional medicines that were reported to facilitate vomiting of poisonous substances in the body and through diarrhoea, other traditionally mentioned ill-health cases like “Mamboleo and Enang’ami”, dental services like removal or cure of teeth problems and cancer diseases. The participants however referred traditional healers in several names like witchdoctors or diviners. Many of them also recognized their importance in various ill-health cases that were impossible to get better in hospital or primary health care facilities. Such ill-health cases were mentioned as the health cases of bewitched people, cases of infertility or sterility among women and cases of evil eyes especially to children. The following was the verbatim quote from one of the interviewees in Oltukai village.

...There are other diseases that cannot either be identified or treated in any hospital including the government and private ones. You can go around all these hospitals but you will end up being told by the doctors that you better visit the traditional healers or specialists as they are very helpful in treating unseen or unknown diseases. These diseases are like sorcery, traditional poisoning and evil eyes...

3.2.4 Preference on Bone Setters

The findings from the field work also revealed that the studied community attends to traditional bone setters to heal fractured bones, setting bones and bandaging. It was reported that there are community specialists in bone healing and people use them as the first entry before looking for further treatment in the primary health facilities. Likewise, the swelling health cases were easily reported to primary health facilities than the total fracture of bones which in the participant’s perceptions are better attended by traditional bone setters manually. The participants reported that the cases of bones taken to primary health facilities are not properly addressed as when they are taken to traditional bone setters. One of the participants in Oltukai village pointed out;

...When you go to a primary health facility for the bone fractures, a doctor just tighten a bandage and give some medicine to you to apply and it takes long time to

get better while the traditional bone setter help you by applying the manual techniques and you get better very early and even without taking pain killers. For this reason I even have faith in traditional bone setters and I prefer their service to primary health care facility.

The traditional bone setters were reported to use very effective local techniques like sticks and animal skins for coating of which to the participants' opinion is unlike bandaging because it does not tighten much and it does not cause pains to the patient.

Furthermore, the health care providers reported the community members' use of alternative means of treatment especially home remedy in which the plants' and animals' remnants are used for treatment. The reason for the community's preference of alternative treatment even before attending to primary health care facilities is that it is rooted in the culture and people have faith in traditional medicine than those available in health centres. The health care providers reported that there is little that can be done to make people use the services from the health care centres from the onset of the disease. There should rather be education on the importance of attending health centres than traditional medicines where people are not sure of the kind of disease and specific medicine for treatment.

3.2.5 Preference on Private Clinics, Pharmacies and Drug Shops

In semi-structured interviews, many participants reported the private clinics, pharmacies and drug shops as among preferable entries where they can access treatment or buy drugs in case of illness. The private clinics were reported to help in diagnosis and administering of the medicine although they were mostly used by the well-off families. The pharmacies supply the community members with drugs which were reported to be at high cost. Both private clinics and pharmacies were reported to be remotely located from the villages and the distance is approximately 10 kilometres and can hardly be accessed by walking on foot but paying much money for a motorcycle popularly known as *bodaboda*. The participants also reported their reliance on drugs especially for headache, which are sold in very small shops found in the villages. It was noted that the hardship experienced in accessing the private clinics and pharmacies negatively affected their preference and use of the services.

Generally, the participants expressed clearly their preference for local or traditional treatment (home remedy, traditional healer and bone setters) as compared to biomedical treatment particularly the primary health care services despite the availability in their vicinity. Furthermore, this has shown that while the introduction of PHC and availability of services in the centres has been a necessary action towards ensuring the accessibility of health care services to the local community, it does not appear to be the sole factor for the community's preference or use of the source or services provided.

3.2.6 Community Preference of Treatment Sources by Sex

Investigating whether or not there was any difference in terms of treatment preference by sex, the findings revealed a very slight difference. The difference was noted in the preference for bone setters whereby men preferred it mostly compared to women. The difference was also noted in the use of primary health care facilities and private clinics,

pharmacies and drug shops of which were mostly preferred by women compared to men (see Table 3.3). Men's preference for bone setters was more faith in traditional treatment while women's preference for primary health care facilities and private clinics, pharmacies and drug shops was attributed to health complications associated with the delivery that is currently properly handled by modern health care systems including primary health care centres. It was further found that women's preference for primary health centres was predetermined by the demand of health officers in the nearer future in that the child will only be attended in clinics if his or her mother will have attended health services including maternal care provided in the centre. One of the woman participants in Oltukai village had the following to say;

...We, women like to use local medicine mostly than modern medicines from hospitals but we cannot avoid being treated in a primary health centre. This is due to the fact that if a woman does not attend or go for health services in the health centre, her child will not receive clinical treatment until you show a clinical certificate and if you won't have it, you will not get health service or else your child will not be attended...

Table 3.3: Community's preference of treatment sources by sex

			Home remedy	Traditi onal healer	Bone setters	PHCS	Private shops, pharmacy and drug shops	Others	Total
Sex of respon dent	male	Count	52	21	11	4	1	2	91
		% within sex of responde rs	57.10%	23.10%	12.10%	4.40%	1.10%	2.20%	100.0 0%
	female	Count	48	20	2	8	4	3	85
		% within sex of responde nt	56.50%	23.50%	2.40%	9.40%	4.70%	3.50%	100.0 0%
Total		Count	100	41	13	12	5	5	176
		% within sex of responde nt	56.80%	23.30%	7.40%	6.80%	2.80%	2.80%	100.0 0%

Source: Field Data (2015)

3.3 Factors that Shaped Community's Treatment Preferences

When inquired about what shaped their treatment preference, the participants highlighted some features which shaped not only their treatment preferences but also determined their

willingness to use (or not) different sources of treatment through the discussions. The attributes or characteristics comprised more faith and trust in well-known traditional means of treatment and quality of services.

The faith and trust in traditional health care system which rooted in cultural set up were a key factor that shaped the treatment preference before the consideration of other factors. This was explained by almost every participant during the study. It was evident that the faith and trust of traditional treatment sources constrained or discouraged the use of primary health care services and hence the reason for the reported little (or none) use of primary health care services provided in facilities. Many health cases were first attended in home remedy of which was basically through the use of local medicines. The home remedy was reported to be effective and cured ill-health cases at early stage and people were also reported to be tolerant to diseases and used much time trying different local medicines before deciding to go to primary health care facilities. Similarly, the participants reported an impossibility of some health cases to be treated in the primary health facilities because there was no medicine for treatment. Through the interview, the health care providers acknowledged the complexity of some of the health cases that could better be handled through tradition treatment options and they advised the patients or caregivers to seek the available experts in traditional medicine. One of the health officers in Oltukai village pointed out;

...Maasai people have much faith in traditional medicines and you cannot convince them to trust the modern ones. It has been challenging even in contributing to Community Health Fund (CHF) because most of them like and use alternative treatment. It has been a problem because a patient can be taken to all possible alternative sources and get admitted to the health centre only when all their trials have failed. It is also true that most of their traditional means of treatment are effective and handle most cases...

Regarding the quality of treatment, the participants explained various considerations from their stand point. This included the proper clinical examination or diagnosis before medicine prescriptions, drugs availability in a sufficient manner, availability of enough and competent health workers, availability of equipment, having health workers with care and compassion, cleanliness and availability of dustbins, availability of electricity or solar energy to facilitate service provision during night and availability of accommodation for patients. These criteria were consistent with the study findings in Uganda in which the factors and consideration used by users to assess the quality health care were availability of amenities such as infrastructure, clean water, supply of sufficient equipment and supplies, good interpersonal relationships as well as accessibility to services for vulnerable populations, referral and preventive services (Kiguli *et al.*, 2009). The participants however mentioned or emphasized nothing on the outcome and preventive services different from the study by Kiguli *et al.* (2009) and that by Haddad *et al.* (1998) in which more emphasis was given to treatment outcomes and however little preventive services. The poor quality of services in primary health care centers was pointed out by those who reported to prefer and use the services as

the big challenge and the reason for many people's choice for alternative treatment options such as the decision to use home remedy, traditional healer and others.

The participants were quoted complaining about the poor quality of services that highly deters community from using the services in PHCs. A 45 year-old villager of Oltukai had the following explanations;

... Here, in our dispensary, there are no tools for diagnosis rather than very simple one which they use to diagnose Malaria disease for children. Currently, people expect to be diagnosed but are told about the disease before any treatment and that is why many of us go to a private health centre for diagnosis and come back to ask for medicine in our health centre. We thank our health workers for understanding us on this and they sometimes ask us to go for diagnosis elsewhere and get back for medicine at the centre.

Explaining the problem of drugs availability, woman participant in Mswakini Juu remarked;

... Many times, we are told by our primary health care providers to go and buy drugs in private shops as they are not available in our health care centres. The doctors direct us where we can go to find the medicine and we buy them at a very high cost. This is discouraging and that is why many of us prefer home remedy and those capable of paying money for treatment in private hospitals do so... ”

The tendency of guessing many health cases in primary health facilities ends up labelling a quite different health problem and prescribing irrelevant medicine was noted during the study. It was also pointed out in focus groups discussions that there was a problem of over guessing health cases. A female respondent at Oltukai village said;

... When I gave birth to my child (pointed to her two month old child), it had unusual crying that is, it cried for the whole day and night time. I decided to take her to the primary health centre and without medical examination, the health specialist told me that the child was suffering from pneumonia and he provided me with medicine. Unfortunately, there was not recovery and I decided to go to the private health centre and the doctor diagnosed my child and discovered that my child was suffering from oral thrush. My child was treated and the problem ended...

4.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

The research findings underline the facts that while the introduction of primary health care and availability of services in the centres has been a necessary action to ensure the accessibility of health care services to the local community, it does not appear to be the sole factor for the peoples' use of the services provided and may not even be a sufficient solution for the health improvement of the people. The sources of health that are highly and widely utilized are those from traditional treatment options.

There is a wide range of factors that shapes and influences the community's preference and use of different health treatment options but in Maasai the community's faith and trust in well-known traditional options is a key characteristic put into consideration. Unless the

broader factors such as culture and quality assurance are identified, and addressed in initiation and provision of the health services, the primary health care services as intervention mechanisms are unlikely to be acceptable, effective or sustainable in practice in a multicultural context.

This paper recommends that full community participation in initiation of the big health programmes is paramount in understanding its preferences and so, developing socially acceptable health services that give special consideration to the culture of the specific community. This will unveil the context specific criteria and guide the intervention or improvement efforts and as a result, it enhances community utilization of services. There is also a need for quality improvement of health services provision in the primary health care facilities based on community perceived criteria. Also, those established conventionally such as those with the aim of making improvement in facility structures especially beds and rooms and process of health delivery from reception to leaving the center should be bettered. The attention should be paid to laboratory facilities for routine diagnoses to be done in primary health care facilities. The laboratory technicians should also be employed to fasten the functioning of laboratories. The provision of power supply, adequate and qualified personnel (medical and administrative) in particular should also be considered to maximize the community's use of services provided in primary health care facilities.

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Our Way, Our Demise: An Overview of Key Selected Self-inflicted Socio-economic, Political and Intellectual Issues Confronting Africa in the 21st Century

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Abstract

The African continent is endowed with enormous human and natural resources, with the latter estimated to be greater than that of almost any other continent in the world, yet she is the least developed region in the world. Although the phenomenon has been the subject of numerous interventions and innumerable studies each purporting to prescribe a solution by discerning the way forward for the continent, the situation continues to persist and exacerbate reducing Africa into a beggarly region. But in specific terms, what is it that keeps dragging African progress back? While many issues have been pinpointed, this analytical paper that benefited from a systematic review of literature attempts to identify and limit itself to a few apparently dire self-inflicted aspects of development the continent is seriously facing in the 21st century. These include poverty, governance, politics, corruption, state capture, and African-mannerism. It is in the opinion of this piece that addressing such issues is key to resolving African underdevelopment quagmire.

Key words: Africa, Corruption, Governance, Politics, State capture, African-mannerism

1.0 Introduction

... “Our biggest challenge today as far as development is concern is ourselves (Africans). Others whom we often label as “enemy” and blame for our misfortunes only take advantage of us because of our own flaws and weaknesses arising from our inefficiencies on the way we approach our societal challenges. ...Any solution to our problems, thus, needs to start by addressing our shortcomings that afflict us as individuals, families, communities, nations, and eventually as the continent. Until we address such, we shall remain prey and the ones primarily to blame for our state of affairs. It is long past time we stopped ...agonizing and whining about how the outsiders namely, our colonizers, the neo-imperialists and neo-colonialists are exploiting us in every manner possible and keeping us down. None of them owe us anything. If, they are preying on us, it is because we have invited them, dined with them, and allowed them to do so”... (Ali Mazrui, 2002: 14)

The history of the post-independent African states is that of monumental democratic and developmental failures. Despite decades of conceptualizing, formulating and implementing various types of development policies and programmes, after almost four and a half decades of independence, most countries on the continent have been characterized by underdevelopment. The evidence for this state of underdevelopment can be found in any

social and economic indicators one cares to examine. At the economic level, Africa has been marked by the dominance of the primary sectors namely agriculture, oil, and minerals partly as a result of the inability of the African state to foster an environment for high value added economic activities, low domestic capital formation and declining direct foreign investment, foreign aid dependence, heavy indebtedness, high unemployment, and the informalization of the economies where the majority of its people live in poverty. Consequently, in the 21st century, Africa has been unable to compete in the global economy (Robert, 2015; Schmidt, 2014).

In the same vein, the majority of African countries lack basic social and physical infrastructure (Schmidt, 2014; World Bank, 2013). As a result, most people on the continent have no access to basic services such as education, potable water, electricity, good sanitation, roads and healthcare. The lack of access to basic medical care occurs against a backdrop of ravaging diseases; a situation which has been exacerbated with the advent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The continent accounts for about 70% of all HIV-infected persons and AIDS-related deaths in the world (UNAIDS, 2017). All of this is against the backdrop of the absence of a social safety net to cushion the effects of the harsh socio-economic realities experienced by most Africans.

Since attaining their independence, most African countries have been plagued by various forms of conflicts. Be it political or otherwise, conflicts have continued to be a trending feature in African countries and a source of underdevelopment. Although much contemporary conflicts seem to be about political, ethnic, or religious differences, in fact these conflicts generally have an economic and a political basis.

In order to reverse underdevelopment in Africa, several initiatives have been put in place. These include: the 1980 Lagos Action Plan, the 1986-1990 Priority Programme of Economic Redressing of Africa (PPREA) adopted by the OAU in 1985 and complementary UN Programme for the Economic Redressing and Development of Africa, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Alternative Structural Adjustment Programme for Africa, and the African Scope of Reference for SAPS for Socio-Economic Redressing and Transformation. These efforts, to a large extent, have not been effectively implemented. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) seems to be the latest African development initiative. This initiative is a merger of the Millennium Action Plan for African Recovery Programme (MAP), the Omega Plan, and the New Compact with Africa. It represents an additional step towards anchoring development in the collective vision and commitment of African leaders.

This paper identifies and examines the key issues which are critical to the development of Africa in the 21st century which have implicitly and explicitly dominated both local and international developmental discourses and debates. Specifically, it aims at examining the issues of poverty, governance, corruption, state capture, politics, and African-mannerism and demonstrating the extent and manner in which they have held Africa hostage as far development in general is concerned. These are of common concern to the continent without identifying the country-level challenges or drawing any country-specific conclusions. The discussion however is cognizant of the heterogeneity nature of the continent and attempts not to juxtapose, rather, in many instances to only draw specific examples to a

specific narrative. The author hopes that this will neither water down nor decimalize the argument brought forth. While admitting the fact that the content of this discussion is almost a monotonic rhetoric to most readers, yet, the reminder of the key issues is of at most importance as the continent struggles to bring about and ensure equitable and sustainable development. This paper however adopts a rather unpopular position. It contends that the so christened 'African problems' are never entirely external but largely authored by Africans themselves. In short, these are mostly 'self-inflicted' maladies

Africa contains 57 countries. In its 2015 book entitled *Challenges of African Growth*, the World Bank notes that African nations range from "sophisticated, middle-income countries such as South Africa, to failed states such as Somalia; from large, oil-rich countries such as Nigeria, to small resource-poor countries such as Niger; from countries that have come out of conflict and have experienced tremendous recent success, such as Mozambique and Rwanda, to countries trapped in conflict, poverty, and poor government such as Somalia." However, for the bulk of the post-independence period (i.e., since 1960), most African countries have displayed, with a striking degree of similarity politically, socially, culturally, and economically (Leon, 2015).

2.0 Methods

The technological advances have led to a vast amount of data that has been collected, compiled, and archived, and that is now easily accessible for research. As a result, utilizing existing data for research is becoming more prevalent, and therefore, secondary data analysis. While secondary analysis is flexible and can be utilized in several ways, it is also an empirical exercise and a systematic method with procedural and evaluative steps, just as in collecting and evaluating primary data. Four important steps were taken in the analysis of data used in this piece. These include identifying the subject domain, gathering existing data, comparing data from different sources, and analyzing the data.

In accomplishing the first step, the author prepared a list of questions to be solved by the end of the process. This step helped to narrow down the topic from the challenges facing Africa in the 21st century to socio-economic, intellectual, and political variables. After identifying the research domain, the author looked at various sources of information and

¹ Repeatedly, the debate has arisen regarding the root cause of Africa's woes. Some Afrocentric scholars within and without have sought to attribute the continent's suffering to the twin ills of the slave trade and colonialism. Going further, those belonging to this school of thought reason that the rest of the world, particularly Europe, owes Africa an apology, for starters, along with the wholesale eradication of her foreign indebtedness- the deserved icing on the cake! Then and only then, in their eyes will the impetus be provided for Africa to begin to assume her rightful place in the community of world nations. Contrary to the above view however, this paper holds a divergent opinion. Africa's tragedy, to my mind, is neither a product of the slave trade nor is there any credence in the lame duck colonialism thesis. In the opinion of the author, Africa's biggest trauma lies in the constant constrictions (economic and otherwise) placed on the dreams, hopes and ambitions that Africans have for themselves. The culprits in Africa's malaise are Africans themselves presided by their rulers (not readers who by far inspire their people towards achieving corporate goals which serve the common good of the larger society), the most ostentatious of the species that history has ever generated. These grandiloquent actors are adept, through their greed, at eroding the best of Africa's promise. It is at the doorsteps of Africans and their rulers that the woes and misfortunes should rightly be consigned

decided where to get credible information in responding to such aspects, and as such, Google-scholar was used. In the second step, the four variables above were further broken into six sub-variables namely, poverty, corruption, governance, politics, state capture, and African-mannerism. This last variable focused on culture, intellectualism, and academic competition. At this step, the keywords and their synonyms were used to search appropriate data which saved the author a lot of time in finding valuable data and this also warranted no important information to be missed out. In the third stage, collected pieces information were assessed for their quality, relevance, and authenticity. At the final stage, the researcher sought actionable findings to support the hypothesis made in this paper, and substantiate the arguments made.

3.0 Poverty

Africa is continually written-off by both foreign and local media as an arena for relief agencies and a continent of economic decay, but also, with potential. Much as in large measure this image is said to be attributed to crisis journalism, fed by international aid agencies pushing their own agendas and compounded by the economic statistics emanating from institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the facts on the ground depicting such a situation are overwhelming, and thus, hard to dismiss. The fact that the poor in Africa have grown to accommodate and accept poverty as part and parcel of their lives (Gardener and Reintsma, 2014), and that all econometric indicators show an increase of some sort does not necessarily translate into progress (Goldman, 2003; World Bank, 2014a).

In spite of all the wealthy resources including human and material in its possession, Africa is the world's poorest² continent (UNDP, 2013; World Development Report, 2014). The development strategies of the last 30 years have failed to halt the impoverishment of Africa. According to the World Bank (2014b), Africa has been the greatest, sustained development failure of the century. This is particularly evident in the extent to which most African countries are off track to achieve most of the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2013). It is widely acknowledged by both local and international studies that by 2025, the majority of those living in absolute poverty will be living on the African continent. Clearly, the major challenge facing most African countries in the 21st century will be finding ways to eradicate poverty (World Development Report, 2014; World Bank, 2015)

... .. "The incomparable paradoxes of Africa include a continent which is richly endowed with human and mineral resources and yet is the poorest continent in the world; a continent which has tracts of arable land large enough to feed continents, yet which cannot feed itself; a continent which is blessed with lakes and large rivers and yet suffers from droughts and where her people die of thirst; and, the strangest

²The assessment was made in light of the following poverty dimensions; lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods, hunger and malnutrition, ill health, limited or lack of access to education and other basic services, increased morbidity and mortality from illness, homelessness and inadequate housing, unsafe environments, social discrimination and exclusion, and lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural rights

paradox of all—the poorest continent on earth which has some of the world’s wealthiest leaders”....[Sam-Mpasu, former Minister of Education, Malawi]

This inadequate progress raises serious questions about the policies and strategies that have been adopted to achieve poverty reduction on the one hand and the commitment and political will of implementing participants in genuinely curbing the problem on the other (Muhammad, 2004). With the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals, including the eradication of extreme poverty by 2030, successful implementation of the post-2015 development agenda will require genuine commitments of the stakeholders, a solid understanding of poverty and inequality in the region, across countries and population groups, and in different dimensions (Muhammad, 2004; Berg *et al.*, 2012).

A clear and definitive state of poverty in Africa remains unclear given the poor quality of the data (Devarajan, 2013; Jerven, 2013), the expansive nature of the definition of poverty, and the nature of the growth process (especially the role of natural resources) (de la Briere *et al.*, 2015), the emergence of extreme wealth (Oxfam 2015), the heterogeneity of the region, and persistent population growth of 2.7 percent a year (Canning *et al.*, 2015) among other factors. However, in order for this paper to show a fairly accurate picture of the phenomenon in its discussion and conclusion, this section utilized the African Poverty Report (2016) of the World Bank (WB), Poverty, the Growth, and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa Report (2015) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Economic Report on Africa (2017) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The reports take a broad and multidimensional view of poverty in assessing progress over the past two decades along both monetary and non-monetary dimensions. The reports examined progress in education and health, the extent to which people are free from violence and able to shape their lives, and the joint occurrence of various types of deprivation. It also reviewed the distributional aspects of poverty, by studying various dimensions of inequality. To shed light on Africa’s diversity, the report examined the differences in performance across the countries by location and gender.

After what is allegedly referred to as two decades of unprecedented economic growth by a score of econometric reports on the continent, to what extent have the lives of African families improved? Even under the somewhat overstated most optimistic and successful scenarios, the latest estimates from the WB, UNECA, and IMF suggest that the share of the African population in extreme poverty did decline from 56 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 2014. At the same time, however, Africa’s population has continued to expand rapidly. As a result, the number of people living in extreme poverty still increased by more than 100 million (330 million in 2014 than in 1990 to about 280 million). A systematic assessment using synthetic two-period panels (which are less prone to measurement errors) constructed for 35 countries reveals that about half of the population was chronically poor (poor in every period), with the other half poor only transiently (in only one period) (Dabalen and Dang, 2015). Chronic poverty remains pervasive in the region. These are staggering numbers. Further, the UNECA and WB reports project that by 2030 the world’s extreme poor will be increasingly concentrated in Africa.

The improvements in nonmonetary domains notwithstanding, the levels of achievement remain low in all domains, and the rate of progress is leveling off. Despite the increase in school enrollment, today still more than two out of five adults are unable to read or write. About three-quarters of sixth graders in Malawi and Zambia cannot read for meaning (Schmidt, 2014). This is just one example of the challenges of providing good-quality schooling. The need to reinvigorate efforts to tackle Africa's basic educational challenge is urgent.

Health outcomes mirror the results for literacy: progress is happening, but outcomes remain the worst in Africa (Schmidt, 2014). Increases in immunization and bed-net coverage are slowing. Nearly two in five children are malnourished, and one in eight women is underweight. At the other end of the spectrum, obesity is emerging as a new health concern (WHO, 2014).

Africans enjoyed considerably more peace in the 2000s than they did in earlier decades, but the number of violent events has been on the rise since 2010, reaching four times the level of the mid-1990s. Violence is increasingly experienced in terms of political unrest and terrorism rather than large-scale civil conflicts. Africa also remains among the bottom performers in terms of voice and accountability, albeit with slightly higher scores than the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and the Pacific. Tolerance of domestic violence (at 30 percent of the population) is still twice as high as in the rest of the developing world, and the incidence of domestic violence is more than 50 percent higher (Annamaria and Walle, 2015). Higher tolerance of domestic violence and less empowered decision making among younger (compared with older) women suggest that a generational shift in mindset is still to come. There is also a paradoxical fact that citizens in resource-rich countries are experiencing steadily lower outcomes in all human welfare indicators controlling for their income level. Clearly, policy matters beyond resource availability.

Factors which in various circles have largely been linked to the impoverishment of Africa include violence, internal conflicts, natural disasters, droughts, food shortages, population growth, population movement, AIDS, environmental degradation and changes in access to land, social discrimination, and bad governance. However, of all the aspects which have in one way or the other been blamed for impoverishment in Africa, bad governance has received a good number of advocates.

4.0 Governance

Beginning from the 1980s, there has been a gradual, but concerted attempt to reverse the trend of political despair and disillusionment, which hitherto characterized political life in Africa. This attempt manifests in the demand for political pluralism and democratization. The long years of political misrule and of course bad governance exemplified by personalized political regimes and ruthless dictatorships left most African states politically demobilised and economically de-capacitated with an immiserized population ravaged by poverty, illiteracy and disease. Regrettably, as explained in the first part of this paper on poverty, Africa harbors the highest stock of the world's poorest people. The debilitating poverty of the people accentuated by the economic crisis seems to have provided a basis and indeed, a

common platform in the demand for democratic change by the people. Thus, the struggle for democratization in Africa has relevance not only in liberalizing the political arena and achieving civil and political liberties, but also to ensure better living standards and social welfare for the African people (Adejumobi, 2006; Lisulo, 2011), in other words, achieving the object of good governance.

The demand for political participation and the involvement of the people in the choice of their leaders and decision-making which constitutes the critical hub of political democracy is not a new phenomenon in Africa. The anti-colonial project was constructed and legitimised on this basis (Sorensen, 1993). As such, the current democratic effervescence in Africa could be regarded not as a process of ‘democratic birth’, but to use the words of Lisulo (2011), a process of “democratic renewal”.

For the purpose of bisecting it and bringing it home, the concept of good governance is deliberated in the views of prominent Africanist scholars Goran Hyden. He considers good governance as the conscious management of regime structures with a view to enhancing the public realm (Hyden, 1992). It seeks to reconstitute politics from a high level frequency of zero sum calculation to a middle ground where politics is a positive sum game characterized by reciprocal behavior and legitimate relations between the governors and the governed. The key properties of the governance realm are authority, reciprocity, exchange, trust and accountability, with each of these components emphasizing and reinforcing democratic norms and practices in one way or the other. For instance, authority seeks expression in the legitimate use of power in which the people elect and control their leaders, while the parameter of accountability is the extent to which the people can hold their elected or appointed officials responsible for their actions or inactions. Reciprocity refers to the nature and quality of the social interaction among members of a political community and its major indicator in the public realm is the extent to which individuals are free to form associations to defend and protect their interests (Ibid). Differently put, the emphases of the governance realm are elections, political control and responsiveness, freedom of expression and plural politics, which are principles, and nuances of liberal democracy. Along the same line, Gerry Stoker (2008), contends that governance is primarily concerned with ordered rule and collective action, but one in which political power must be seen to be legitimate, there must be autonomous self-governing network of actors, and a balance between state and civil society. It is when this is achieved in qualitative terms that there may be good governance and so does the development.

Without overstating and reiterating on what has already been empirically expounded earlier on poverty, generally, Africa’s development hemorrhage is a debilitating and profound one, when compared with that of other parts of the world. The genealogy and dimensions of the African crises have been well analysed, they therefore need no rehash. Suffice it to point out that a recurring decimal in Africa’s development dilemma is the issue of governance (Onimode, 2008; Sandbrook, 2015). The situation in Africa, as Samuel Huntington (2010) described it, is one in which governments simply do not govern, that is, they often lack the organisational capacity to manage society and promote economic change and social

welfare. Sandbrook (2015) portrays the governance dimension of the Africa crises quite graphically:

... "But the actual and present condition of Africa is one of deep trouble, sometimes of a deeper trouble than the worst imposed during the colonial years... harsh governments or dictatorships rule over peoples who distrust them to a point of hatred and usually for good and sufficient reasons; and all too often one dismal tyranny gives way to worse one. Despair rots civil society, the state becomes an enemy, bandits flourish"... [2015:114]

Nevertheless, today, good governance, though with countless challenges is being practiced in many parts of Africa. Yet, there is an agitation for democratic reforms by the African people which shows a clear predilection for plural politics and democratic governance. The expectation is that this will transform the social sphere and make life more abundant for the people. The pattern and modalities of such reforms have differed from place to place ranging from the national conference model of the French West African countries to the state authored democratic transition process (Sandbrook, 2015). Between 1985 and 1990, not less than 20 authoritarian regimes were forced to liberalize the political arena, while multi-party elections were held in eight countries (Bratton and Va de Walle, 1992). Today, about three-quarter of African countries are under a fairly democratic rule (Leon, 2015; Bartels and Achen, 2016). However, the extent to which the current democratic project with its frailties, uncertainties and sometimes reversals, could usher in a viable democracy and ensure good governance particularly in the 21st century remains an issue of conjecture.

In spite of this positive leap, the democratic project in Africa remains wobbly and qualitatively stunted. In countries like Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, Gabon, Rwanda and Uganda, Democratic Republic Congo, and Rwanda to mention a few could at best talk of a 'façade' democracy in which massaged elections were grudgingly arranged, with the perpetuation of civil political autocracy under the guise of democratic rule. In Zimbabwe, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, and Gambia, yesterday's military dictators have suddenly become 'born again' democrats, re-institutionalizing their power mostly through a corrupted electoral process (Mkandawire, 2010). To be sure, civil and political liberties remain highly constrained in Africa and the parlous economy does not brighten the prospects of democracy on the continent.

In general terms, because countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many countries have served their own interest without fear of being called to account. In self-defence, individuals have built up personal networks of influence rather than holding the all-powerful state accountable for its systemic failure. In this way, politics becomes personalized and patronage becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy, information is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or disbanded. Such environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy (World Bank, 2013). Further, the military constitutes a major obstacle to the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Africa where militarisation of the political arena and civil control has flourished and become a norm of the hour (Bartels and Achen, 2016; Stoker, 2008). While citizens are harassed and opposition leaders victimized,

apprehended and branded with unfounded allegations, the problem is even more debilitating when it has been realized in most African countries that the military often detest and mostly thwart the reform of the institution not emanating from or conducted by it for the very purpose of upholding the status quo.

However, in spite of this dismal picture, it would be apposite to note that the performance and outcome of political regimes in Africa have varied among and within nations at different periods. Some have performed fairly better and some have miserably failed to lift African up on the map of success. It is only fair to assert that most have exemplified the latter characteristic than the former. This can well be demonstrated by the failure of African heads of state to secure the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership. Since being launched in 2006, the Ibrahim Prize has been awarded only four times. The previous Laureates are President Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia (2014), President Pedro Pires of Cabo Verde (2011), President Festus Mogae of Botswana (2008), and President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique (2007). Nelson Mandela was the inaugural Honorary Laureate in 2007.

Some other African heads of state who will go down to history to have truly carried out the African development agenda at heart given the timing and limitations are some immediate post-independent regimes like that of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya. Although statist in character, did place some premium on the welfare of the people and constructed what could be described as minimally or fairly good government.

The World Bank (2015) and various other local and international bodies and scholars therefore argue that adjustments alone cannot put Africa on a sustained poverty-reducing path; such adjustment must be complemented with institution building and good governance. Germane to the conception of good governance are the issues of public accountability of government officials, transparency in government procedures, rule of law and public sector management (Hyden, 1992; Nunnekamp, 2015). The process of evolving good governance in Africa according to the World Bank (2015) requires the shrinking of the state and engendering support for non-state actors (civil society) among other efforts which Africa has so far not delivered to its contentment.

5.0 Corruption

Corruption can no longer be viewed as the victimless crime. It is a crime against humanity. Corruption has existed since time immemorial. Even in biblical scriptures, corruption is present in many stories. The scourge of corruption in post-colonial Africa is gnawing at the progress that the continent could be enjoying. The continent has many ideological voices all seeking relevance. Politicians and Statesmen in Africa are in an ideological tug of war. From Nkrumah's 'scientific socialism', Nyerere's 'ujamaa' (socialism) and Senghor's 'Negritude' all these ideologies had good intentions but none of them materialized. Regardless of the ideological persuasion, from the post-independence era to date, Africa has produced a few states capable of creating enabling environment for economic development. It is not a

contest of which ideology is suitable for Africa, it is a question of whether all these ideologies can be implemented free of the shackles of corruption.

Corruption emerges from many avenues. In Africa, some of the identifiable causes of corruption include the negative colonial legacy, poor leadership, politics of the belly, omnipotent state, greed and selfishness (Ayee, 2014; Barr and Serra, 2010; Cameron, 2016). Clientelism and patronage nepotism, absence of popular participation of the public in government, weak institutions of governance, lack of accountability and transparency, lack of political will, weak ethical values, centralist nature of the state and concentration of state power, weak judicial system and constant insecurity and conflicts are also the causes of corruption (IMF, 2016). It is the top African echelons who are mostly the perpetrators of corruption.

Former Nigerian president Sani Abacha was estimated to be worth \$20 Billion at the time of his death (IMF, 2016). How a president, a public servant ends up being a billionaire can only be attributed to corruption. In South Africa, Jacob Zuma was found to have unduly benefited from the taxpayers money in the infamous Nkandla debacle (Transparency International, 2015). In Congo, Joseph Kabila and his family are among the richest people in the continent owing their wealth to diamond mining (Ibid). Uhuru Kenyatta, the president of Kenya and son of Jomo Kenyatta was on the Forbes list of the richest men in Africa. Jomo Kenyatta openly grabbed vast tracts of land from the British when Kenya attained independence (Transparency International, 2015). Paul Biya in Cameroon is also amongst the richest people in Africa and corrupt dealings have been synonymous with his name (Ibid). In Zimbabwe, the top government officials are notorious for their lavish lifestyles (Transparency International, 2015). Money has been stolen from the government coffers without any apology or remorse. The examples the author has given here are not exhaustive. The mention of trillions lost to a few powerful individuals should make all of us Africans to pause and see that we will not progress if we do not tackle corruption by the horns.

The culture of corruption has entrenched its roots in Africa. South Africa the youngest democracy is seeing nascent corruption, grand or petty. Africa is unashamedly wearing the cloak of corruption without taking cognizance of the fact that it is its society that is rotting. Traffic violations that merit traffic fines are swept under the carpet as traffic officials openly ask for bribes. Civilians like you and me are familiar with petty corruption. Similarly, the ruling classes are familiar with grand corruption. Karl Kraus (1998), an Australian satirist said that corruption is worse than prostitution. The latter might endanger the morals of an individual while the former invariably endangers the morals of an entire country. Africa is poor not because the right political ideologies are not in place. She is poor because of the far reaching effects of corruption.

Political parties chant mantras of helping the poor. Irrelevant politicians were propelled into power because they were riding on the tide of 'helping the poor'. Because of corruption, the poor suffer disproportionately from the effects of corruption. When health and basic education expenditures are given lower priority in favor of capital intensive programs that offer more opportunities for high-level rent taking (such as defense contracts), lower

income groups lose services on which they depend. The poor do not eat political dogma but need services provided to them by politicians who are not corrupt.

Corruption impedes economic growth (World Bank, 2013; 2015) by discouraging foreign and domestic investment, taxing and dampening entrepreneurship, lowering the quality of public infrastructure, decreasing tax revenues, diverting public talent into rent-seeking and distorting the composition of public expenditure. In Zimbabwe, for example, funds that were allocated by donors during the Mubage regime were openly embezzled by the political elite (Transparency International, 2015). The purpose for which the funds are donated for end up at the lowest priority rung and suffering continues.

South Africa and Lesotho have the highest inequality in Africa (World Bank, 2015). Politicians will make noise on what ideology will work to correct the income inequalities but the problem can be surmounted by vanquishing corruption. There exists a positive correlation between corruption and income inequality (Lambsdorff, 2012; World Bank, 2013; 2015). Explanations for this link are that corruption distorts the economy and the legal and policy frameworks allowing some to benefit more than others. Corruption leads to unfair distribution of government resources and services. It reduces the progressivity of the tax system. It further increases the inequality of factor ownership and lower income households (and businesses) pay a higher proportion of their income in bribes than the middle or upper-income households do.

While there is no immediate panacea for corruption, this paper is of the conviction that ethical leadership will be a huge leap towards creating one. Ethics, a branch of philosophy that deals with morality should be a compulsory discipline for our leaders. A code of ethics that addresses the limitation of power, accountability, effectiveness and justice should be mandatory for all public office bearers. This paper cannot think of one solution but there are colorful measures that can be taken against corruption. Establishing a special court that shall specifically be dealing with all matters of corruption like the Tanzanian Corruption Court and Organised Crime and the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) is essential for every country. Africa needs to strengthen democratic institutions in order to ensure governmental accountability and transparency. Public participation in decision-making, the working together of private sector, and civil society institutions must be ensured. Economic rights must be guaranteed to all. The judicial system must be modeled on an autonomous foundation. An open review of public salaries, a free media and civil society which work closely with other stakeholders to create awareness to make sure that the public is supportive of the anti-corruption campaigns are amongst the leaps we can take against corruption.

6.0 State Capture

Relatively different from how normal corruption is accomplished, “state capture” in light of the Transparency International (2013) is a situation whereby powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use an influence of any form, largely, corruption to shape the nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their own private interests. As such, the state capture can broadly be understood as the

disproportionate and unregulated influence of interest groups or decision-making processes, whereby special interest groups manage to bend state laws, policies and regulations through practices such as illicit contributions paid by private interests to political parties and for election campaigns, parliamentary vote-buying, buying of presidential decrees or court decisions, as well as, through illegitimate lobbying and revolving door appointments. The state capture can as well spring from the more subtle close alignment of interests between specific business and political elites through family ties, friendship, and the intertwined ownership of economic assets. The most evident adverse consequence of state capture is that decisions no longer take into consideration the public interest, but instead, favour a specific group. Laws, policies and regulations are designed to benefit a specific interest group, often times to the detriment of smaller firms and groups and society in general. State capture seriously affects the economic development, regulatory quality, provision of public services, quality of education and health services, infrastructure decisions, and even the environment and public health. Public institutions such as the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and regulatory agencies both at the central and local levels are subject to capture.

Because of the lack of good governance, especially in terms of weakness on the part of African states to strengthen their institutions, control its bureaucracy, contractual rights and rule of law (Lambsdorff, 2012; World Bank, 2013; 2015), the states are giving way to increasing penetrations and commodification by large corporations. As a result, corruption and cronyism have become the order of the day. In this paper the author argues that in Africa as well as in other emerging economies, the inextricable relationship between state bureaucracy and large corporates, individuals or families cannot be ignored in any critical analysis of corruption and cronyism.

When one reads about the state of corruption in Africa, he/she conjures up images of state bureaucrats extracting bribes from helpless individuals or a private firm in order that they can facilitate some important work to be done. In this context, it would seem that the state is extracting a kickback for the selective benefit of some politician or bureaucrat. The flipside of this effect is when some large corporate or family stage-manages the governance policy framework of the state for its own selfish ends as the case appears for South Africa³. By any stretch of imagination, this ought to be regarded as the corruption of the most pernicious kind since it violates every tenet of democracy.

In many African states, politicians and public officials are perceived (and have often been found to be) as part of illicit, elite and corrupt networks (Transparency International, 2013). Over time this has resulted in increasing public mistrust of parliamentarians, public servants and state institutions, often leading to a waning respect for authority and the rule of law, and decreased institutional legitimacy. While Samuel Harris (2010) notes that the funding of parties and candidates is “just one of the fronts where the battle between the captures and democratic institutions is played out,” it remains important since investing in politics is a

³ Reference is made to the alleged relationship between President Zuma and the Gupta family

natural step for an industry that requires weak law enforcement and a measure of control over crucial public institutions such as customs to thrive.

This insidious situation has had many repercussions not only for the government and its leader, but perhaps, more importantly for the state of the economy and its poor world ranking. It has affected almost every facet of the state's apparatus, including the violation of its contractual rights and rule of law in Africa (Transparency International, 2013; World Bank, 2000). In contrast to other illicit means of interaction with the state, state capture often seeks to prevent the law from being enforced altogether leading to, or further ensconcing a culture of impunity. Further, evidence suggests that because of being susceptible to capture, international firms with local headquarters have been taking advantage, and thus, engaging into venality when competing for public procurement contracts due to the financial muscles they possess. Equally, within the perspective of state capture, there are real challenges for the long-term development of the African economy. It is highly unlikely that local emerging businesses will concentrate on competing in a warped economy through entrepreneurial spirit and innovation. They would rather spend their time, energy and entrepreneurial skills on capturing the state. Sadly, the distorted economy rewards those firms which are well connected to the bureaucracy of the state, and not those which show entrepreneurial promise.

If the African political economy continues to be captured by private business interests, it will weaken the state through corruption and cronyism and undermine good governance and the rule of law. If unchecked, the captured African states will systematically deter new private investment in the economy, both foreign and domestic, and create obstacles to the entry of small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of any competitive global economy. In the interest of the future of the African economy and good governance, Africans need to purge the state of corruption and cronyism. Failure to do so will only result in a situation that will perpetually be in a condition of capture and lend itself towards a slippery slope to economic decimation. Africa needs to improve her governance structures and strengthen her legal and regulatory environment.

7.0 African Mannerism in the Globalized World

7.1 African Culture

To Europe, Africa has been a source of raw materials and cheap labour for its commercial enterprises and lucrative profit. In order to fulfill this historical mission and profit realization in Africa, the foreign organizations had to subdue or even destroy local systems catering for the needs and aspirations of local communities. There is no respect for different cultures of the world. The dominant culture is European culture, which is universalized. This needs to be studied and analysed in local contexts. As Chivaura Gukwe (2008) wrote:

... "After we have understood Europe's destruction of African cultural and economic institutions and their replacement by its own as business, then, we will be in a position to know the appropriate action to take to liberate Africa's creative potential from continued repression and exploitation by European" ... (2008: 112)

From the evidence of history, the European culture in Africa cost lives, human worth, and minds (Chivaura, 2008). The European culture as part of a global package indicates nothing else but the extinction of local cultures. This comes about when African leaders and intellectuals turn away from their own cultures and put 'the destiny of their countries in European hands' (Mazrui, 2002). With globalization, the European systems in Africa will continue with their hegemony. By continuing to embrace such systems, African leaders and intellectuals continue to turn their backs on their own people, culture, and history and surrender themselves to Europe for direction in political, social, cultural, and moral matters.

The European culture in Africa has also become a big business. This culture is sold to Africans through the media, science fiction, magazines, school textbooks and other sources of information. Many movies watched by Africans on television and movie theatres, and songs broadcast on radio, promote the culture and values of Europe, with no relevance to Africa. English language has become no more a language of international communication but marginalization and subjugation of local languages. Ousmane (2009) is right, therefore, by saying that:

... "New leaders of Africa today are all-ears to Europe ... and speak to their people in European languages. Neither their radio, televisions ... press nor cinema uses the national languages, which are not used at any level in the schools either. The media, which should constitute right schools to replace the traditional evening gatherings ... to create awareness, are simply ... relay stations for the former mother country. African capitals are chief provinces-of New York, Paris, Rome, London, Madrid and Lisbon. There is the mad rush of the African heads of state to be received in Moscow, Beijing, Washington, London, Bonn, ... extending their cups, vying with each other for prestige,... claiming non-alignment and hypnotising slogans ... based on no economic or cultural reality in their respective countries"... (2009: 98-99)

African leaders and intellectuals have, therefore, through global culture lost their minds to Europe by losing their own culture. They have become possessed and a property of Europe. Prince Smith (2012) says:

... "When you control a man's thinking-you do not have to worry about his actions. You do not have to tell him to stand here or go yonder. He will find his proper place and will stay in it. You do not need to send him to the back door; he will cut one for his special benefit"... (2012: 116).

The global culture propagated by Europe ignores the fact that Europe and Africa are different. They have different beliefs, cultures, and institutions that impart opposite cosmologies. Not only does globalization ignore the fact that Africa is different from Europe but also the entire globe which is multicultural. Local cultures are therefore undermined over the superior European culture, with no recognition of the multicultural complexity of the world.

7.2 Intellectual Thought

One of the most significant obstacles to bring about fundamental changes in Africa is mental colonialism, conservatism, reactionary and dependent thinking of the African intellectuals or

so-called educated class. Trained by colonial masters, African intellectuals are mere students ready to carry out orders of their former masters. Their intellectual training has bred a dependency syndrome into them and left them with the pride of the Cambridge, Oxford, London universities where they have been trained to be better colonial agents. Hence, they cannot be entrusted with the mission of liberating the African continent. This is how Chango Machyo (2006) further explains the condition of the African intellectuals:

... "Generally speaking, the educated African is not a revolutionary. And the higher up in the educational ladder he or she climbs, the more conservative, reactionary and dependent he or she becomes. The role of the educated African is always to seek to be on the safe-side where the chances of falling into things of eating are brightest. Those who seemed to be revolutionary during their youth, slowly but surely shed their revolutionary outlooks as they grow up. They change their colours and preach 'moderation' and 'we must be realistic' joining the continuing efforts being made to de-revolutionize the masses - the peasantry and workers - and urging them to forgive and forget"... (2006: 58).

African intellectuals and revolutionaries, on ascending to power, whether-university or state, they sometimes carry out the instructions of the ex-colonial masters even more rudely than the masters themselves. The intellectuals' dependence has betrayed the African revolution for political emancipation. Their intellectual training has not only tamed them but also made them better civil servants of the colonial and now globalizing systems. Their education has neither made them to be better leaders, radical policy-makers, project initiators and developers nor critical thinkers. This is the kind of education that Walter Rodney describes as "education for subordination, exploitation with creation of mental confusion and the development of underdevelopment" (Rodney, 1976).

The history of the struggle for liberation in Africa was intended to change this white paternalism still embraced by African intellectuals including potential leaders. The 'talking on behalf of blacks' and 'thinking on what is best for them' that were acted by colonial masters still continues even after colonialism. The white people in Washington, London, and Paris decide and blacks implement the decision. When those decisions do not bear fruits they (blacks) are chastised for being inexperienced, corrupt and undemocratic. Surprisingly, the same African intellectuals continue to go to these western countries for more advice and expertise, which in the end does not work in the African context. Sometimes, the African intellectuals make as their own ideologies and value systems of the oppressors even when the result is demonstratively against themselves (William, 2009). In Africa, the foreign ideologies and value systems are embraced in the name of progress, modernization, and even globalization. The development of African thought in both academy and politics will only be possible the day when African intellectuals will make an ideological shift to Africanism.

7.3 Academic Competition

Due to their commitment to reason, one would not expect competition among and within academic disciplines. However, the last few years have witnessed a growing tendency of

competition among various academic disciplines, particularly between the social sciences, natural sciences, information technology, and economic management sciences. This was brought about by various factors. The first factor was the recent market appeal to educational institutions to produce graduates who will be able to fit the demands and requirements of the markets. Educational institutions therefore had to be responsive to the needs of the markets and redesign their curricula according to the dictates of the markets. The second factor is that there is an emphasis on science and technology. It is seen as essential for human development. It is assumed that the solutions to human problems like poverty, illiteracy, and other social ills can only be found in science and technology. This has led to the third factor, which is a dwindling of student numbers in the social sciences and lack of financial support in these disciplines. In fact, the sciences and economic subjects are better subsidized than their counterparts in the social sciences. African Studies, a branch of the social sciences, therefore, has to compete for survival with the sciences and market-related subjects. As an African discipline which attempts to bring African insights into the predominantly western education, it is perceived as something archival and of no value for modernity.

For some people, a productive focus on African contexts and cultures has no contribution to make in education. The western universalistic education and thought are seen as essential not only for knowledge production but also for human progress.

8.0 Our Politics

Analyzing African politics is a contested issue. The African countries are marked by their diversity. The plurality affects how politics evolve (Said, 2010). The ethnic, religious, linguistic, spatial, gender and class dimensions contribute to a complex picture. For example, the continent has about 2,110 living languages constituting about 30% of the world's total (Ayole, 2008). With forced amalgamation, there was the indiscriminate drawing of political boundaries by the colonial authorities lumping non-identical groups and communities together in the newly created states. Constructing nation-states and promoting cohesive national politics by groups and communities without identical social and political history, cultural affinity or social contiguity has been a major challenge. As such, the trend of politics and political regimes that unfolded on the continent since independence is obviously not monolithic. Some countries kept faith with multi-party democratic politics, although with a mostly dominant one-party-system while others had it official, and many of them reclined into a cycle of military coups and political dictatorships after independence.

However, since the beginning of the 21st century, the authoritarian regimes gradually gave way to nascent democratic attempts, shifting the nature of the political debate. Elections, multiparty democracy, contestation, rights, institutional checks, and governance accountability are now common currencies in Africa (Said, 2010; Bratton and Logan, 2014). Nevertheless, the progress recorded in democratic politics in Africa in recent times is not without its challenges and constraints. The relish and legacy of authoritarian practices loom large in many countries. Executive dominance, though in decline, remains ubiquitous as the use of discretionary power threatens the growth of democratic dispensations. Limited institutional growth and restraint also pose a challenge to political accountability. The

parliaments, judiciary, and opposition political parties-three important democratic institutions remain subordinated in many countries, with little capacity, resources and autonomous space. The institutions of horizontal accountability like the anti-corruption and human rights bodies, or audit departments, do not have the vitality or capacity for effective controls. Further, African politics have been characterized by fractured, disempowering of the majority, non-inclusive and sometimes violent, tribalistic, and religionist tendencies. Political impunity is still rampant (Bratton and Logan, 2014; Steven, 2015; Said, 2010). African states are more often attentive to the criticism they receive from international media or external public opinion than they do with their own constituents.

Politics is still perceived as a 'do or die' affair in which politicians and political parties stake virtually everything in the accumulation and retention of power. This makes elections a discounted value in promoting meaningful change in governance. Often the 'winner takes' all syndrome prevails and has been a causative of numerous political tension as recently cited by Raila Odinga, the Kenyan opposition presidential candidate in 2017 presidential election during the press conference he conducted with the media in Nairobi in the 27th November 2017. Negotiation of political power is associated with access to public resources (Steven, 2015). However, the rise and flourishing of civil society portends a good omen for democratic politics in Africa. The possibility of accountability from below is increasing by the day as citizens' demand for rights and opportunities (Bratton and Logan, 2014). Civil society claims and agitations, if consistent and sustained, may begin to reshape not only the character of politics but also the nature and essence of the state.

9.0 Conclusion

The discussion on the issues facing Africa in the 21st century demonstrates the magnitude of the underdevelopment phenomenon on the ground and the manner in which the situation has been crafted out by Africans themselves. Much as there seems to be a multitude of issues affecting the development of Africa, a few which have been discussed in the paper in the view of the various discourses are the most critical ones which require deliberate and sober political commitment above all to address. In spite of the visible progress reported above, state institutions and capacity remain weak and the democratic project remains fragile and reversible. Also, progress in controlling corruption remains poor because of weak institutional arrangement and infrastructure. In a number of countries, the vestiges of authoritarianism are still conspicuous as is evident from the reported cases of human rights violations, manipulation of elections and misuse of power of incumbency. In others, the press freedom and freedom of association and information and generalized political participation are circumscribed. With respect to African mannerism, it is abundantly clear that Africa has fallen short of intellectual relevance both theoretically and pragmatically, and thus, unable to respond to all kinds of problems affecting the communities. What is now conceived as apposite knowledge in Africa is found in the western mental bucket and libraries even when that route it has proved to be a failing developmental trajectory.

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The Paradox of Development in Africa in the 21st Century

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Abstract

The purpose of this analytical paper is an attempt to understand the challenges of development in the 21st century. Relying on literature and content review, the paper argues that multiple definitions of development, the shifting of the focus of development, multiple paths to development, to be told what to do, and attitude are the major challenges facing development in the 21st century. The paper concludes that each society should be allowed to define and develop organismically in response to its social institutions and structures.

Key words: Development, organismic, social institution, social structures

1.0 Introduction

This paper attempts to understand the concept of development and its challenges in the 21st century. Development is a phenomenon inherent in any society (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). The classical thinkers of development proceeding from the organismic analogy argue that development is an organismic process towards meeting needs and increasing choices of members of any society. From their arguments, the essence of development has also emerged and advanced explanations of what development should be for. A lot have been done to bring about development. However, down the road to the 21st century, the societies do not seem to be contented with what have been achieved blaming it on the challenges. This paper have identified multiple definitions of development, the shifting of the focus of development, multiple paths to development, to be told what to do, and attitude as the major challenges facing development in the 21st century.

2.0 Multiple Definitions of Development

The concept of “development” as of now seems to defy its prescribed definitions and associations (Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Bryant and White, 1982). Several attempts, particularly from the North have attempted to describe the concept of development as endeavors that resulted into the formulation of multiple definitions of the term which unfortunately, carry much of subjectivism and ethnocentrism rather than relativism.

Gilbert (2004) attempted to define the concept of development in the sense that it helps in the trace of the etymology, evolution, and use of the term. The concept of development was used to explain the natural growth of plant and animals. However, at that time, the scientists introduced the word evolution to connote development. Karl Marx (1967) expanded the use of the term development to cover the evolution of the society from simple to complex, and better condition. Since 1900 onwards, the word development had been transformed to express growth, evolution, maturation, favourable change, step from

simple to complex, from inferior to superior, from worse to better, and advancement towards desired goal (Gilbert, 2004).

The report of the South Commission (1990), produced under the chairmanship of the former Tanzanian President Julius Kambarage Nyerere defined development as a process which enables human beings to realize their potentials, build self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. It is the process which frees people from the fear of want and exploitation. It is a movement away from political, economic, or social oppression. Through development, political independence acquires its true significance. And it is a process of growth, movement essentially springing from within the society that is developing.

The *Human Development Report* (UNDP, 2016) published by the United Nations Development Programme defines development from the objective point of view. It states the objective of development as a desire to enlarge the range of people's choices to make development more democratic and participatory. The definition lists people's access to income and employment opportunities, education and health, clean and safe physical environment, enabling individual to have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and enjoy human economic and political freedom as important indicators/determinants of development (Rist, 2008).

On the other hand, Tayebwa (1992) defines development as a broad term which should not be limited to mean economic development, economic welfare or material wellbeing. According to him, development in general includes improvements in economic, social and political aspects of the whole society in terms of security, culture, social activities and political institutions. Along similar lines, Todaro defines development as a multi-dimensional process involving the reorganization and reorientation of the entire economic and social systems. He continues to argue that development is a physical reality and a state of mind in which society has, through some combinations of social, economic and political process secured the way of obtaining better life (Todaro, 1981: 56). Perroux (1978: 65) defines development as the combination of mental and social changes among the population which decide to increase its real and global products, cumulatively and in sustainable manner.

Expanding the definition, Rogers (1990: 30) adds that "development is a long participatory process of social change in the society whose objective is the material and social progress for the majority of population through a better understanding of their environment". However, Hettne (1995) and Rist (2008) discredit these efforts of defining the concept of development as not good enough to be called definition. They argue that these attempts cannot help one to separate developed society from non-developed society, rather, they can enable one to categorize the society which has either less or more of the same thing, let say schools, roads, currency reserves, average calorie consumption, cars, democracy or telephones but less of that illiteracy, cultural traditions, children per family, absolute poverty, time, skilled labour, while the other set has the reverse. With lack of precise definition, development has become a new religion and faith that people have to follow without asking many questions (Rist, 2008: 12).

The struggles to define development, inherent relativism and ethnocentrism in the endeavors to define development, present the biggest challenge to what actually development is.

3.0 Shifting Focus on Development: The Essence of Development

Todaro and Smith (2006) suggest that development has three aspects to focus on in the society. The first focus of development is life sustenance which deals with the availability of basic needs namely; food, clothing, shelter, health and education. The second focus of development is freedom of choice from hunger, deprivation and destitution. By Choice, Todaro and Smith refer to the expansion of the capacity to choose different life patterns and ways of living. The third focus of development is self-esteem which entails that development should be a source of pride and dignity of a person.

Todaro's and Smith's (2006) ideas echoes the belief held by Nyerere (1922 - 1999) and Gandhi (1869 - 1948) who argued that the essence of development is the society and not the materials. Gandhi further felt that the focus of the governments should not only be the society per se but also taking into account the point of view of the society in bringing about and organizing development. However, in the 21st century, this humanistic nature of development seems to be ignored, instead, the material nature of it is increasingly being adopted. Currently, development is seen from the point of view of economic growth measured by matrixes such as gross domestic product (GDP) and poverty reduction (Knutsson, 2009; Gale, 2008).

4.0 Multiple Paths to Development

The literature reviewed seems to suggest multiple ways that if followed could lead a society to development. The challenge out there is; which one is the right path to development and what are the criteria of selecting it? This paper refers to Biggart and Guillén (1999); Reyes (2001); Gale (2008) and Barkan (2017) who have identified organismic, modernisation, interaction, globalization and institution as a set of paths to development.

4.1 Organismic Path to Development

Organismic path prevailed from the beginning of development to date. It suggests that development is inherent in any society and comes naturally as it does in natural organism. This path suggests that with time, every society is capable of evolving from simple to complex and better condition. This path also entails that development is a natural process that expresses growth, evolution, maturation, favourable change, step from simple to complex, from inferior to superior, from worse to better, and advancement towards desired goal(s) (Gilbert, 2004).

4.2 Modernization Path to Development

This was advanced prominently from 1940s to 1950s. It ignored the organismic path of development besides being dehumastic. The path suggested the presence of the most advanced society which all societies had the duty to copy, imitate and try to be like it. The path forced other societies to stop the natural process of growth and advancement in order

to be like the self-programmed developed societies. The modernization proponents borrowed heavily from the classical evolutionary theorists such as Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857), Émile Durkheim (1859–1917), Herbert Spencer (1820 – 1903), and Ferdinand Tönnies (1855 – 1936), functionalist theorists such as Talcott Parsons (1902 – 1979) and Edward Shils (1911 – 1995), and conflict theorists such as Max Weber (1864 - 1920).

In his book “Economy and Society”, Weber (1921) was concerned about modernization. He noted correctly the hallmarks of modernization as rationalization, loss of tradition, and the rise of impersonal bureaucracy. He despaired of the impersonal quality of rational thinking and bureaucratization because he thought that it was a dehumanizing influence. No wonder, the implementation of modernization disregarded the important human aspect.

The period between 1940s and 1950s fits well with the presidency of Harry S. Truman, the 33rd President of the United States of America (USA). Sach (1992) held the view that the development we know today is in fact the process designed to make the world in the image of the United State of America (USA). The declaration is traced to Harry S. Truman, the 33rd President of the United States of America. In the same manner, the biblical phrase that recasts the creation of man states “Then God said, let us make mankind in our image, in our likeness” (Genesis 1:26). In his inaugural speech in 1949, Truman (33rd President of the USA) stated that:

... We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas’ ... (Rist, 1997 as quoted in Knutsson, 2009).

This USA policy is implemented by the international development agencies namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is concerned with promoting stability of the international monetary system, the World Bank which is concerned with promoting long term economic growth through aid and credit, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which is concerned with promoting international trade through tariff reductions (Knutsson, 2009).

4.3 Interaction Path to Development

This path which was promoted in succession between the 1960s and 2000s suggests that interaction among societies could lead to development. For example, the dependency interactions (1960s - 1970s) see development coming from the interaction between former colonies and their colonial master. In that interaction, there is an exchange of cheap raw materials from the former to the latter; and expensive finished goods and services from the latter to former. This assumption therefore suggests that more export of raw materials, and import substitution through industrialization in the former colonies signifies development.

The world system interaction (1980s - 2000s) suggests that economically, the world is unequally divided into three hierarchical layers consisting of core, periphery, and semi-periphery areas. These three layers are in unequal interaction. The core countries dominate

and exploit the peripheral countries for cheap labour and raw materials in exchange for expensive capital, goods and services. The inequality arises from the balances that the core gets from exchanging their expensive capital, goods and services with cheap labour and raw material of which they also set the prices. The world system theory suggests that for a country to develop, it has to have an upward mobility towards the core. This can only happen through a radical social and political change triggered by contra—contradiction.

The third interaction path to development takes a form of a market (1980 - 2000s). The market path blames underdevelopment to wrong pricing (Biggart and Guillén, 1999), state control (McGan, 2010 and Sach, 1993). McGan (2010) argues that in order for countries to develop, four changes must be implemented. The first change is the stabilization of fiscal and monetary systems to take control of inflation and attract foreign direct investments. The second change is liberalization of trade that allows the market forces and competition to set the prices of goods and services. The third change is privatization that allows the private ownership of property, and greater role played in the economy. The fourth change is institutionalization whereby the state establishes state controlled regulatory authorities for licensing and oversighting.

4.4 Globalization Path to Development

This path sees the world as one society; thus by a mere belief that the world is one unit and equal, all the societies become developed regardless of the existence of numerous differences. With regard to globalization, development is impeded by the inequality manifested in the world system, dependency and modernization. For a nation to develop, the path of globalization suggests that it has to eliminate all the barriers and allow free movement of labour, capital, goods and services in total disregard of the imminent comparative advantage.

4.5 Institutional Path to Development

Scott (1995, 2001) asserts that every society according to institutional perspective has social institutions and structures composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements. The social institutions and structures have isomorphism nature (ability to form and shape) that affects individuals and social organisation in a particular society. Any social action including the development process must observe, comply, and conform to social institutions and structures prevailing in particular society (Scott, 1995).

Biggart and Guillén (1999) assert that underdevelopment arises from the disregard of social institutions and structures of the society. The development (economic growth) can be attained if different actors and relationships are allowed to play their role. The proponents of each perspective on the path of development identify factors that are more likely to impede development than not. Moreover, they have put forward the possible solution and actors that can harness the potential and bring about the desired development. The institutional perspective tested in the comparative study conducted on the rise and development of the auto industries of South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina found out that neither a critical factor nor single path leads to economic development. The institutional perspective departs from these views of modernisation, dependency, world

system, market reform and globalization, by theorizing that institutional patterns of social organization enable countries to take different approaches to development (Biggart and Guillén, 1999).

5.0 Who has the Right to Tell Others What to Do?

Americans live in a free country. Unlike people living in many other nations in the world, Americans generally have the right to think and do what we want. That is, as long as we do not hurt anyone else; we can choose to go to college or not to go, we can be conservative or liberal, we can believe in a higher deity or not hold this belief, and we can decide to have a romantic relationship with whoever we want or choose not to engage in a relationship. We can make up our own minds on such issues as abortion, affirmative action, death penalty, gun control, health care, and taxes. We are individuals, and no one has the right to tell us what to do (as long as our actions are legal) or how to think. This belief which is widely held by the American contradicts the position held by Harry Truman (the 33rd President of the USA), which is expressed in his inaugural speech in 1949. On the other hand, American belief is widely echoed by the behavior and conduct of global development agencies. The World Bank being the leading agency claims to have the responsibility of helping underdeveloped countries by offering the loans and tailored knowledge and advice in all aspects of development. All suggest that the so called underdeveloped countries have been robbed of their right to follow their inherent path of development; and have been deprived any say in their modality of development. The robbery and deprivation are a challenge to development.

6.0 Attitude

This paper has also identified attitude as a challenge to development. The development has assumed the meaning advanced and proposed by the self-proclaimed North America and Western Europe and the rest seem to agree. Has the development brought the desired improvement that can help pick underdeveloped societies from the rest leaving the developed societies? The answer is more likely to be no other than yes.

Nothing serves this paper better than the observation made by Mahbubul Haq, the director of policy, planning and programme review with the World Bank who wrote in the preface of the World Bank Publication titled *First Things first: meeting basic human needs in the developing countries*. He stated:

... Judged by the usual yardsticks of economic growth, the development process of the past three decades was a spectacular, unprecedented, and unexpected success: it resulted in an annual increase of more than 3 percent in income per head in the developing world. Judged by even the normal measures of social development, the development process must also be labeled a success. Life expectancy at birth increased from only forty-two years in 1950 to nearly sixty years in 1980. But judged by the reduction of poverty, it was far less successful. The aggregate statistics quoted above hide tremendous disparities between nations and within nations. Overall economic growth and social progress did not mean much improvement in

the circumstances of the poorer segments of the population (Mahbubul Haq, year of publication as quoted in Streeten, 1982: vii).

From Haq's statement, it can be gathered that the development agencies' areas of focus were to increase per capita income, life expectancy, and poverty reduction. Whereas the success was recorded in per capita and life expectancy, the poverty remained a serious problem. The poverty was boldly stated in the inaugural speech of President Truman (the 33rd President of the USA), that launched the era of development in 19... President Truman believed that development of the underdeveloped nations was being impeded by poverty meaning that the logical approach will have tackled poverty in order to unlock the impeded potential. What is the verdict? The verdict is straight forward, target missed.

Fast forward in 2016, and 67 years on the road from President Truman's speech, USA, the founder and champion of the development project elected the 45th President. In his inaugural speech, President Donald Trump noted that America had no great school, Americans wanted great schools for their children; America had no safe neighborhoods, Americans wanted safe neighborhoods for their families; America had no good jobs, Americans wanted good jobs for themselves; Mothers and children in inner cities are trapped in poverty, and rusted out factories are scattered like tombstones across the landscape of the United States of America. With all big ideas of development, American education system although flushed with cash, it generates young and beautiful students deprived of all knowledge. In the midst of development, America and its people face high rate of crime, gangs and the drugs which deprive people of so much unrealized potential (POTUS, 20th January, 2017).

Is Tanzania far better? Tanzania got her independence in 1961. Many thanks partially go to the drive of decolonization lead by USA which was aiming at dismantling the colonialist Europe in order to gain excess to market and raw material from former colonies (Knutsson, 2009). Tanzania highlighted illiteracy, poverty, and disease as the big three enemies that ought to be fought and eradicated. In that effort, Tanzania was supported by its own resources, international aid, and loans to implement externally formulated policies (Hettne, 1995 and Knutsson, 2009). Fifty years on the road, Tanzania still faces the three big enemies. What does this tell? It tells that some of the underdeveloped countries have not been able to bring about the promised and desired development even after imitating and following to the dot what they have been told to do?

If we are in agreement with Todaro's and smith's (2006) suggestion that development is about life sustenance, freedom of choice, and self-esteem. What do homelessness, unemployment, and social inequality apparent in North America and Western Europe tell? What explains the inferiority complex observed from an African who sleeps in his self-built and owned traditional mud walled and grass thatched house against an American who owns no house and sleep in the street of New York? Who signifies self-esteem - an African who grows his own food or one American whose government is able to give him food rationing ticket? The answer is attitude and this is a development agent facing the world in the 21st century.

7.0 Conclusion

This paper concludes by stating that the failure to have no common definition of development; presence of many paths to development; deprivation of the right to decide how to develop and disregard the organismic nature of development; and attitude presents the challenges to development in the 21st century and beyond. This paper wishes to suggest that the solution to these challenges are as suggested by Reyes (2001) who stated that the term development is understood as a social condition within a nation, in which the authentic needs of its population are satisfied by the rational and sustainable use of natural resources and systems. This utilization of natural resources is based on a technology which respects the cultural features of the population of a given country. This general definition of development includes the specification that social groups have access to organizations, basic services such as education, housing, health services, and nutrition, and above all else, that their cultures and traditions are respected within the social framework of a particular country.

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Measurement of Social Inequalities in Developing Countries: Lessons from Africa

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Abstract

The study examined ways of measuring social inequalities in Africa where 31 countries were sampled from Africa. The data were obtained using documentary review method. Multiple regression models were used to analyse the data based on the macro-factors with which inequality as social phenomenon is expressed. The study found that the key determinants of poverty and inequalities in Africa are GNI per capita, government effectiveness, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) use, gender inequalities, FDI Net flows, political stability, ease to pay taxes and easiness to get credit in a country. The study recommends that the reduction of poverty should be determined by the increase in the use of ICT, effectiveness of implementation of MDG3, and restructuring of the micro-credit policy and outreaching the services to the rural and poor people, and effectiveness of the government.

Key words: *Social inequality, determinants of social inequality, Inequality-index,*

1.0 Introduction

Over the past two decades, one of the major efforts of African countries has been war waged to eradicate social inequalities as per standards set by Millennium Development Goals currently replaced by SDGs. The considerable literature shows that poor monitoring of MDGs in most of the developing countries (MDGR, 2015) is due to misunderstanding of the role played by the key determinants and features of inequality. It is a substantial step towards the understanding of vulnerabilities. Knowing the key determinants and features of inequalities which take place in the society enables planners, decision makers and implementers to escape an on-going dilemma in the context of Africa. The ideas and practices associated with inequality tend to change over time and space.

Inequality is one of the critical agendas that MGDs currently replaced by SDGs seek to address through policy making and strategies applied in every society. Their policies and strategies are not aligned to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, 2000-2015 currently replaced by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, 2015-2030). The MDGs report (2015) evidences that there is a persistence of the gender inequity in developing countries and big gaps exist between the poorest and the richest households, and between rural and urban areas. Millions of poor people still live in poverty and hunger, without access to basic services. The conflict remains the biggest threat to human development. The climate change and environmental degradation undermine the progress achieved, and poor people suffer the most. The report indicates that there is a larger disparity that remains in primary school enrolment and the poorest and most disadvantaged children bear the heaviest burden. The

policy and decision makers lack the *appropriate and effective monitoring strategies* of the MDGs. They lack empirical determinants and features that address social inequality in the context of Africa as a guideline and a directing tool to achieve the SDGs.

The impressive features as reported by empirical studies confirm that there is persistence of social inequalities in Africa (Kerr and Teal, 2014; Marrero and Rodriguez, 2012 and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010). Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem (2009) retard socio-economic growth and well-being in African countries. This paper establishes the empirical features and determinants of inequality in reflecting the African socio-economic well-being. Examining the determinants of social inequalities in Africa using the set of 48 countries, with the multiple regression model, it is established that population rate, inflation and external serving, low economic activities and gender discrimination are the key determinants of the poverty in Africa. Anyanwu (2013) examined the causes and effect of the inequality and economic growth in Africa and his research findings conform to the findings by the Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem (2009).

The trade openness, higher real capita GDP, income inequalities and low education expenditure are found to be the determinants of poverty in Africa (Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem, 2009). Sekhampu (2013), Anyanwu (2005) and Aker and Mbiti (2010) identify social inequality to be determined by aspects of the households head education, households size, employment age and low education in African countries. The study by Apata et al. (2010) on the investigation of the determinants of inequality in Nigeria reveals that limited access to micro-credit, education and gender discrimination tend to cause inequality in West Africa. Their study findings were supported by the study findings by Bogale, Hagedorn and Korf (2005), Iradian (2005), Geda, de Jong, Kimenyi and Mwabu (2005), Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), and Woolard and Klasen (2004) who argue that social inequalities are determined by the household size, credit market imperfection, low level of education and increase of income inequalities. Odedokun and Round (2004) examining the determinants of inequality among 35 African countries found that inequality is determined by political stability and fertility rate. It is evidenced that there is no direct evidence on private saving and taxation practices to influence the poverty level in Africa (Odedokun and Round, 2004). This finding is supported by the findings by Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003), Rupasingha and Goetz (2007), Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro (2007) and Naschold (2002) who affirmed the same in their analysis.

The study by Go et al. (2007) examined the determinants of inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa and concluded that unfavourable investment (risks) and FDI flow cause inequalities in Africa. The unfavourable investment contributes to continued lack of sustainable productivity, lack of profitable investment and low FDI net flows among the African counties. This causes unemployment and lack of management competence skills and technology that is created or accelerated by more FDI and Investment. The political stability and good governance will be likely to overcome poverty in Africa (Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou, 2007). Lopez and Perry (2013) examining the determinants of inequality in Latin America confirm that the higher inequality constitutes a barrier to poverty reduction. Furthermore, they found that inequality is a major determinant of crime and violence in Africa.

Geda (2006) examining inequality in Africa indicated that the transparency and openness of the government and the use of ICT are the determinants of inequalities in Africa. The ICT use increases the likelihood of the innovation and creativity so as to increase the productivity and entrepreneurial skills. Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits (2008) examining inequalities in South Africa found that the population growth, gender, house household structure and the age of the household are the determinants of inequality in Africa. The World Bank group (2013) examining the poverty in Tanzania confirmed that poverty is negatively correlated with higher education of the household head whereas internal migration is related to the level of economic growth.

Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013) examining inequality, economic growth and poverty in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) revealed that the government expenditure, population growth and flow of FDI increase poverty, and the domestic investment, trade openness and GNI per capita and income inequalities increase poverty in Africa. The increase of the government expenditures increases the consumption to saving, and this causes the hindrance of poverty reduction. The increase in the population growth will retard the poverty reduction since it will increase the government expenditure over saving. The domestic investment will be encouraged or preferred to the FDI as evidenced by Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013) and Ali, Mwabu and Gesami (2002).

The better access to rural credit and capacity building of the community based organisation in rural areas will reduce the poverty in rural areas in Africa (Binam *et al.* (2011). The access to micro-credit in African societies particularly in the rural areas will reduce poverty. It is claimed that poverty in rural areas is more acute than in urban areas. The cultural and gender inequalities, large household size, low education and political instability are found to be the causes of the poverty (Abebe and Quaicoe, 2014; Ikejiaku, 2009; Philip and Rayhan, 2004; Andersoon, Engvall and Kokko, 2006; Edoumiekumo, Karimo and Tombofa, 2013; Khalid, Shahnaz and Bibi, 2005; Oluoko-Odingo, 2009).

The technological and policy dependency are suggested to cause inequality in Africa. As it is evidence, the use of ICT in Africa, innovation and creativity are noticed to be low, and create high dependency on the technology and policy from the American and European countries. Andriopoutou and Tskloglou (2011) and Albert and Collado (2004) suggested that high political and technological dependency of the African countries are some of the causes of poverty. They lack innovation and creativity and they are forced to use the hired technology and have the opportunities for developing the technology they acquired.

The growth of GDP is also found to have the positive impact on reducing social inequality. The decrease of the GDP is likely to cause social inequalities (Vijayakumar and Olga, 2012; Edoumiekumo, Karimo and Tombofa, 2013). Malik (1996) examining the determinants of rural poverty in Pakistan found that participation rate, education attainment and female-male ratio and market and capital access are the determinants of poverty in Pakistan. This finding is supported by the study findings by Herrera, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2006) in Madagascar and Peru, and Ennin *et al.* (2011) in Ghana, Bahta and Haile (2014) in Eritrea. The study done in Nigeria (Asongwa, Okwocha and Umeh, 2012) on the investigation of the

determinants of the poverty among rural farmers and in Eritrea (Bahta and Haile, 2014), in Cambodia (Runsinarith, 2011) and in Nigeria (Ataguba, Fonta, and Ichoku, 2013) indicated that the less expenditure on education (primary education and secondary) and limit or less access to micro-credit accelerate the increase of poverty in Eritrea, Cambodia and Nigeria respectively.

In general, the literature explains more on micro-factors (individual level) of the country at the household level. The macro-factors such as economic growth, social, political and economic inequalities have not been given more attention by many researchers particularly in Africa. This paper attempts to address the determinants and features of poverty and inequality by examining the empirical, social, economic and political experiences in 31 African countries.

2.0 Material and Methods

2.1 Site Description and Sample Analysis

The study was based on 31 African countries which are predominantly poor. These include Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. They were sampled based on western region, southern region, north region, eastern region, horn of Africa and central region.

2.2 Data Collection and Analysis Methods

The study used the descriptive research design and quantitative approach in order to extract the facts from the practical reality in 31 African Countries. The data is extracted from the OECD Fact book, the World Banks and other national specific documents. The stepwise multivariate regression models were used to analyse the data.

2.3 Procedure

The process of selecting the documents to be reviewed for this study involved accessing the soft and or hard copies available in the field, checking their authenticity, credibility and evaluating them carefully. Indeed, the documentary review deemed useful to this study due to its advantages of providing vast information, cost-effective and provision of permanently available data. However, the use of this method for this study was challenging as there are many policy documents related to empirical determinants of poverty in the context of Africa with regard to macro-factors across each country.

3.0 Operationalization of Variables

3.1 Social-Inequality-Model

$(\vartheta, \rho, \eta) = c + b_1\alpha + b_2\beta + b_3\chi + b_4A + b_5\mu + b_6v + b_7\kappa + b_8\psi + b_9\omega$ where c is constant value whereby all the explanatory variables are at zero or equal to zero; b 's are intensity levels of the explanatory variables, that are either poverty; ϕ = Multidimensional Poverty Index; H = Poverty Headcount Index; Z = Poverty Gap Index; ϑ = GINI Coefficient; ρ = Female Participation Rate; η = Gender Inequality Index; α = Political stability index; β =

Government effectiveness; χ =Regulatory Quality Index; A =Rule of Laws index; μ =Ease to Start Business index; ν =Ease to Pay Taxes Index; κ =FDI Net Flows; ψ =Domestic Credit to Private; ω =Ease to Get Credit Index^{3.1}

3.1.1 Dependent Variables

3.1.2 Inequality Dependent Variables

3.1.2.1 GINI Coefficient: GINI index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (World Bank, 2010).

3.1.2.2 Female Participation Ratio: The participation rate is the ratio of the labour force (female) to the working age population. The labour force is defined as the sum of employed and unemployed people (OECD, 2013).

3.1.2.3 Gender Inequality Index: It measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development- reproductive health measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status expressed as labour market participation and measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older (UNDP, 2010).

3.2 Independent variables

3.2.1 Political Stability Index: It captures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010 and World Bank, 2010). **3.2.2 Government Effectiveness Index:** It captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010 and World Bank, 2010).

3.2.3 Regulatory Quality Index: It is the scaled ration on capturing the perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010; World Bank, 2010).

3.2.4 Rule of Laws Index: It is the ratio that captures the perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010 and World Bank, 2010).

3.2.5 Ease to Start Business Index: World Bank's Ease of Doing Business (Index) measures the business regulations of countries, worldwide, and examines the key factors that directly

affect each country's businesses, for example; business formation, operation, laws, challenges (World Bank, 2010).

3.2.6 Ease to Pay Taxes Index: The ranking of economies on the ease of paying taxes is determined by sorting their distance to frontier scores for paying taxes. These scores are the simple averages of the distance to frontier scores for each of the component indicators, with a threshold and non-linear transformation applied to one of the component indicators, the total tax rate. The threshold is set as the frontier for the total tax rate indicator. It is defined as the total tax rate at the 15th percentile of the overall distribution of total tax rate indicator for all years included in the analysis (Djankov *Et al.*, 2010).

3.2.7 FDI Net Flows: The World Bank defines foreign direct investment as the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 per cent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors. The data are in current U.S. dollars.

3.2.8 Domestic Credit to Private Sectors: According to World Bank, domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to private sector by financial corporations such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries, these claims include credit to public enterprises. The financial corporations include monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other financial corporations where the data are available (including corporations that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur costs such as those related to time and savings deposits). Examples of other financial corporations are finance and leasing companies, money lenders, insurance corporations, pension funds, and foreign exchange companies.

3.2.9 Ease to Get Credit Index: The ranking of economies on the ease of getting credit is determined by sorting their distance to frontier scores for getting credit. These scores are the distances to frontier score for the sum of the strength of legal rights index and the depth of credit information index.

3.2.10 GNI per Capita: GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the mid-year population. GNI is the sum of the value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI which is calculated in national currency is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptional large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions.

3.2.11 ICT Use Index: The ICT Use Index (IUI) is an index published by the United Nations International Telecommunication Union based on internationally agreed information and

communication technologies (ICT) indicators. This makes it a valuable tool for benchmarking the most important indicators for measuring the societal information. The IUI is a standard tool that the governments, operators, development agencies, researchers and others can use to measure the digital divide and compare ICT performance within and across countries. The ICT Use Index is based on 11 ICT indicators grouped in three clusters namely access, use and skills.

4.0 Results and Discussion

Table 1 shows the results of responses to hopes as obtained from each village surveyed. These results fit the test hypothesis H_1 ; which clearly demonstrates that actually there is no significance relationship between social inequality and international determinants set by MGDs currently replaced by SDGs.


Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the country specific characteristics

Total						
Variable	Count	N*	Mean	SE Mean	StDev	CoefVar
Political Stability Index	31	0	-0.420	0.154	0.855	-203.48
Government Effectiveness	31	0	-0.5735	0.0892	0.4964	-86.55
Regulatory Quality Index	31	0	-0.4955	0.0939	0.5227	-105.49
Rule of Law Index	31	0	-0.5455	0.0929	0.5175	-94.87
Ease to Start Business Index	30	0	0.3930	0.0417	0.2285	58.15
Ease to Pay Taxes	31	0	0.4190	0.0525	0.2922	69.74
FDI Net Flows	31	0	0.0310	0.00660	0.03675	118.77
Domestic Credit to Private	31	0	0.2647	0.0456	0.2537	95.85
Ease to Get Credit Index	31	0	0.4519	0.0517	0.2877	63.66
ICT Use Index	31	1	0.4320	0.0696	0.3812	88.24
Multidimensional Poverty Index	31	4	0.2895	0.0307	0.1597	55.18
Gender Inequality Index	31	2	0.5473	0.0168	0.0903	16.51
Female Participation Rate	31	0	60.71	3.74	20.84	34.33
Poverty Headcount Rate	31	2	39.40	4.10	22.09	56.06
GINI Coefficient	31	1	44.54	1.69	9.28	20.83
Poverty Gap Index	31	2	14.66	2.07	11.13	75.92

Source: Field Data (2015)

The social inequality measures are graphed in graph 1 (a) to show the graphical patterns in each sample country in Africa. The trend shows that in Tunisia, Egypt, Mozambique, Algeria and Sudan, there is less female participation ratio of which is due to cultural beliefs. Botswana, Namibia, Tunisia, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and Gabon are indicated to have minimal poverty gap index contrary to Zambia, Malawi, Rwanda, Kenya and Burundi which are indicated to have high poverty gap index (Graph 1.a).


Graph 1a: The graphical presentation of inequality measures in Africa



Source: World Bank (2010)

Graph 1(a) shows the graphical presentation of poverty and inequality in 31 African countries which were involved in the study. The graph shows the sampled countries with their respective indices of poverty and inequality. For more clarification, the area presentation of poverty and inequalities measures used in the study is presented in graph 1 (b). The graph shows the area covered-kurtosis of the respective indicator of both poverty and inequality [(Graph 1(b))]

Graph 1(b). The area presentation of the poverty and inequality measures in Africa



Source: World Bank (2010)

Graph 1 (b) shows the area graphical presentation of inequality measures to examine the simple kurtosis of the data sampled. The graph shows that the most shared variable by a group of country, for example, Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Kenya, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal and Cameroon have the same range of inequality. For example, the countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal reflect inequalities taking place in the western African region.

In the graphical presentation of some of the macro-factors for the sampled countries, the political stability index is very low in Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, Ethiopia, Burundi, Algeria and Zimbabwe. These countries have minimal government effectiveness but have high indices of the ease of paying taxes [(Graph 2 (a))]. Botswana is the country that is doing better in the government effectiveness, political stability, rules of law, ease of paying taxes and regulatory quality.

The hypotheses were tested statistically at 5 and 10 per cent levels of significance. The political stability index has a positive coefficient value of 9.018, *t-value* of 3.36 and the *p-value* of 0.006 in the poverty regression model, positive coefficient value of 5.978, *t-value* of 2.42 and *p-value* of 0.031 in the inequality regression models which were found to be statistically significant at 1 per cent level in poverty regression model. The *p-value* is less than 0.01 or 1 per cent. This implies that there is a strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis at this level of significance in the first pair of hypotheses. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the first pair of the hypotheses is rejected. That is, there is a significant relationship between poverty and political stability index at 99 per cent of confident level. Also, the hypothesis was found to be statistically significant at 0.05 or 5 per cent in the inequality regression model, since the *p-value* in inequality model is 0.031 which is less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the first set of the hypotheses is rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. That is, there is statistical evidence regarding relationship between inequality and political stability in African countries.

The government effectiveness index has a negative coefficient value of -0.13865, *t-value* of -2.27, and *p-value* of 0.038 in the inequality regression model which were found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is less than 0.05 or 5 per cent. This implies that there is a strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the second pair of hypotheses. That is, the alternative hypothesis is accepted at 95 per cent level of confidence. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between inequality and government effectiveness in Africa. The *p-value* of poverty is out greater than 0.05 levels of significance. Therefore, there is no strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis in poverty relations. That is, there is no relationship between poverty and government effectiveness in Africa.

The regulatory quality index in the poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.11152, *t-value* 1.56, and *p-value* of 0.38 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent of which implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the third pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and regulatory quality index.

The regulatory quality index in the inequality model has the negative coefficient value -10.94, *t-value* of -1.07 and *p-value* of 0.307 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 0.10 since the *p-value* is greater than 0.10. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the third part of the hypotheses pair is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between inequality and regulatory quality in a country.

The rule of laws index in poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.093, *t-value* of 1.02 and *p-value* of 0.320 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. Therefore, there is no strong evidence to reject the null hypotheses of the fourth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is no significant relationship between the rule of laws and poverty in Africa.

The rule of laws index in inequality regression model has the negative coefficient value of -5.161, *t-value* of -0.55 and *p-value* 0.590 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent of level of significance. It was found that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypotheses in the fourth pair of hypothesis. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between inequality and rule of law in Africa.

The ease of starting business index in the inequality regression model has the negative coefficient value of -5.942, *t-value* of -0.79, and *p-value* of 0.442 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 0.1 or 10 per cent of which implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the second pair of hypotheses. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the fifth set of hypotheses is accepted, and that there is no significant relationship between the easiness of starting business in the country and inequality in Africa.

The ease of starting business index in poverty regression model has the positive coefficient value of 0.140, *t-value* of -1.19, and *p-value* of 0.245 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level of significance since *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent. This evidences that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the fifth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is no significant relationship between poverty and easiness of starting business in African countries.

The ease to pay taxes index in the poverty regression model has the positive coefficient value of 13.889, *t-value* of 1.39, and *p-value* of 0.189 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent of which implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the sixth pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and easiness of paying taxes in the country.

The ease of paying taxes in the inequality model has the negative coefficient value -0.05904, *t-value* of -0.71 and *p-value* of 0.485 which are found to be statistically insignificant at 0.10 since the *p-value* is greater than 0.10. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the sixth part of the hypotheses pair is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between inequality and easiness of paying taxes in the country.

The FDI Net flows in the poverty regression model has a positive coefficient value of 0.379, *t-value* of 0.96, and *p-value* of 0.347 were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 10 per cent of which implies that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the third pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and FDI Net Flows in African countries.

The FDI Net Flows in the inequality model has the negative coefficient value of -248.03, *t-value* of -2.54 and *p-value* of 0.020 which were found to be statistically significant at 0.05 since the *p-value* is less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the sixth pair of the hypotheses is accepted. That is, there is a significant relationship between inequality and FDI Net flows in Africa.

The domestic credit to private sectors index in the poverty regression model has the positive coefficient value of 0.111, *t-value* of -2.72, and *p-value* of 0.010 which were found to be statistically significant at 10 per cent level. The *p-value* is equal to 10 per cent of which implies that there is a strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the seventh pair of the hypotheses. That is, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, there is a significant relationship between poverty and domestic credit to private sectors in Africa.

The domestic credit to private sectors index in the inequality model has the positive coefficient value of 0.05918, *t-value* of 0.95 and *p-value* of 0.358 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 0.10 since the *p-value* is greater than 0.10. Therefore, the null hypothesis in the third part of the hypotheses pair is accepted. That is, there is no significant relationship between inequality and domestic credit to private sectors in the country.

The ease to get credit index in poverty regression model has the negative coefficient value of -0.077, *t-value* of -2.57 and *p-value* of 0.017 which were found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is less than 5 per cent. Therefore, there is a strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the eighth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is a significant relationship between the easiness of getting credit and poverty in Africa.

The ease to get credit index in inequality regression model has the positive coefficient value of 31.93, *t-value* of 1.63 and *p-value* of 0.121 which were found to be statistically insignificant at 10 per cent of level of significance. It was found that there is no strong statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the eighth pair of hypotheses. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted. That is, there are no significant relationships between inequality and easiness of getting credit in Africa.

The GNI per capita in poverty regression model has the negative coefficient value of -0.000019, *t-value* of -5.54 and *p-value* of 0.0000 which were found to be statistically significant at 1 per cent level. The *p-value* is less than 1 per cent. Therefore, there is a strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis of the ninth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is a significant relationship between GNI per capita and poverty in Africa.

The GNI per capita in inequality regression model has a negative coefficient value of -0.0020128, *t-value* of -2.17 and *p-value* of 0.043 which were found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent of level of significance, since the *p-value* is less than 5 per cent of the significance level. It was found that there is no strong statistical evidence to accept the null hypothesis in the ninth pair of hypotheses. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. That is, there is a significant relationship between inequality and GNI per capita in Africa.

The ICT Use index in poverty regression model has a negative coefficient value of -0.298, *t-value* of -2.32 and *p-value* of 0.030 which were found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent level. The *p-value* is greater than 5 per cent. Therefore, there is a strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the tenth pair of hypotheses. That is, there is a significant relationship between ICT Use and poverty in Africa.

The ICT Use index in inequality regression model has the negative coefficient value of -0.15872, *t-value* of -2.69 and *p-value* 0.016 which were found to be statistically significant at 5 per cent of level of significance, since *p-value* is less than 5 per cent of level of significance, and it was found that there is no strong statistical evidence to accept the null hypothesis in the tenth pair of hypotheses. Therefore, alternative hypothesis is accepted. That is, there is a significant relationship between inequality and ICT Use in Africa.

4.1 Measurements and Determinants of Social Inequality in Africa

The study aimed to examine the ways of measuring social inequality in Africa by considering three aspects namely income inequality – (GINI coefficient), social and political inequality (gender inequality index) and the socio-economic aspects (female participation rate). The regression techniques were used to determine the determinants and features of inequality in Africa.

4.1.1 GINI Coefficient: Measure of Social Inequality and its Determinants

The income inequality in African countries was measured by using GINI coefficients in order to determine their determinants and features. The regression model was used to determine the features and determinants (Table 2).

Table 2: The regression analysis of GINI coefficient and macro factors of a country

The regression equation is

$$\theta = 30.8 + 5.98\alpha + 0.08\beta + 0.97\chi - 5.16A - 5.94\mu + 5.24v - 6.2\kappa + 5.29\psi + 15.1\omega - 5.40\pi + 5.9\eta + 0.046\rho + 0.000376 \text{ GNI} \dots\dots\dots (i)$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	30.80	22.77	1.35	0.199
Political Stability Index	5.978	2.471	2.42	0.031
Government Effectiveness Index	0.082	7.781	0.01	0.992
Regulatory Quality Index	0.974	9.960	0.10	0.924
Rule of Law Index	-5.161	9.337	-0.55	0.590
Ease to Start Business Index	-5.942	7.493	-0.79	0.442
Ease to Pay Taxes	5.240	9.095	0.58	0.574
FDI Net Flows	-6.19	47.81	-0.13	0.899
Domestic Credit to Private	5.292	7.592	0.70	0.498
Ease to Get Credit	15.142	8.271	1.83	0.090
ICT Use Index	-5.403	8.293	-0.65	0.526
Gender Inequality Index	5.87	27.98	0.21	0.837
Female Participation Rate	0.0456	0.1125	0.41	0.692
GINI Per Capita	0.0003763	0.0004165	0.90	0.383

S = 6.20978 R-Sq = 76.7% R-Sq (adj) = 53.4%

Analysis of Variance					
Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	13	1649.53	126.89	3.29	0.020
Residual Error	13	501.30	38.56		
Total	26	2150.83			

Source: Field data (2015)

Table 2 shows the regression analysis of the income inequality - GINI coefficients and their determinants and features. The table profile that has only one factor which is political stability index has a significant positive influence on the income inequality in African countries. The features of the income inequality in Africa are the result of an increase of the political stability in the country and increase in the GINI coefficient.

4.1.2 Gender Inequality Index: Measurement for Social and Political Inequality in Africa

Inequality in social and political aspects was measured in gender inequality index and the regression analysis was done in order to determine the determinants and features. The

study finding confirms that only the use of technology (ICT use) and government effectiveness are the key determinants for the social and political inequality in African countries (Table 3). The key features of the social and political inequalities in African countries are less or poor government effectiveness and less use of technology (use of ICT) in the country.

Table 3: Regression analysis of gender inequality and macro-factors of African Countries

The regression equation is

$$\eta = 0.566 - 0.0254 \alpha - 0.139 \beta + 0.112 \chi + 0.0105 A + 0.0545 \mu - 0.0590 v + 0.578 \kappa + 0.0592 \psi - 0.159 \pi - 0.000002 \text{ GNI} \dots\dots\dots (ii)$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	0.56646	0.05766	9.82	0.000
Political Stability Index	-0.02542	0.02186	-1.16	0.262
Government Effectiveness Index	-0.13865	0.06119	-2.27	0.038
Regulatory Quality Index	0.11152	0.07139	1.56	0.138
Rule of Law Index	0.01048	0.08783	0.12	0.907
Ease to Start Business Index	0.05446	0.06679	0.82	0.427
Ease to Pay Taxes	-0.05904	0.08267	-0.71	0.485
FDI Net Flows	0.5785	0.3498	1.65	0.118
Domestic Credit to Private	0.05918	0.06256	0.95	0.358
Ease to Get Credit	-0.00384	0.07252	-0.05	0.958
ICT Use Index	-0.15872	0.05892	-2.69	0.016
GNI Per Capita	-0.00000163	0.00000336	-0.49	0.633

S = 0.0588760 R-Sq = 75.5% R-Sq (adj) = 58.6%

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	11	0.170877	0.015534	4.48	0.004
Residual Error	16	0.055462	0.003466		
Total	27	0.226339			

Source: Filed data (2015)

Table 3 shows the regression analysis of the social and political inequality in African countries. The regression model was determined at 75.5 per cent at p-value 0.004 less than 0.05 levels of significance. The regression analysis was done at 0.05 or 5 per cent. The use of ICT and the government effectiveness influence the social and political inequality.

4.1.3 Female Participation Rate as the Measures of Socio-economic Inequality and its Determinants

The social economic inequality was examined to determine the determinants and features of the inequalities in African countries. The regression analysis was done on female participation rate and macro-factors of the sampled countries. The study findings revealed that GNI per capita and FDI Net flows are the key determinants of the socio-economic inequality in African countries. The key features of the socio-economic inequality are less GNI per capita and less FDI Net flows in the country (Table 4).

Table 4: Regression analysis of female participation and macro factors of African countries

The regression equation is

$$\rho = 81.4 + 4.59 \alpha - 6.1 \beta + 0.4 \chi + 9.7 A - 15.8 \mu + 3.8 v - 248 \kappa - 9.0 \psi + 31.9 \omega - 17.1 \pi - 0.00201 \text{ GNI} \dots\dots\dots (iii)$$

Predictor	Coef	SE Coef	T	P
Constant	81.38	15.39	5.29	0.000
Political Stability Index	4.588	5.850	0.78	0.443
Government Effectiveness Index	-6.11	16.48	-0.37	0.715
Regulatory Quality Index	0.43	18.21	0.02	0.982
Rule of Law Index	9.74	22.83	0.43	0.675
Ease to Start Business Index	-15.75	18.45	-0.85	0.404
Ease to Pay Taxes	3.83	20.61	0.19	0.855
FDI Net Flows	-248.03	97.57	-2.54	0.020
Domestic Credit to Private	-9.03	17.00	-0.53	0.602
Ease to Get Credit	31.93	19.62	1.63	0.121
ICT Use Index	-17.11	15.13	-1.13	0.273
GNI Per Capita	-0.0020128	0.0009266	-2.17	0.043

S = 16.8006

R-Sq = 59.4%

R-Sq (adj) = 34.5%

Analysis of Variance

Source	DF	SS	MS	F	P
Regression	11	7423.8	674.9	2.39	0.049
Residual Error	18	5080.7	282.3		
Total	29	12504.5			

Source: Field data (2015)

Table 4 shows the regression model of the female participation rate and the country's macro-factors. The model is determined at 59.4 per cent with p-value of 0.049 which is less than 0.05 level of significant.

The macro-determinants of political stability in the country reveal the negative influence on inequality. This implies that a country with a stable political stability is more likely to have low level of poverty and inequality. The study finding conforms to the findings by odedokun and Round (2004), Rupasingha and Goetz (2007), Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007), Ikejiaku (2009), Oluoko-Odingo (2009), and Addae-koronkye (2014) who found that the political stability does not favour inequalities. The political stability is associated with the good working and investment conditions that attract the economic activities and flows of the FDI in the country.

The government effectiveness has a negative influence on inequalities. The inequalities and poverty will be reduced by improving or increasing the government effectiveness in the country. The government effectiveness indicates the operational and administrative policies in the country. The study finding conforms to the findings by Adeyemi, Ijaiya and Raheem (2009), Anyannwu(2013), Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007), Geda (2006), Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013), Vijayakumar and Olga(2012), and Addae-Koronkye (2014) who found that the good governance practices and administration are negatively related to inequality.

Regulatory quality, rule of law and ease to start business are positively related to social inequalities and are found to be statistically insignificant. The increase of these factors causes the increase in poverty and reduces the inequality. The higher regulatory quality will increase the poverty but will reduce the inequality in the country. The poverty eradication will not be accelerated by higher regulatory quality. On the other side, the higher regulatory quality, rule of law and ease to start business will reduce the social and political inequalities. The literature does not explain these factors.

Easiness of paying taxes is insignificantly related to inequality negatively. It is indicated that inequality is accelerated by the low easiness of paying taxes. Therefore, the countries that are likely to pay more taxes are less poor and have less inequality. The FDI net flow is significantly related to inequality negatively and insignificantly positive with poverty. That is, the higher FDI Net Flows in the country it accelerates the poverty but reduces the inequality. This finding conforms to the findings by Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013) who found that FDI flow accelerates poverty in the country.

The increasing domestic credit to private sectors will increase inequality in the country. The provision of the domestic credit to private sector will encourage inequality. This needs more empirical investigation into this statistical conclusion.

The easiness to get credit in the country has negative relations to inequality but insignificantly related to inequality. That is, the country that has good legal and environmental opportunities to offer more and easier credit (micro-credits) to their citizen is more likely to reduce poverty and inequalities. The provision and establishment of micro-credit financing in rural and urban areas are the appropriate strategies that reduce inequality. This finding conforms to the study findings by Apata, Apata, Igbalajobi and

Awoniyi (2010), Iradian (2005), Binam et al. (2011), Bahta and Haile (2014), Asogwa, Okwocha, and Umeh (2012), and Runsinarith (2011) who revealed that favourable and conducive environment for accessing the credit or sometimes micro-credit foster inequality reduction in country. The micro-credit financing will be improved and regulated to allow the people to accumulate the seed capital and start the business or investments in education or other long term investment that will increase the household asset in the country. The micro-credit financing will reduce the income inequalities.

The use of technology (ICT Use) was found to have the negative influence on both poverty and inequality. That is, the higher use of ICT in the country accelerated less inequality. This finding indicates that the application of ICT in the country reduces inequality. This is true in that the innovation and creativity in the country foster the development and reduce inequality. The application of ICT in the country is geared at reducing the workforce and costs of production and increases the comparative advantage. This study finding is supported by the findings by Geda (2006) who confirmed that the application of the ICT will reduce poverty and inequality in Africa.

The GNI per capita is negatively related to inequality. That is, the higher GNI per capita reduces inequality. The increased GNI per capita will increase the income of the individuals and saving and investment for short and long term projects/investments. The income inequalities will be reduced by the increased GNI per capita in the country. This study conformed to the findings by Anyanwu (2013), Go, Nikitin, Wang and Zou (2007), World Bank Group (2013), Ncube, Anyanwu and Hausken (2013), Albert and Collado (2004) and Edoumiekumo, Karimo and Tombofa (2013), Vijayakumar and Olga (2012) who found that there was a negative effect of the GNI per capita and inequalities.

The gender inequality is found to be positively related to social economic inequality. The higher gender inequality increases the poverty and inequality in the country. The Millennium Development Goal 3 aims to promote gender equity and women empowerment as an appropriate goal to eradicate inequality in Africa. The promotion of gender equity and women empowerment will increase the women participation in the economy and reduce the gender inequality. This study finding conforms to the findings by Adeyemi, Ijaiya, and Raheem (2009), Apata, Apata, Igbalajobi and Awoniyi (2010), Naschold (2002), Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits (2008), Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), Abebe and Quaicoe (2014), Malik (1996), Oluoko-Odingo (2009), Marrero and Rodriguez (2012) who concluded that the gender discrimination decelerated the poverty reduction in African countries.

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendation

The results presented in this paper were a result of the investigation of the determinants and features of measuring social inequality in Africa. The general findings of the study revealed that the GNI per capita influences social inequality in negative ways. Also, the growth of the national economy accelerates the reduction of inequality in the country. The political stability contributes to the eradication of inequality in Africa. The country with stable political stability has more opportunities to eradicate inequality. The study also confirms that the ICT use and gender inequality have the negative influence on inequality. This means that the use of ICT and effective implementation of the MDGs will reduce

inequality in the country. The study also confirms that the easiness of the getting credit in the country and government effectiveness reduce inequality. Furthermore, it is evidenced that the higher inequality in the country hinders the reduction of poverty since inequality mediates the determinants of poverty.

It is recommended that social inequalities stemming from every sector of life should be addressed starting from the grassroots to the nation and entire continent. This has to deal with micro-credit policy to allow more rural people to have access to micro-loans. The national policy should be aligned with the MDGs, increase the GNI per capital, maintain the political stability, improve the taxation structures and administration to increase the easiness of paying taxes (reduction of tax aversion and avoidance). It should also monitor effective implementation of the MDG -3 to promote gender equity and women empowerment in order to achieve the MDG-1. The effective monitoring of the MDGs will foster poverty and inequality eradication in Africa and other developing countries.

The African countries should invest more in ICT use and application and reduce the technological dependency and increase the creativity and innovation. Since the female participation in some African countries is low, this should be recovered by increasing the female participation rate in political, social and economic issues.

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Endnote

1. Inequality is a broader concept than poverty in that it is defined over the entire population, not just for the portion of the population below a certain poverty line. It can either be relative or absolute. Relative inequality is about ratios whereas absolute inequality is about differences. For example, country X: two incomes \$1,000 and \$10,000 per year and country Y: these rise to \$2,000 and \$20,000. The ratio is not changed but the absolute gain to the rich is twice as large in country B. Most inequality measures do not depend on the mean of the distribution. This property of mean independence is considered to be a desirable feature of an inequality measure. Of course, inequality measures are often calculated for distributions other than expenditure - for instance, for income, land, assets, tax payments, and many other continuous and cardinal variables (Haughton and Khandken, 2009). Social inequality focuses on the distribution of attributes, such as income or consumption across the whole population. In the context of poverty analysis, inequality requires examination if one believes that the welfare of individuals depends on their economic position relative to others in society (Haughton and Khandken, 2009).
2. To address this cycle of inequalities in African countries, the determinants of social inequality should be well stated. The critical questions such as African cultural practices hinder inequality eradication in Africa as required by SDGs.
3. Inequity: syn. inequality, (i) sociological concept applied to describe different access to resources to live with in relation to members of society. (ii) a kind of treatment among social groups which is both unfair and unjust towards accessing resources and opportunities for better welfare. It is the concept applied to describe social condition of a society accompanied with tension, conflict, violence, injustice, oppression and exploitation usually built in social structures of the society. The types of inequalities include: Unequal opportunities, unequal political opportunities, unequal economic opportunities, unequal education opportunities, unequal access to social rewards, unequal access to education rewards, natural inequity, biological inequality and, power inequality

African Social Institutions Meltdown in the Era of Cultural-Globalization: Family and Marriage Institutions Diagnosed

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Abstract

It is almost axiomatic to state that marriage and family are two most fundamental institutions in Africa as it is in any other social organization given the vital roles they play. While the family is considered as the sociocultural manufacturing industry, training ground, foundation, cradle and basic unit of any social being, marriage is generally considered as a defining marker in the transition from childhood to adulthood and the dais for profound human fulfillment, procreation and societal stability and continuity. However, a plethora of literature, generally, suggests that their eminence has progressively been weakening and their functions melted down as a result of cultural globalization. This analytical paper that capitalizes on secondary data is set to clearly show the specific areas and manner in which the phenomenon has come about. The evidences from several parts of Africa indicates that, various social, cultural, and economic practices and values of the two institutions that were considered noble, grandiose and functional have progressively been eroded and in some way compromised by the dominant western cultural contents. The former in many ways surpasses the latter in terms of the context and contents within which African marriages and families are positioned, and therefore, should not be left to wither. The paper, therefore, calls for the African people not to stockpile and embrace every socio-cultural element prescribed by the western creed but selectively align with what contextually works for the betterment of the African societies.

Key words: Cultural globalization, Family, Marriage, African culture, Western culture

1.0 Introduction:

Cultural globalization is a subset of globalization both as a system and process (Nederveen, 2004; Robertson, 1992; Adinlofu, 2009). Sociologist Roland Robertson (1992:8) is considered a key founder of the concept of globalization, which he defines as “the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole”. Robertson provides an excellent overview of the historical development of globalisation. He argues that an interest in globalisation arose from a division between sociology, which dealt with societies comparatively, and international relations and political science, which dealt with societies interactively. However, as this division became destabilized, an interest in globalization developed as a result of the new academic fields such as communication and cultural studies.

Cultural globalization has recently become a key research field in the social sciences and continues to be a hotly debated topic. No single definition of cultural globalization exists; as with all core concepts in the social sciences, its precise meaning remains contested. For this discussion, the author will use Castells's definition of cultural globalisation, which "denotes the emergence of a specific set of values and beliefs that are largely shared around the planet" (Castells, 2009, p. 117). The source of most global informational flows is mass media. Traditionally, this entails a flow of information in a single direction (mainly from North to South) and dispersion from one cultural block to many. Throughout the developed world, the globalization of media is often argued to be tantamount to the globalization of culture. Indeed, cultural globalization is familiar to almost everyone. Prominent icons of popular culture like Coca-Cola and McDonalds are common examples that can be found almost everywhere in big cities. It is very unfortunate that such a trend has adversely affected African way of life because of its fragility and attempts to create cultural homogeneity across the globe (Sassen, 1991).

Clearly, African culture is not homogeneous, but there are sufficient commonalities (Hountondji, 1983; Appiah, 1987; Gyekye, 2006) to enable this paper to draw a common picture of what the family and marriage mean within this broad value system over a given period. Africa has existed as a continent even before the colonial era, with its own distinct cultural beliefs, values, norms and practices despite its multi-ethnic nature. The peculiar nature of the African culture is evidence in African's way of life depicted in marriages and family relationships, legal systems, religious, economic and political structures. These value structures or systems were used to ensure and promote an order of socialization and morality in the African society. The traditional culture and value system may not be perfect, but they serve the purpose of which they were meant to serve and kept the society moving without the rancour and disorganization experienced in the modern-day African society. Unfortunately, the eventual contact with western culture and civilization and subsequent upsurge of globalization are threatening to erode these well-established values and practices (Madukwe and Madukwe, 2012). Since then, the Africa's traditional culture, values and practices have withered and are still withering through well programmed western spells, storms and cultures that have pervaded through almost all facets of human life and activities. This does not imply that the diffusion of western culture spells a bad omen for Africa but, the argument here is that Africa had a culture which shaped the traditional African society economically, socially, legally and morally, and serves to maintain social order.

Attempting to completely condemn the western culture and globalization is not the intent of the author but simply that of encouraging Africans to sift or separate the 'kernel' from the 'husk'. This is because the place of the family of which the marriage is the pivotal foundation for the learning of cultural values is quite necessary. The transformation of African society towards modernity, westernization and globalization and its attendant social changes has greatly altered most African traditional institutions-one of such institutions being marriage and family system. Adinlofu (2009) asserts that the African practices, relevance and functions are being, socially disfigured by the intrusion of modern western values. This study, therefore, explores the manner in which

African conception of marriage and family has little by little been changing as a result of cultural globalization, the situation that has consequently weakened and prevented such institutions from discharging their cultural desired functions in Africa. The sharing of most cultural activities among the African countries give credence to the choice of this geographic terrain called Africa for analysis.

2.0 Methods

There is a vast quantity of secondary data on family and marriage which is available to the individual researcher. However, the sheer quantity of data available, and the fact that the data are collected and archived by many different individuals and public and private entities, means that the process of locating appropriate secondary data is complex and should be carefully done and scientifically followed to arrive at the most relevant, trustworthy, credible and defensible source. Despite the verity that there is no single process to be followed in every case (Thorne, 2004), this paper used the most typical way of using and analyzing the secondary data for research. As such, several steps were painstakingly followed as follows; (a) the research question was clearly defined which in this case is to establish the ways and manner in which cultural globalization has weakened the institutions of marriage and family in Africa (b) the nature of population this study was interested in, which in this case was the African (c) the period and range of data within which they were collected, which in this case was a mix of current and old data in an attempt to draw the difference between the sociocultural epochs (d) the decision on the nature of data needed, that is, whether qualitative or quantitative, and for this case the former was preferred over the latter because of the cultural subject nature (e) the decision on the nature of language used in communicating the data where English language was chosen over the other languages which might have affected the scope of the study. This challenge however was in many ways addressed by the fact that most of the studies conducted in non-English have been published in English language (Patton, 2000) (f) a list of data sets that contained information related to the research question and other aforementioned characteristics was collected and examined. The sources for this information include the websites, published reports, books, and both research and analytical based articles.

Further, the question of determining the original purpose of the projects that produced the data used in this paper was important because its influence may have been present in other characteristics of the data, from the population targeted to the specific wording of questions included in the methods of data collection (FGDs, IDIs etc). Because the author of this article was not involved in planning phases for the project whose data this study analysed, this information was important in order to place the data in context.

3.0 Theoretical Framework

There are two principal theories from which this paper will utilize in its lines of arguments; the cultural/media imperialism in which one culture dominates or is imposed on others and the hybridization in which new versions of culture emerge when different cultures come in contact with one another. In both types of theories, cultural

globalization is criticized on the basis that it is disseminating a homogeneous, hegemonic form of culture, reflecting the attitudes and values of western, particularly, American capitalist societies. In this paper, while the former serves to demonstrate the ways through which cultural globalization has dominated and neutralized African cultural values on marriage and family, the latter charts out the way forward and the manner in which Africa can still gain from exterior ideology

Cultural imperialism as a theory referred to the imposition upon other countries of a particular nation's beliefs, values, knowledge, behavioral norms and style of life (Salwen, 1991). Beginning in the 1960s, scholars argued that American culture disseminated in other countries constituted a form of cultural domination (Tomlinson, 1991; Laing, 1986). Scholars interpret certain types of culture as representing the interests of the powerful capitalist societies. The difference is demonstrated in the discrepancy in the power to disseminate culture between the industrial West and the developing world blocks. This nature of culture tends to propagate a one-sided western ideology while compromising the opposite (Laing, 1986). This system affects the survival of national cultural industries in smaller and weaker countries whose cultural goods are often unable to compete in their own countries with those that are distributed by international media conglomerates (Kellner, 1999). Transnational corporations (TNCs) can eliminate or decrease opportunities for the expression of indigenous cultures by substituting western media culture.

Cultural hybridization as a theory argues that cultural globalization is accompanied by a desirable outcome and the hybridization of national cultures, which Nederveen (2004) defines as "the ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new forms in new practices". According to this theory, hybridity may occur through 'global localization' or 'glocalization', in which a globally disseminated product is altered in order to fit the cultural outlook or tastes of people in a specific country or of members of a specific ethnic group within a country (Iwabuchi, 2002; Nederveen, 2004; Robertson, 1992).

The people who are exposed to foreign cultures are influenced selectively, depending upon the characteristics of their national or ethnic cultures, and are likely to integrate foreign elements with their own cultures as illustrated by Liebes and Katz's (1993) empirical studies of how the audiences in different countries belonging to different ethnic groups interpreted the television serial Dallas. Alternatively, people synthesize diverse cultural influences in their environment to produce distinctive hybrid cultural practices, institutions and meanings. Appadurai (1990) claimed that "the central problem of today's global interactions is the tension between cultural homogenisation and cultural heterogenization". This suggests that neither outcome dominates but both are taking place.

4.0 African Conception of Marriage

Marriage and family are two concepts in one which are at the center of any culture across the globe, especially in Africa. They are seen as the foundation of human

existence, honored and considered to be sacred because they were instituted by God himself which explains the copious attention accorded to it and the celebration that accompanies the final process of marriage. Marriage is a socially approved mating relationship that people expect to be stable and enduring. The family and societal expectations in marriage are high because a breakdown of marriage is associated with a widespread negative effect on the couple, children, extended family members and the society at large. The Africans have high respect for marriage and family values at all times and this creates the sacredness of this institution to the social functioning of individuals and society members. Despite various socio-economic, social, religious, political and cultural changes, the marriage and family institutions remain quite auspicious for society functioning. In the past, marriages conducted were strictly the responsibility of the extended family members as it did not only concern the couples-to-be, but outcomes of marriage contract were extended familial members concerns.

Marriage is simply defined as the union of a man and woman but more recently in western countries, the union of same sex persons (though quite controversial in most countries because it negates cultural and moral values according to some individuals and it is rather strange in the society and seen as a taboo in African cultural value system) is being accepted as a legal marriage. It solidifies relationships that enrich communities and nations by bringing forth new lives, new hopes as well as diffuse ethnic barriers that tend to prevent unity. This perspective of the African marriage underscores the reason for involvement of families and sometimes the entire community in the marriage processes of any intending couple. Marriage in Africa is seen as a cherished and most celebrated norm and rite of passage for male and female members of society (Bigombe and Khadiagala, 2003) and a fulfillment of parental obligations and roles as parents give out their children and also expect to receive new members or persons into the family. Some of the basic traditional African concepts in marriage before the influx of western culture were:

- a) Marriage was seen as an aspect of promoting cohesion and cementing of a bond between two extended families, compounds and communities. In most African communities, very close families or friends went into marriage engagement of their children immediately after they were born as a sign of bond in their friendship. This was the foundation of the concept and process of marriage contract and betrothal experienced in different African societies and cultures especially amongst the Igbo and Cross Riverians.
- b) In contracting marriage, it was not just the business of the couple but that of different extended families involved. Therefore, the consent of the family members must be sought and obtained. It was not just a two person affair but the entire family and sometimes the community was involved (Madukwe and Madukwe, 2012).
- c) Children were highly valued in African marriages. Practically speaking, the birth of a child marked the real consummation of a sustained marriage and crisis free marriage. So much were children valued that the marriage without children was

seen as a curse from the gods and it was a very good reason and strong enough for divorce or polygamy (Caldwell, 2012; Carter, 2015).

- d) Sex was treated as a sacred reality. Sex outside marriage was a taboo, hence, to engage in sexual activities as an unmarried couple or partner, especially the female partners in marriage, merited a curse and brought shame to the family. The virginity in the African tradition was held in high esteem. It attracted an increase in bride-wealth and reward to the mother of the bride. So sacred was the issue of sex that Burke (2010) wrote that, “even husband and wife within an African home are reserved in their behaviour before their children”. The public expression of any type of sexual familiarity was repugnant in the African value system and practice. This was also witnessed and emphasized among the Christian religious faith. These value systems had however suffered some degree of neglect as individuals no longer trust their partners’ productivity and libido level. So, they are encouraged to secretly or openly engage their partners in sexual activities to be sure of the partners’ qualitative nature (Carter, 2015).
- e) For Africans, marriage was one of the yardsticks for measurement of real men in the society (Kyalo, 2012). This explains the rites of passage carried out in some societies for young men and women matured enough for marriage as part of the initiation process into the institution of marriage. Example of one of this most valued aspect of the cultural process is the “Fattening Room⁴” (Oku, 2011)
- f) Polygamy was accepted and seen as a sign of wealth. Burke (2010) asserts that, so used were the women to a polygamous marriage that sometimes the marriage of a second wife is provoked by the first wife who urges her husband to take a second wife to help her in the farm work. The resultant effect is a large family with so many children, and each wife performing different tasks or responsibilities so as to sustain her position and secure a future for both herself and the children.

5.0 African Conception of Family

The family is the most basic trait of social organisation in Africa and indeed the globe in terms of socialisation, child upbringing, transfer of cultural activities and knowledge embedded in the process of socialisation. It is the traditional African institutions responsibility for the transmission of traditional norms and values, beliefs, knowledge and practical skills to the members of the society for their future survival, because the first point of interaction for any member or child for whatever reason is in the family. It is also the socio-biological unit that ensures orderly reproductive continuity of the human race (Ochalla-Ayayo, 2000). In a typical African perspective, the family is the cradle of

⁴ This is a custom practiced in most parts of Nigeria, the purpose of which is to seclude individuals from their customary duties and companions, feed them a variety of food and teach them new rituals and skills. The Fattening Room is used as a retreat prior to a major social change in a person’s life. This sort of cultural practice prevails in most parts of Africa but in different forms; Oku, M. (2011). Fattening Room: A Nigerian Tradition: www.esopefik.tripod.com.

human values and development. Broadly defined, it includes all the persons existing in an area or a group of people with common ancestors. This definition connotes an extended family system which is the pillar of African support system. However, in a more restrictive term, the family may refer to a smaller group consisting of the husband, wife or wives, the children and probably dependants that form a part of the household. As a result of society growth, development, change and continuity, there are current developments that create a unique picture and differentiation between African and other family systems in the globe today. The traditional African culture does not recognize a nuclear family structure but rather cherish and practice the extended family system whose membership include not only the man, his wife or wives and children but also blood relations of a common descent such as grandchildren, grand mothers and fathers, nephews, nieces, cousins and aunts (Madukwe and Madukwe, 2012).

An African becomes fulfilled in life only in relation to the fulfillment of other members of the family. Osonwa in Madukwe and Madukwe (2012) described the African family as “a system whereby everybody is linked with all the other members living or dead, through a complex network of spiritual relationship into a kind of mystical body. Consequently, it is not just being that the African values, being rooted in kinship are an equally important existential characteristic of the Africans” (Ibid: 46-7). He is never isolated since persons are assimilated into one parental role. A person is an individual to the extent that he is a member of a family, a clan or community.

The Africans cherish children and by extension large families which give individuals a sense of belonging, hence, this serves as the core factor for the sustainability of the extended family system until today despite prevailing socio-economic challenges in homes. Therefore, an African counts his blessings with regard to the number of children he or she has. This creates an inward satisfaction irrespective of one's social or economic status. The following are the types of African family structures being practiced in different parts of the continent: (a) nuclear family (b) extended family (c) single parental family (d) step family (e) matrilineal family structure (f) patrilineal family structure (g) monogamous family and (h) polygamous family structure.

Researchers have variously shown that these categories of the family systems mentioned above do not often exist as exclusive families but they have been influenced by social change and other factors, thus, at some point in society, they exist as combined or mixed level.

6.0 Neglect and Alterations in Family and Marriage Value Systems

6.1 Rites of Passage and Rituals

Most of the current studies suggest that there are enormous changes in the rites of passage among the African communities. These rites are carried out in order to prepare individuals to assume other higher roles in the community or society, which are seen as normal in the socialization process aimed at initiating young boys and girls who are matured into adulthood. The majority of the scholars further state that the rituals that are usually associated with the rites have been removed as a result of contact with the

West. For example, Oku (2011) cites the fattening process being one of the practices which have been eroded as a result of contact with the West.

... “In our growing up days, young girls are taken to particular houses which are labeled fattening houses and during this period, the young girl is massaged three times, fed well and gets plenty of sleep in order to increase the waistline. Most importantly, the girl goes through domestic training of home economics, like cooking, housekeeping, childcare and she is thought how to respect and make her husband to be and his family happy. The older women give advice base on their experiences in marriage to ensure that the young lady succeeds in her own. This period is accompanied with celebration and well-wishers are invited to come and rejoice with the family over her successful graduation to adulthood”... [2011:19]

Currently, the fattening room practice has been neglected and abandoned, thus, making it more difficult for the younger generation to learn this aspect of the society culture. The neglect and abandonment of such rites of passage for young girls and boys who are matured for marriage deprive the young ones of learning practical lessons from experienced elders of the community. Furthermore, it leaves them ignorant and ill-prepared for entrance into marriage. A score of scholars in African studies like Iwabuchi (2002), Madukwe (2012), Ocholla-Ayayo (2000), and Kyalo (2012) agreed that the neglect of this cultural practice is associated with the current upsurge in separation and divorce issues which are not part of African understanding of marriage. Some of these rites of passage have been hijacked by the different churches (in the name of modernity and Christianity) which in most cases do not teach the values of the African marriage that has sustained this institution. All participants agreed that prior to colonial contact; divorce was a rare issue in traditional African society, the sentiment which is also corroborated by Burke (2010) who asserts that divorce was almost nonexistent in traditional African societies. This finding is further corroborated by Ojua (2013), who associated the rareness of divorce issues in traditional African society prior to colonial contact to these rites of passage as well as parents spending ample time with their children and instilled in them the virtues of perseverance, hard work and submissiveness.

6.2 Choice of Marriage Partner

There was also the choosing of marriage partners by parents and relations for their children. This was a common practice among most individuals in the traditional African societies. The parents used this practice in order to ensure that children have someone to marry at a due time in life and also prior to that understand themselves as they grow together (Kyalo, 2012), and further reduces issues and incidents of separation and divorce. Some societies in Africa, for example, the Maasai in East Africa (Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda) and the Hausas of Northern Nigeria are still practising this rite, and hence, have been able to sustain minimal divorce rates. Furthermore, this practice is anchored on the traditional African belief that marriage is not an affair between two individuals only but instead an alliance between two families and in some small and close villages, it is a village affair. This position is in consonance with the findings by Iroegbu (2011) who revealed when a male among the Igbos males of Eastern Nigeria is ready to marry, his

family initiates the search for a bride and emphasis is placed on the would be bride's family social and illness background as a major yardstick for determining the suitability of a girl and likewise a boy.

The family involvement was very conspicuous right from declaration of intention to the ceremony. The process of marriage spanned through a long period of time accompanied with exchanging of several visits to the bride's home for negotiation. Also, the bride to be visits her husband's to be family several times where she related with her husband family. This process enhanced acceptability and understanding, thus, prevented the common in-law spouse conflict or rancour that has destroyed a lot of families today. The family involvements in marriage arrangement acted as a social support and security for African marriages. During the periods of material crisis that threaten to break such marriages, the family intervened in an effort to save the marriage. This is in consonance with Burke's (2010) view that the survival and stability associated with African families and marriages is linked to the concern and social support received from other family members.

The fact is, in most African societies particularly in the South of Sahara, this concept had been altered (Adinlofu, 2009; Burke, 2010; Baker, 2005; Kuper, 2002). The western culture of personal arrangement (of man meets a woman in a bus and love begins) with the concept that marriage is a union of two people joined together by love has over thrown the communal arrangement. This trend has resulted into break down in marriages with high rate of divorce as most families would not want to interfere for fear of being seen as intruders. Also, the long processes of negotiations have been taken over by the one day negotiation found among the urban dwellers that are always in a hurry to return back to town. Moreover, there is an economic connotation attached to this, as parents are in a hurry to give out their daughters to collect the cash handed down and to further relive themselves of the burden of catering for the child they are giving out for marriage.

Studies on family and marriage like those by James (2016), Burke (2010), and Bigombe and khadiagala (2003) hold that the norms of marriage in most parts of Africa are experiencing severe erosion as formal marriages are also giving way for informal marriages. This indicates that there is a high level of cohabitation. This sentiment corroborates that of Mawere (2010) who associated the commonality of this kind of arrangements with the educated and urban segments of the population. And hence, sex which once cherished and upheld its value is lost.

6.3 Sex

Studies further show that sex was particularly chastised outside wedlock because it was seen as sacred only to be practiced in marriage. Furthermore, the African conception of sex was geared towards procreation, religious and social uses and it is expected that sex is limited to married couples only. To ensure the sustenance of this deified arena, the taboos were sounded and violation attracted family shame and penalties. In fact, the genitals and buttocks are parts of the body most carefully covered and lack of coverage

constituted nakedness and moral violation (Kyalo, 2012). The findings, however, indicate that these cherished norms and values have been neglected today due to the influx of contrary values due to culture contact through the media and the learned values from western world. Of recent, therefore, nudity has become the new norm among young girls as indicated by Furstenberg *et al.* (2013) in his study “teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and child-bearing in Africa”

Further studies agree to the fact that virginity in traditional African society was held in high esteem so much that if a girl went into marriage as a virgin, the bride wealth that her suitor's family paid would be increased, and in some ethnic groups, the would-be bride's mother received gifts of cash and cows as tributes to her successful upbringing of the would-be bride and further earned her respect from her in-laws (Iroegbu, 2011; Vuyk, 2012). Today, such values and virtues are criticized and mocked at with the popular slogan of “women's right”. This has further weakened the cultural methods of placing restrictions on growing teenagers in terms of morality and sexuality as part of familial integrity and cultural discipline of African societies. The women are currently also given the right to freely express their sexuality like men.

The study carried out in 2012 in 48 African countries by Furstenberg *et al.* (2013) attributed this risky and free expression of sexuality behaviour on the part of women to women's inability to conceive because of the various abortions they may have carried out during their adolescent stage and in some cases the different types of untreated sexuality transmitted infections they may have contacted and unable to treat. Such risky and free expression of sexuality behaviour has contributed in the reduction of the fertility rate of African families and children are no longer seen as important and the primary reason for marriage in Africa.

6.4 Child Bearing and Family Planning

Child bearing in Africa is one of the fundamental attributes in defining a family (Madukwe and Madukwe, 2012; Ochalla-Ayayo, 2000). According to them, children secure conjugal ties, offer social security, assist with labour, confer social status, secure rights of property and inheritance, provide continuity through re-incarnation and maintaining the family lineage, and satisfy emotional needs. The parenthood, therefore, appears to have more and, arguably, deeper roots in African communities when compared to industrialized countries. It is from this backdrop the majority of male respondents in the aforementioned study stated that polygamy was the most cherished cultural practice in African society. Many children also meant a sign of wealth as it demonstrated the power and status of the head of the household. This practice has become a rarity particularly among African urban dwellers due to a number of reasons including modernization culture, socio-economic difficulties to meet pressing needs, liberal mockery, new civilization, and cognizance of women rights. This corroborates the findings by Bigombe and Khadiagala (2003) in a comparative study in Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania which showed that monogamous families that were once commonplace in African societies have almost vanished.

The fertility behavior in Africa, like other parts of the world, is determined by biological and social factors. Several factors have contributed to sustain relatively high levels of fertility in most of sub-Saharan Africa. These factors include high levels of infant and child mortality, early and universal marriage, early child bearing as well as child bearing within much of the reproductive life span, low use of contraception and high social value placed on child bearing (UNFPA, 2014). Moreover, in the face of perceived high infant and child mortality, the fear of extinction encouraged high procreation with the hope that some of the births would survive to carry on the lineage (UNFPA, 2014; James, 2016). Interestingly, it is also believed that Rwanda's birth rate is on the increase because Rwandans generally believe that it is their moral duty to replace the one million or so people who perished during the genocide in 1994.

The high value which is traditionally placed on marriage ensured not only its universality but also its occurrence early in life with the consequence that child bearing started early and in most cases continued until late into the productivity span. The institution of polygamy which sometimes promoted competition for child bearing among co-wives also contributed to sustaining high fertility. The use of modern contraception was traditionally unacceptable as it violated the natural process of procreation. The traditional long period of breast-feeding and postpartum abstinence guaranteed adequate spacing between the children and babies' welfare.

As a result of various campaigns and initiatives from both local and international organizations which in essence discourage women from bearing beyond four children, available evidence suggests that there have been changes in these socio-cultural factors over time, leading to unprecedented highly reduced pace of conceptions (UNFPA, 2014). Apart from discouraging women from bearing many children in Africa, modern contraceptive methods such as the use of oral pills and condoms amongst others have been endorsed and prodigiously promoted. Such methods have demonstrated various medical and psychological effects such as inter-menstrual spotting, nausea, breast tenderness, headaches, weight gain, mood changes, missed periods, decreased libido, vaginal discharge and visual changes with contact lenses (Kalipeni, 2014; Caldwell, 2012) amongst others.

The literature suggests that the tradition of spacing births was impressive in its historical antecedence. Long before the influx of Western ideas, the understanding of the importance of child spacing to maternal and infant health was widespread in these cultures. Despite the unavailability of modern contraceptive methods, an array of techniques was developed to enforce taboos on fertility behavior. Of course, there is no way to demographically document the effectiveness or even the prevalence of such contraceptive practice in the past. But the fact that these procedures had their roots in deep-set tribal traditions has indicated by many people, that they were not only widespread, but perhaps more effective than the current mish-mash of broken traditions and poorly understood innovations. The message from these surveys is that those introducing modern family planning methods must not ignore the inherent traditions of

child spacing that already exist, and must determine how to capitalize on that tradition to enhance both the acceptance and continual use of modern contraception.

For example, a study conducted in 52 African countries by UNFPA on “traditional methods of birth control” in 2013 identified the various measures falling into eleven general categories namely virginity, total abstinence, polygamy, withdrawal, medicinal plants, contraceptive rites, abortion, sending of wives to in-laws, mockery, separation of beds after getting birth, and prolonged breast feeding. The first three methods are essentially cultural inhibitions regarding intercourse. They were consistently reported by almost all tribes in the 48 regions visited, and apparently have had the greatest impact on fertility behavior. The other eight methods represent indigenous attempts at limiting or allowing intercourse without pregnancy, for which there is no basis for an accurate estimation of effectiveness. All these methods have now been demeaned on the pretext of inefficiency.

Besides, the socio-cultural and economic aspects that have made developed countries to suffer from low fertility rate have greatly in large part been celebrated in Africa, particularly, among the urbanites and the child-bearing population (age 15-49) (Kalipeni, 2014). For instance, there are several factors such as lifestyle factors, an increase in sexually transmitted diseases, rise in obesity, and environmental factors involved in urbanisation and urban lifestyle that are affecting fertility and have led to rise in male and female subfertility (UNFPA, 2014). In addition, other factors that have led to women and couples delaying having children or contributed to the current low fertility/birth rates include lack of affordable housing, flexible and part-time career posts for women, and affordable and publicly funded (free) child care (Caldwell, 2012, UNFPA, 2014; Kalipeni, 2014). Couples/women are delaying starting a family which has led to a true decline in their fertility levels due to ovarian ageing and related reasons leading to reduced chance of conception. This can result in a demographic economic paradox.

6.5 Changes in Family Form

In recent years, several family forms other than the traditional African family have evolved. Of these forms, single-parent families have been the fastest growing family lifestyles in Africa (Blaine and Chatelain, 2011; Dolan and Lown, 2005). Seventeen percent of African households are headed by single parents (Prosen and Farmer, 2012). This has become common scenery both among young urban females and rural young girls. This is again mostly associated with the prevalence of sexual decadence perpetuated by negligence of the African sexual values, increasing number of women who have joined the labour force, secular changes in educational status, occupational mobility of women and in some cases the decline of marriageable men and increase rate of separation and divorce as a result of acculturation from Western medias. These western ideologies have increase in the autonomy and status of women; hence, the trends of female headed households have escalated tremendously.

This is in line with the position of Ocholla-Ayayo (2000) who stated that most patrilineal societies in Africa seem to be changing to matrilineal system which was previously not

the case. Thus, the phenomenon of many single mothers heading large households is now accepted as normal. This has created a new movement of change called democratization and gender sensitivity, meaning women supremacy. The alteration and neglect of the African system of marriage and family has produced a myriad of social problems which are rapidly increasing on a daily basis. According to James (2016), Iroegbu (2011) and Vuyk (2012), such social problems include, single parenthood, separation and divorce, rape and HIV/AIDS, homosexuality and lesbianism, prostitution and crime, and child trafficking, child labour and child abuse.

Further changes have also been occurring in the age of getting married. The typical age at first marriage for men and women continues to rise as young adults postpone marriage until they are well into their twenties. The median age of marriage is 22 for women and 24 for men (Johnson, 2012). The adolescents have become more sexually active, resulting in a significant increase in the numbers of unintended teenage pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases.

There has also been a growing number of dual-income households in which both the father and mother are employed outside the home (Long and Long, 2005). Dual career couples, especially those with young and elementary school-age children, experience a complicated pattern of managing and allocating the precious resources of time, energy, and money within the family (Jorgensen & Haley, 2015). As a result, the children who are in school become "latch-key" children, mostly left to untrained and locally solicited housemaids or in their own self-care and supervision in the hours before parents return home (Hoffereth, 2009). Early adolescents need help in effectively dealing with the complexities and challenges of everyday life in a modern society, particularly, in terms of family living. Many parents see this need but because of lack of knowledge or sufficient time, they rely on outside specialists such as teachers to perform this task.

Another change in the families has been the increase in sexual activity among teenagers and teenage pregnancy. The young people are initiating sexual relationships earlier than they would ever have and are marrying much later than has been the custom. Thus, the risk of premarital pregnancy has risen sharply, resulting in some increase in abortion and elevated levels of out-of-wedlock childbearing among adolescents (Furstenberg *et al.*, 2013). An estimated 200 million teenage boys and girls (15-24 years) in Africa are sexually active (UN-DESA, 2015). Six hundred thousand illegitimate babies were born to girls between 15-18 years of age in between 1990-2014 (Blaine and Chatelain, 2016).

The change in the mode and content of socialization is yet another space less not to ignore. This is one area that has greatly been affected as a result of cultural-globalization. The sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and other students of human behavior have generally agreed on the importance of the social and developmental process they refer to as socialisation. The socialization process is one by which children learn the rules and regulations of their own family group, culture, and society. Within this framework, socialization is a process of assisting the child in acquiring the attitudes, skills, and knowledge needed to get along in that society (Harris and Liebert, 1984; McConnell, 1980). Socialization also refers to the learning of information, cognitive processes,

values, attitudes, social roles, self-concepts, and behaviors that are generally accepted or expected within one or many segments of society (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Dorr, 1982).

The major institutions most involved in the early learning process related to socialization have traditionally been the parents and family, school, and religious organizations. In addition, the peer group plays a role in the process as the child matures. Of these institutions, the agent that has the most influence on the learning process of children remains the parents and family who surrounds them. The parents or primary caregivers exert the most influence on the child because they serve as the models from which children receive positive reinforcement for their behavior as well as corrections of their actions when they fall outside of the values of the family unit and its broader cultural group. A set of connected relationships within such an environment provide the framework for young children's development. When relationships are predictable, responsive, and reciprocal, they help children break down the incoming stream of information from the outside world so that they can assimilate, understand, and trust it. The rhythms of close relationships with parents, siblings, extended kin, and other caregivers in the community support cognitive, social, emotional, language, and motor development in young children.

Cultural patterns of childrearing differ across time and place according to such macro-factors as climate, geography, demographics, economics, political systems, and technology, yet they are not too uniquely different in Africa. Indeed, underneath the variation, the care of infants and toddlers has many common features across cultures. This is because, except for their difference in mediums, modalities, and ways through which socialisation takes place a situation that creates a sense of heterogeneity, all societies desire their children to survive and thrive (Harkness and Super, 2002; Whiting and Edwards, 1988). Just to pick one simple case that demonstrates the typical inherent diversity is the way mothers take care of the young ones. For example, mothers are more likely than any other single individuals to feed, clean, hold, and interact with their infants, but how they do so varies widely. For example, patterns of cultural variation are seen in how much mothers carry and hold their babies during the day, where they put them to sleep at night, how early they wean them and how abruptly, whether they interact with them in a more distal and verbal or more proximal and kinesthetic style, whether and how they involve them in their daily work and leisure activities, what style of discipline and control they use, how much they play and interact with them face to face, how early they expect independent skills of hygiene, dressing, and feeding, and what kinds of politeness and mature behaviors are expected.

Currently, in Africa, the task and process of socializing children differs in principles and contents with what is offered in the developing countries. This was so to prepare them to face and solve the challenges of their political, economic, and social likings and not the imaginary domain. For them to survive, fit, and be functional to themselves and the society as a whole, mechanisms were put in place to serve as such. Although mothers were usually the primary caregivers of young children, they were not usually the

exclusive caregivers. Instead, the shared caregiving that extended the child's circle of consistent relationships was the norm. Sometimes these supplementary caregivers were family members, for example, fathers, grandparents, or siblings (Appiah, 1992; Gyekye, 2006). However, today, in many parts of Africa, particularly, in the cities where modernization is the norm, supplementary non-family caregivers or professionals are often employed to look after children either in their own or the child's home or in a group care setting (Castell, 2009; Carter, 2015). Researchers in social psychology, social work, and sociology have demonstrated that the household structure and composition is clearly a fundamental milieu in creating one's self. While many agree that when people live in extended families, with many close kin in the compound or in nearby courtyards, then grandmothers, aunts, and co-wives (women married to the same husband) often assist the mother in childbirth, supplementing socialization, and infant care, in contrast, the nucleate caregiving system offers an individualistic, unguided, and subjective platform which is often times porous and accommodative of whichever value that makes it jump and positivistically rewarding (Fouts, 2013; Hewlett and MacFarlan, 2010; Katz and Konner, 1981; Marlowe, 2000).

The mass media such as television can be a powerful teacher (Wright and Huston, 1995) whereby children can learn valuable lessons about racial harmony, art, creativity, cooperation, kindness, simple arithmetic and the alphabet through an educational television format. Some public television programs stimulate visits to the zoo, libraries, bookstores, museums and other active recreational settings, and educational videos can certainly serve as powerful pro-social teaching devices. However, in the era where the parents are pretty busy catching up with challenging schedule, they are thus unable to monitor and censor the content broadcasted or posted in their gadgets. As such, violence, drug abuse, inappropriate sexuality, individualism, and offensive language amongst others are the most common convincing content to most of the children among the urban middle and upper class families. The same experience has to a certain extent permeated the rural context whereas a result of rural electrification, educational tales, songs, and teachings are gently being overtaken by the western content in the form of movies, sports, soap-operas which do not in most cases offer solutions to their problems and do not mirror their life, experiences, effort, and therefore, inappropriate (Johnson et al., 2002; Dietz and Strasburger, 1991).

The content of indigenous education had much stress on the communal and social aspect rather than on an individual. This was done mainly to prepare boys and girls for adult life in households, villages and tribes (Mwanakatwe, 2014). The content of indigenous education had its paramount importance on the detailed knowledge of the physical environment and the skills to exploit it. It also had its stress on unity as well as understanding the rights and obligation of each individual in a particular society. The concept of togetherness would teach the indigenous people on how to live and work with others within the societies while the rights and obligations put in place the extent and limitations of individual rights. This was responsible for making sure that boys and girls understood what was required of them in a particular society. In its content, the indigenous education also included laws, moral principles obligation to ancestral spirits,

to relatives and to others in groups or tribe (Ibid: 28). It is from these lessons that children would learn to respect elders as well as pay allegiance to the spirits if they wanted their days of their lives to be extended.

Unlike the traditional African nature and contents of teachings, the western mode which is hinged on capitalism and liberalism creeds champion for self-containment, individualism, different ways, good and evil, of how to survive in a highly competitive society, where, each should strive to materially outshine the other (Ocitti, 2005) are taught and reinforced through popular culture and the media. Instead, the African teachings were valuable to both the individual as well as the society. An individual benefited in that the emphasis was much more concerned with instilling the accepted standards and beliefs governing correct behaviour. In addition, the indigenous knowledge did not encourage competitiveness in intellectual and practical matters, and instead, it created harmony and consensus among members in society. Thus indigenous education was not only concerned with socialisation of younger generation into norms, religion, moral beliefs and collective opinions of the wider society, it also laid a very strong emphasis on acquisition of knowledge which was useful to the individual and society as a whole (Kelly, 2009).

6.6 Respect and Obedience for Elders

If the African family has a single supreme value, it is probably fertility, rather than any equivalent of Confucian filial piety. However, respect for parents and seniority is central to social systems, in which lineages and age-groups are core features of the social structure, and deference to elders is a pervasive norm. Strict paternal and teacher discipline is also a frequent theme of the autobiographical literature (Kenyatta, 1938; Mandela 1994; Nkrumah 1957; Odinga 1967). True, these eminent gentlemen were children quite some time ago.

Although the norm of deference to parents is included in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, whose article 29 stipulates that everyone is obliged "to respect his parents at all times, and to maintain them in case of need", and should be taken as a valid social norm (Goolam 2008), unprecedented state of insolence among the children has been reported in Africa. According to the *United Nations World Report on Aging and Health* of 2015, for the first time, Africa has witnessed children physically abusing their parents under the pretext of self-defense and fighting for child rights, rocking them down to avoid embarrassment, not to mention the emotional and verbal abuses which have now grown into a norm. Such cases have been reported in almost all parts of Africa and their quantity is mounting by the day.

As it is articulated in all religious writings, human beings ought to prioritize their parents over all other elders and return their love, affection and kindness, and always be on guard against using any harsh tone or words towards their parents. African traditions teach children from a very early age to become and remain faithful and obedient to parents, this process enables the development of strong parent and child relationships through to adulthood. Should any situation arise when the behavior of one or both of

the parents become difficult, especially during old age, their children should never get offended and respond back rudely, nor express even the slightest bit of disgust or anger. Instead, the children should treat their parents with kindness and utmost respect. By doing so, not only will the children gain loving and affectionate prayers from their elderly parents, but they will also be reaping blessing. It is very important to understand why African traditions emphasize respect and obedience to parents. This is because they recognize the innumerable favours, sacrifices and hard work by parents to provide for their children's physical, emotional and financial needs in the best possible way. This is why traditions place great emphasis on the duties, rights and obligations not only on the relationship between the husband and wife and their relationship with their children as parents, but their relationship with their own parents too. In this way, life can be made blissful and rewarding for children, their parents, grandparents and grandchildren and future generations too (James, 2016; Carter, 2015; Oppong, 1971; Oheneba-Sakyi, 1999; Vuyk, 2012).

In most cultures, the children were trained from an early age to obey and respect their parents and other elderly members of the community. There is a wealth of ethnographic data showing different ways in which the young were taught to submit to the authority of the elders. Rattray (1956), for example, noted in respect of the Ashanti of Ghana that children were taught to honour and respect their elders and keep silent in their presence. Swazi children were trained to regard the father as the legal and economic authority in the home. They were taught from infancy to obey the father's word and even married sons were never regarded as free from his control (Kuper, 2002). Referring to Swazi traditions, Kuper noted that it was hard to convey the extent of the subservience of a Swazi son to his father:

... "He works for him, consults him in all his negotiations, refers to him as 'his head', takes legal oaths 'by father'. . . [Even married sons] as long as they live in his homestead they are expected to hand over to him whatever they may earn, and he may, if he wishes, give them back a portion" ... [2002: 71]

In societies where the age-grade system or generation classes were used to rank individuals and where initiation ceremonies were conducted to admit the youth into the lowest age-grade, the respect for the elderly began hierarchically with members of the preceding circumcision set right up to the retiring age-grade (Spencer, 2013; Ruel, 1958; Baker, 2005; Brantley, 2014; Turnbull, 1976; Gulliver, 2006). Through this hierarchical system, an individual grew up knowing the importance of submitting to the authority of seniors and simultaneously learning to expect similar obedience from others below him.

Yet, this education of the young generation ought to be seen mainly as a preparation for them to fit into an existing social and economic system which placed the elderly at the top, and thus, enabled the elders to build up their old-age security. Perhaps, the most significant source of security which kept the juniors loyal to this system was their control over strategic as well as scarce resources, such as land, livestock, essential skills and ritual powers. The elders often used these resources in a manner which ensured that the economically active members of the community remained bound to them.

One modernist would think that in such a system, the children's rights and justice were never served or ignored and neglected. This was never the case, in fact, the system landed a much more severe sentence to the parent or the elderly whose action intended to cause harm to those under their protection. Isolation, rebuke, mockery and removal of certain social, cultural and economic privileges were used as social control (James, 2016; Carter, 2015). These were regarded as the most functional modes of punishment to a social being whose life entirely depended on social, economic, and cultural milieu for survival and not otherwise. The hierarchy was always at the core of the justice system (Carter, 2015; Kuper, 2002, Gulliver, 2006). When grievances landed in the household, and more specifically, to those below the social ladder such as the children and wife, the structure beyond and above the wrongdoer was informed and the appropriate decree was justly determined. Mashanga and Lauren (2009) also had the following to comment on the same:

... "While grandfathers and grandmothers in some instances would present themselves as the comforters, they were Chief Justices of their communities representing a wider and hierarchical system of justice. Instead of the households' matter being taken to the higher authority, grandparents were entrusted to foresee and handle matters of their sons, daughters, and grandchildren. Therefore, in cases where the head of the household, presumably the father, mistreated his children and wife, the matter was taken to the grandparents (father's side) who were required to decide and handle the matter without any fear or favour"[2009: 111]

The reconciliatory nature of traditional justice systems and the types of judgments awarded were in many ways a reflection of the goal of restoring equilibrium and harmony in the community, and encouraging collective responsibility. The restoration was particularly important in intra-family disputes and other situations where the parties were in continued close contact with one another. The judgments also reflected the practical necessities of solving disputes in an effective manner, one which was satisfactory to the disputants and provided for the safety and security of the community. As traditional justice mechanisms normally did not distinguish between criminal and civil causes of action, but rather dealt broadly with what was considered to be a wrongful act in the community. Therefore, their judgments might have carried both punitive and compensatory elements.

Today, under the so called "children rights and protection" culture where the statutory prevails over the traditional mechanisms and the verity that the media, urbanism, and struggle for survival (poverty) are now dominating the sociocultural domain, the elderly have lost grip of their social and economic advantage and control (Kuper, 2002; Mashanga and Lauren, 2009; Carter, 2015).

While some western educationists such as Horowitz (2006) and Langford (1975/2011) and psychologists Rogoff (2013) and Kozulin (1998) have argued against such a parenting style and labeled it a "repressive parenting style" which hinders children's critical

thinking, ambitions, and dreams, other scholars from the same block such as Wertsch (2015) and Higgs (2007) refute this theory. They claim that many studies on children performance in school and beyond have in many ways demonstrated that children raised in such environments are more likely to succeed since success is an amalgamation of respect, hard work, determination, and endurance, the attributes that in essence underlie this style. In an attempt to breathe a life in the argument, Sayre (2009) uses an example of the 'stone-child' versus an 'egg-child' to drive the latter argument home:

... "In a circumstance where survival of the fittest is an order of the day....and survival options are very limited, except for the precarious social milieu; you can never expect a father to raise his children as eggs [...the way they wish...] that when wind blows they crack, but like a stone when earthquakes sing he shakes, bounces, and live"....[2009:119]

As a result of the diminishing power of elderly and respect, children have engaged in temporary and would be endeavors which possess face value and not intrinsic value. Most of these are prescribed by cultural globalisation with no regard of the context and the value they bring to recipients and society as a whole.

7.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper discussed the African traditional perspective of the neglect of marriage and family values. It identified some basic areas where the African marriage and family values, culture and practices have been altered or neglected as a result acculturation through cultural globalization. The argument in this paper is not to disregard the Western culture and some of the benefits inherent in them nor does the paper attempt to claim that the African concept, values or practices as far as marriage and family are concern are better, but rather, it argues that the traditional-cultural African attributes remain the best on the basis of the settings in which Africans found themselves. This is because they possess all the ingredients that can make marriages and families successful. Therefore, just like Kyalo (2012) had argued, Africans should not be in a hurry to give up their culture, rather, they should take only the "kernel" from the influx of ideas associated with marriage and family from the Western world and gladly throw away the "husk". It is worthy of note to explain in this paper that the concept of acculturation is a dual contextualization. Thus, Western and African family systems must interface each other to create conducive platform for operation and interaction.

This paper, therefore, recommends the following; The process of mate seeking and contracting of marriage should be taken seriously by African communities, families and individuals so as to add value and credibility to the institutions of marriage and family; Parents should insist on a gradual and steady but inquisitive process of courtship and mate seeking or selection during which time the seriousness of the lover's intention can be affirmed; The sacredness of marriage and sex should be upheld right from the early child rearing stage with parents as models to curb sexual indecency; The practice of rites of passage should be restored to prepare the young men and women transiting to adulthood. This will reduce the unpreparedness syndrome in the African society that has

recently made marriage a temporal union rather than a life time union; Extended family structure should be strengthened to help instill societal values to the young; and The value and cultural respect for child rearing pattern and upbringing should be given quality attention and consideration as the family morals inculcated in the children will determine the continuous upholding of marriage values and practices.

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